Practice Book Revisions

Superior Court

Rules of Professional Conduct

July 25, 2006

NOTICE

SUPERIOR COURT

Notice is hereby given that on June 26, 2006, the judges of the Superior Court adopted the Practice Book revisions which are contained herein.

These revisions become effective on January 1, 2007, except as follows: the revisions to Rule 1.15 of the Rules of Professional Conduct become effective on September 1, 2006; and new Sections 2-28A and 2-28B and new subsection (e) of Section 2-27 become effective on July 1, 2007.

The judges of the Superior Court also approved a technical revision to subsection (3) of Section 25-67 which is contained herein.

In addition, on June 26, 2006, the judges of the Superior Court voted to extend for a one year period commencing October 1, 2006, the revision to Section 1-10 that was adopted by them last June to become effective for a one year period commencing October 1, 2005. This revision concerns the possession by attorneys of certain electronic devices in court facilities.

Attest

Carl E. Testo

Director of Legal Services

INTRODUCTION

Contained herein are amendments to the Rules of Professional Conduct. These amendments are indicated by strikethroughs for deletions and underlines for added language. Amendment Notes to the Rules of Professional Conduct are also contained herein. The Amendment Notes are included for informational purposes only.

Also contained herein are amendments to the Superior Court rules. These amendments are indicated by brackets for deletions and underlines for added language. Commentaries to the Superior Court rules are also contained herein. These commentaries are included for informational purposes only.

This material should be used as a supplement to the Practice Book until the 2007 edition of the Practice Book becomes available.

Rules Committee of the		
Superior Court		

RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

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Preface

The Rules contained in the Rules of Professional Conduct as adopted by the American Bar Association and as recommended, with revisions, by the Connecticut Bar Association for adoption were approved by the judges of the superior court, effective October 1, 1986. The Commentaries following each Rule, as adopted by the American Bar Association and as recommended, with revisions, by the Connecticut Bar Association for adoption were approved in principle by the judges of the superior court, effective October 1, 1986. These Rules do not, however, exhaust the moral and ethical considerations that should inform and guide a lawyer, but simply provide a framework for the ethical practice of law.

Preamble: A Lawyer's Responsibilities

A lawyer, as a member of the legal profession, is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system and a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice.

As a representative of clients, a lawyer performs various functions. As advisor, a lawyer provides a client with an informed understanding of the client's legal rights and obligations and explains their practical implications. As advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client's position under the rules of the adversary system. As negotiator, a lawyer seeks a result advantageous to the client but consistent with requirements of honest dealing with others. As intermediary between clients, a lawyer seeks to reconcile their divergent interests as an advisor and, to a limited extent, as a spokesperson for each client. A As evaluator, a lawyer acts as evaluator by examining examines a client's legal affairs and reporting reports about them to the client or to others on the client's behalf.

In addition to these representational functions, a lawyer may serve as a third-party neutral, a nonrepresentational role helping the parties to resolve a dispute or other matter. Some of these Rules apply directly to lawyers who are or have served as third-party neutrals. See, e.g., Rules 1.12 and 2.4. In addition, there are Rules that apply to lawyers who are not active in the practice of law or to practicing lawyers even when they are acting in a nonprofessional capacity. For example, a lawyer who commits fraud in the conduct of a business is subject to discipline for engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation. See Rule 8.4.

In all professional functions a lawyer should be competent, prompt and diligent. A lawyer should maintain communication with a client concerning the representation. A lawyer should keep in confidence information relating to representation of a client except so far as disclosure is required or permitted by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law.

A lawyer's conduct should conform to the requirements of the law, both in professional service to clients and in the lawyer's business and personal affairs. A lawyer should use the law's procedures only for legitimate purposes and not to harass or intimidate others. A lawyer should demonstrate respect for the legal system

and for those who serve it, including judges, other lawyers and public officials. While it is a lawyer's duty, when necessary, to challenge the rectitude of official action, it is also a lawyer's duty to uphold legal process.

As a public citizen, a lawyer should seek improvement of the law, access to the legal system, the administration of justice and the quality of service rendered by the legal profession. As a member of a learned profession, a lawyer should cultivate knowledge of the law beyond its use for clients, employ that knowledge in reform of the law and work to strengthen legal education. A lawyer should be mindful of deficiencies in the administration of justice and of the fact that the poor, and sometimes persons who are not poor, cannot afford adequate legal assistance, and should therefore devote professional time and civic influence in their behalf. All lawyers should work to ensure equal access to our system of justice for all those who, because of economic or social barriers, cannot afford or secure adequate legal counsel. A lawyer should aid the legal profession in pursuing these objectives and should help the bar regulate itself in the public interest.

Many of a lawyer's professional responsibilities are prescribed in the Rules of Professional Conduct, as well as substantive and procedural law. However, a lawyer is also guided by personal conscience and the approbation of professional peers. A lawyer should strive to attain the highest level of skill, to improve the law and the legal profession and to exemplify the legal profession's ideals of public service.

A lawyer's responsibilities as a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system and a public citizen are usually harmonious. Thus, when an opposing party is well represented, a lawyer can be a zealous advocate on behalf of a client and at the same time assume that justice is being done. So also, a lawyer can be sure that preserving client confidences ordinarily serves the public interest because people are more likely to seek legal advice, and thereby heed their legal obligations, when they know their communications will be private.

In the nature of law practice, however, conflicting responsibilities are encountered. Virtually all difficult ethical problems arise from conflict between a lawyer's responsibilities to clients, to the legal system and to the lawyer's own interest in remaining an upright ethical person while earning a satisfactory living. The Rules of Professional Conduct often prescribe terms for resolving such conflicts. Within the framework of these Rules, however, many difficult issues of professional discretion can arise. Such issues must be resolved through the exercise of sensitive professional and moral judgment guided by the basic principles underlying the Rules. These principles include the lawyer's obligation zealously to protect and pursue a client's legitimate interests, within the bounds of the law, while maintaining a professional, courteous and civil attitude toward all persons involved in the legal system.

The legal profession is largely self-governing. Although other professions also have been granted powers of self-government, the legal profession is unique in this respect because of the close relationship between the profession and the processes of government and law enforcement. This connection is manifested in the fact that ultimate authority over the legal profession is vested largely in the courts.

To the extent that lawyers meet the obligations of their professional calling, the occasion for government regulation is obviated. Self-regulation also helps maintain the legal profession's independence from government domination. An independent legal profession is an important force in preserving government under law, for abuse of legal authority is more readily challenged by a profession whose members are not dependent on government for the right to practice.

The legal profession's relative autonomy carries with it special responsibilities of self-government. The profession has a responsibility to assure that its regulations are conceived in the public interest and not in furtherance of parochial or self-interested concerns of the bar. Every lawyer is responsible for observance of the

Rules of Professional Conduct. A lawyer should also aid in securing their observance by other lawyers. Neglect of these responsibilities compromises the independence of the profession and the public interest which it serves.

Lawyers play a vital role in the preservation of society. The fulfillment of this role requires an understanding by lawyers of their relationship to our legal system. The Rules of Professional Conduct, when properly applied, serve to define that relationship.

Scope

The Rules of Professional Conduct are rules of reason. They should be interpreted with reference to the purposes of legal representation and of the law itself. Some of the Rules are imperatives, cast in the terms "shall" or "shall not." These define proper conduct for purposes of professional discipline. Others, generally cast in the term "may," are permissive and define areas under the Rules in which the lawyer has professional discretion to exercise professional judgment. No disciplinary action should be taken when the lawyer chooses not to act or acts within the bounds of such discretion. Other Rules define the nature of relationships between the lawyer and others. The Rules are thus partly obligatory and disciplinary and partly constitutive and descriptive in that they define a lawyer's professional role. Many of the Commentaries use the term "should." Commentaries do not add obligations to the Rules but provide guidance for practicing in compliance with the Rules.

The Rules presuppose a larger legal context shaping the lawyer's role. That context includes court rules and statutes relating to matters of licensure, laws defining specific obligations of lawyers and substantive and procedural law in general. Compliance with the Rules, as with all law in an open society, depends primarily upon understanding and voluntary compliance, secondarily upon reinforcement by peer and public opinion and finally, when necessary, upon enforcement through disciplinary proceedings. The Rules do not, however, exhaust the moral and ethical considerations that should inform a lawyer, for no worthwhile human activity can be completely defined by legal rules. The Rules simply provide a framework for the ethical practice of law.

Furthermore, for purposes of determining the lawyer's authority and responsibility, principles of substantive law external to these Rules determine whether a client-lawyer relationship exists. Most of the duties flowing from the client-lawyer relationship attach only after the client has requested the lawyer to render legal services and the lawyer has agreed to do so. But there are some duties, such as that of confidentiality under Rule 1.6, that may attach when the lawyer agrees to consider whether a client-lawyer relationship shall be established. See Rule 1.18. Whether a client-lawyer relationship exists for any specific purpose can depend on the circumstances and may be a question of fact.

Under various legal provisions, including constitutional, statutory and common law, the responsibilities of government lawyers may include authority concerning legal matters that ordinarily reposes in the client in private client-lawyer relationships. For example, a lawyer for a government agency may have authority on behalf of the government to decide upon settlement or whether to appeal from an adverse judgment. Such authority in various respects is generally vested in the attorney general and the state's attorney in state government, and their federal counterparts, and the same may be true of other government law officers. Also, lawyers under the supervision of these officers may be authorized to represent several government agencies in intragovernmental legal controversies in circumstances where a private lawyer could not represent multiple private clients. They also may have authority to represent the "public interest" in circumstances where a private lawyer would not be authorized to do so. These Rules do not abrogate any such authority.

Failure to comply with an obligation or prohibition imposed by a Rule is a basis for invoking the disciplinary process. The Rules presuppose that disciplinary assessment of a lawyer's conduct will be made on the basis of the facts and circumstances as they existed at the time of the conduct in question and in recognition of the fact that a lawyer often has to act upon uncertain or incomplete evidence of the situation. Moreover, the Rules presuppose that whether or not discipline should be imposed for a violation, and the severity of a sanction, depend on all the circumstances, such as the willfulness and seriousness of the violation, extenuating factors and whether there have been previous violations.

Violation of a Rule should not <u>itself</u> give rise to a cause of action <u>against a lawyer</u> nor should it create any presumption that a legal duty has been breached. <u>In addition, violation of a Rule does not necessarily warrant any other nondisciplinary remedy, such as disqualification of a lawyer in pending litigation. The Rules are designed to provide guidance to lawyers and to provide a structure for regulating conduct through disciplinary agencies. They are not designed to be a basis for civil liability. Furthermore, the purpose of the Rules can be subverted when they are invoked by opposing parties as procedural weapons. The fact that a Rule is a just basis for a lawyer's self-assessment, or for sanctioning a lawyer under the administration of a disciplinary authority, does not imply that an antagonist in a collateral proceeding or transaction has standing to seek enforcement of the Rule. Accordingly, nothing in the Rules should be deemed to augment any substantive legal duty of lawyers or the extra-disciplinary consequences of violating such a duty. Nevertheless, since the Rules do establish standards of conduct by lawyers, a lawyer's violation of a Rule may be evidence of breach of the applicable standard of conduct.</u>

Moreover, these Rules are not intended to govern or affect judicial application of either the attorney-client or work product privilege. Those privileges were developed to promote compliance with law and fairness in litigation. In reliance on the attorney-client privilege, clients are entitled to expect that communications within the scope of the privilege will be protected against compelled disclosure. The attorney-client privilege is that of the client and not of the lawyer. The fact that in exceptional situations the lawyer under the Rules has a limited discretion to disclose a client confidence does not vitiate the proposition that, as a general matter, the client has a reasonable expectation that information relating to the client will not be voluntarily disclosed and that disclosure of such information may be judicially compelled only in accordance with recognized exceptions to the attorney-client and work product privileges.

The lawyer's exercise of discretion not to disclose information under Rule 1.6 should not be subject to reexamination. Permitting such reexamination would be incompatible with the general policy of promoting compliance with law through assurances that communications will be protected against disclosure.

The Commentary accompanying each Rule explains and illustrates the meaning and purpose of the Rule. The Preamble and this note on Scope provide general orientation. The Commentaries are intended as guides to interpretation, but the text of each Rule is authoritative. Commentaries do not add obligations to the Rules but provide guidance for practicing in compliance with the Rules. The Commentaries are sometimes used to alert lawyers to their responsibilities under other law, such as court rules and statutes relating to matters of licensure, laws defining specific obligations of lawyers and substantive and procedural law in general.

Terminology

"Belief" or "believes" denotes that the person involved actually supposed the fact in question to be true. A person's belief may be inferred from circumstances.

- "Consult" or "consultation" denotes communication of information reasonably sufficient to permit the client to appreciate the significance of the matter in question.
- "Firm" or "law firm" denotes a lawyer or lawyers in a private firm, lawyers employed in the legal department of a corporation or other organization and lawyers employed in a legal services organization. See Commentary, Rule 1.10.
- "Fraud or "fraudulent" denotes conduct having a purpose to deceive and not merely negligent misrepresentation or failure to apprise another of relevant information.
- "Knowingly," "known," or "knows" denotes actual knowledge of the fact in question. A person's knowledge may be inferred from circumstances.
- "Partner" denotes a member of a partnership and a shareholder in a law firm organized as a professional corporation.
- "Reasonable" or "reasonably" when used in relation to conduct by a lawyer denotes the conduct of a reasonably prudent and competent lawyer.
- "Reasonable belief" or "reasonably believes" when used in reference to a lawyer denotes that the lawyer believes the matter in question and that the circumstances are such that the belief is reasonable.
- "Reasonably should know" when used in reference to a lawyer denotes that a lawyer of reasonable prudence and competence would ascertain the matter in question.
- "Substantial" when used in reference to degree or extent denotes a material matter of clear and weighty importance.

AMENDMENT NOTES: The Terminology section originally immediately followed the "Scope" of the Rules of Professional Conduct. It has now been made a rule and numbered as such.

RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

Rule

1.0. Terminology

Client-Lawyer Relationships

Rule

- 1.1. Competence
- 1.2. Scope of Representation and Allocation of Authority Between Client and Lawyer
- 1.3. Diligence
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- 1.5. Fees
- 1.6. Confidentiality of Information
- 1.7. Conflict of Interest: General Rule Current Clients
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- 1.11. Successive Special Conflicts of Interest For Former and Current Government Officers and Private Employment Employees
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Rule

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Rule

- 3.1. Meritorious Claims and Contentions
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Rule

- 4.1. Truthfulness in Statements to Others
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Rule

- 7.1. Communications concerning a Lawyer's Services
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Maintaining the Integrity of the Profession

Rule

- 8.1. Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters
- 8.2. Judicial and Legal Officials
- 8.3. Reporting Professional Misconduct
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- 8.5. Jurisdiction Disciplinary Authority; Choice of Law

AMENDMENT NOTES: The paragraphs below originally appeared immediately after the Scope. They have been amended and moved and numbered as Rule 1.0.

Rule 1.0. Terminology

(a) "Belief" or "believes" denotes that the person involved actually supposed the fact in question to be true. A person's belief may be inferred from circumstances.

(b) "Client" or "person" as used in these Rules includes an authorized representative unless otherwise stated.

"Consult" or "consultation" denotes communication of information reasonably sufficient to permit the client to appreciate the significance of the matter in question.

- (c) "Confirmed in writing," when used in reference to the informed consent of a person, denotes informed consent that is given in writing by the person or a writing that a lawyer promptly transmits to the person confirming an oral informed consent. See subsection (f) for the definition of "informed consent." If it is not feasible to obtain or transmit the writing at the time the person gives informed consent, then the lawyer must obtain or transmit it within a reasonable time thereafter.
- (d) "Firm" or "law firm" denotes a lawyer or lawyers in a private firm, law partnership, professional corporation, sole proprietorship or other association authorized to practice law; or lawyers employed in a legal services organization or the legal department of a corporation or other organization and lawyers employed in a legal services organization. See Commentary, Rule 1.10.
- (e) "Fraud" or "fraudulent" denotes conduct having that is fraudulent under the substantive or procedural law of the applicable jurisdiction and has a purpose to deceive and not merely negligent misrepresentation or failure to apprise another of relevant information.
- (f) "Informed consent" denotes the agreement by a person to a proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has communicated adequate information and explanation about the material risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed course of conduct.
- (g) "Knowingly," "known," or "knows" denotes actual knowledge of the fact in question. A person's knowledge may be inferred from circumstances.
- (h) "Partner" denotes a member of a partnership and, a shareholder in a law firm organized as a professional corporation, or a member of an association authorized to practice law.
- (i) "Reasonable" or "reasonably," when used in relation to conduct by a lawyer, denotes the conduct of a reasonably prudent and competent lawyer.
- (j) "Reasonable belief" or "reasonably believes," when used in reference to a lawyer, denotes that the lawyer believes the matter in question and that the circumstances are such that the belief is reasonable.

- (k) "Reasonably should know," when used in reference to a lawyer, denotes that a lawyer of reasonable prudence and competence would ascertain the matter in question.
- (*l*) "Screened" denotes the isolation of a lawyer from any participation in a matter through the timely imposition of procedures within a firm that are reasonably adequate under the circumstances to protect information that the isolated lawyer is obligated to protect under these Rules or other law.
- (m) "Substantial," when used in reference to degree or extent denotes a material matter of clear and weighty importance.
- (n) "Tribunal" denotes a court, an arbitrator in a binding arbitration proceeding or a legislative body, administrative agency or other body acting in an adjudicative capacity. A legislative body, administrative agency or other body acts in an adjudicative capacity when a neutral official, after the presentation of evidence or legal argument by a party or parties, will render a binding legal judgment directly affecting a party's interests in a particular matter.
- (o) "Writing" or "written" denotes a tangible or electronic record of a communication or representation, including handwriting, typewriting, printing, photostatting, photography, audio or videorecording and e-mail. A "signed" writing includes an electronic sound, symbol or process attached to or logically associated with a writing and executed or adopted by a person with the intent to sign the writing.

COMMENTARY: Confirmed in Writing. If it is not feasible to obtain or transmit a written confirmation at the time the client gives informed consent, then the lawyer must obtain or transmit it within a reasonable time thereafter. If a lawyer has obtained a client's informed consent, the lawyer may act in reliance on that consent so long as it is confirmed in writing within a reasonable time thereafter.

Firm. Whether two or more lawyers constitute a firm within paragraph (d) can depend on the specific facts. For example, two practitioners who share office space and occasionally consult or assist each other ordinarily would not be regarded as constituting a firm. However, if they present themselves to the public in a way that suggests that they are a firm or conduct themselves as a firm, they should be regarded as a firm for purposes of the Rules. The terms of any formal agreement between associated lawyers are relevant in determining whether they are a firm, as is the fact that they have mutual access to information concerning the clients they serve. Furthermore, it is relevant in doubtful cases to consider the underlying purpose of the Rule that is involved. A group of lawyers could be regarded as a firm for purposes of the Rule that the same lawyer should not represent opposing parties in litigation, while it might not be so regarded for purposes of the Rule that information acquired by one lawyer is attributed to another.

With respect to the law department of an organization, including the government, there is ordinarily no question that the members of the department constitute a firm within the meaning of the Rules of Professional Conduct. There can be uncertainty, however, as to the identity of the client. For example, it may not be clear whether the law department of a corporation represents a subsidiary or an affiliated corporation, as well as the corporation by which the members of the department are directly employed. A similar question can arise concerning an unincorporated association and its local affiliates.

Similar questions can also arise with respect to lawyers in legal aid and legal services organizations. Depending upon the structure of the organization, the entire organization or different components of it may constitute a firm or firms for purposes of these Rules.

Fraud. When used in these Rules, the terms "fraud" or "fraudulent" refer to conduct that is characterized as such under the substantive or procedural law of the applicable jurisdiction and has a purpose to deceive. This does not include merely negligent misrepresentation or negligent failure to apprise another of relevant information. For purposes of these Rules, it is not necessary that anyone has suffered damages or relied on the misrepresentation or failure to inform.

Informed Consent. Many of the Rules of Professional Conduct require the lawyer to obtain the informed consent of a client or other person (e.g., a former client or, under certain circumstances, a prospective client) before accepting or continuing representation or pursuing a course of conduct. See, e.g., Rules 1.2(c), 1.6(a) and 1.7(b). The communication necessary to obtain such consent will vary according to the Rule involved and the circumstances giving rise to the need to obtain informed consent. The lawyer must make reasonable efforts to ensure that the client or other person possesses information reasonably adequate to make an informed decision. Ordinarily, this will require communication that includes a disclosure of the facts and circumstances giving rise to the situation, any explanation reasonably necessary to inform the client or other person of the material advantages and disadvantages of the

proposed course of conduct and a discussion of the client's or other person's options and alternatives. In some circumstances it may be appropriate for a lawyer to advise a client or other person to seek the advice of other counsel. A lawyer need not inform a client or other person of facts or implications already known to the client or other person; nevertheless, a lawyer who does not personally inform the client or other person assumes the risk that the client or other person is inadequately informed and the consent is invalid. In determining whether the information and explanation provided are reasonably adequate, relevant factors include whether the client or other person is experienced in legal matters generally and in making decisions of the type involved, and whether the client or other person is independently represented by other counsel in giving the consent. Normally, such persons need less information and explanation than others, and generally a client or other person who is independently represented by other counsel in giving the consent should be assumed to have given informed consent.

Obtaining informed consent will usually require an affirmative response by the client or other person. In general, a lawyer may not assume consent from a client's or other person's silence. Consent may be inferred, however, from the conduct of a client or other person who has reasonably adequate information about the matter. A number of Rules require that a person's consent be confirmed in writing. See Rules 1.7(b) and 1.9(a). For a definition of "writing" and "confirmed in writing," see subsections (o) and (c). Other Rules require that a client's consent be obtained in a writing signed by the client. See, e.g., Rules 1.8(a) and (g). For a definition of "signed," see subsection (o).

Screened. The definition of "screened" applies to situations where screening of a personally disqualified lawyer is permitted to remove imputation of a conflict of interest under Rules 1.11, 1.12 or 1.18.

The purpose of screening is to assure the affected parties that confidential information known by the personally disqualified lawyer remains protected. The personally disqualified lawyer shall acknowledge in writing to the client the obligation not to communicate with any of the other lawyers in the firm with respect to the matter. Similarly, other lawyers in the firm who are working on the matter should be informed that the screening is in place and that they may not communicate with the personally disqualified lawyer with respect to the matter. Additional screening measures that are appropriate for the particular matter will depend on the circumstances. To implement, reinforce and remind all affected lawyers of the presence of the screening, it may be appropriate for the firm to undertake such procedures as a written undertaking by the screened lawyer to avoid any communication with other firm personnel and any contact with any firm files or other materials relating to the matter, written notice and instructions to all other firm personnel forbidding any communication with the screened lawyer relating to the matter, denial of access by the screened lawyer to firm files or other materials relating to the matter and periodic reminders of the screen to the screened lawyer and all other firm personnel.

In order to be effective, screening measures must be implemented as soon as practical after a lawyer or law firm knows or reasonably should know that there is a need for screening.

CLIENT-LAWYER RELATIONSHIPS

Rule 1.1. Competence

A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.

COMMENTARY: Legal Knowledge and Skill. In determining whether a lawyer employs the requisite knowledge and skill in a particular matter, relevant factors include the relative complexity and specialized nature of the matter, the lawyer's general experience, the lawyer's training and experience in the field in question, the preparation and study the lawyer is able to give the matter and whether it is feasible to refer the matter to, or associate or consult with, a lawyer of established competence in the field in question. In many instances, the required proficiency is that of a general practitioner. Expertise in a particular field of law may be required in some circumstances.

A lawyer need not necessarily have special training or prior experience to handle legal problems of a type with which the lawyer is unfamiliar. A newly admitted lawyer can be as competent as a practitioner with long experience. Some important legal skills, such as the analysis of precedent, the evaluation of evidence and legal drafting, are required in all legal problems. Perhaps the most fundamental legal skill consists of determining what kind of legal problems a situation may involve, a skill that necessarily transcends any particular specialized knowledge. A lawyer can provide adequate representation in a wholly novel field through necessary study. Competent representation can also be provided through the association of a lawyer of established competence in the field in question.

In an emergency a lawyer may give advice or assistance in a matter in which the lawyer does not have the skill ordinarily required where referral to or consultation or association with another lawyer would be impractical. Even in an emergency, however, assistance should be limited to that reasonably

necessary in the circumstances, for ill considered action under emergency conditions can jeopardize the client's interest.

A lawyer may accept representation where the requisite level of competence can be achieved by reasonable preparation. This applies as well to a lawyer who is appointed as counsel for an unrepresented person. See also Rule 6.2.

Thoroughness and Preparation. Competent handling of a particular matter includes inquiry into and analysis of the factual and legal elements of the problem, and use of methods and procedures meeting the standards of competent practitioners. It also includes adequate preparation. The required attention and preparation are determined in part by what is at stake; major litigation and complex transactions ordinarily require more elaborate extensive treatment than matters of lesser complexity and consequence. An agreement between the lawyer and the client regarding the scope of the representation may limit the matters for which the lawyer is responsible. See Rule 1.2(c).

Maintaining Competence. To maintain the requisite knowledge and skill, a lawyer should keep abreast of changes in the law and its practice, engage in continuing study and education and comply with all continuing legal education requirements to which the lawyer is subject. If a system of peer review has been established, the lawyer should consider making use of it in appropriate circumstances.

Rule 1.2.. Scope of Representation and Allocation of Authority Between Client and Lawyer

- (a) <u>Subject to subsections (c) and (d), a</u> A lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation, <u>subject to subsections (c)</u>, (d) and (e), and, as required by Rule 1.4, shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued. A lawyer may take such action on behalf of the client as is <u>impliedly authorized to carry out the representation</u>. A lawyer shall abide by a client's decision whether to accept an offer of settlement of settle a matter. In a criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the client's decision, after consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial and whether the client will testify.
- (b) A lawyer's representation of a client, including representation by appointment, does not constitute an endorsement of the client's political, economic, social or moral views or activities.
- (c) A lawyer may limit the objectives scope of the representation if the limitation is reasonable under the circumstances and the client consents after consultation gives informed consent.
- (d) A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law.
- (e) When a lawyer knows that a client expects assistance not permitted by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law, the lawyer shall consult with the client regarding the relevant limitations on the lawyer's conduct.

COMMENTARY: Scope of Representation. Allocation of Authority between Client and Lawyer. Both lawyer and client have authority and responsibility in the objectives and means of representation. The Subsection (a) confers upon the client has the ultimate authority to determine the purposes to be served by legal representation, within the limits imposed by law and the lawyer's professional obligations. Within those limits, a client also has a right to consult with the lawyer about the means to be used in pursuing those objectives. At the same time, a lawyer is not required to pursue objectives or employ means simply because a client may wish that the lawyer do so. A clear distinction between objectives and means sometimes cannot be drawn, and in many cases the client-lawyer relationship partakes of a joint undertaking. In questions of means, the lawyer should assume responsibility for technical and legal tactical issues, but should defer to the client regarding such questions as the expense to be incurred and concern for third persons who might be adversely affected. Law defining the lawyer's scope of authority in litigation varies among jurisdictions. The decisions specified in subsection (a), such as whether to settle a civil matter, must also be made by the client. See Rule 1.4(a)(1) for the lawyer's duty to communicate with the client about such decisions. With respect to the means by which the client's

objectives are to be pursued, the lawyer shall consult with the client as required by Rule 1.4(a)(2) and may take such action as is impliedly authorized to carry out the representation.

On occasion, however, a lawyer and a client may disagree about the means to be used to accomplish the client's objectives. Clients normally defer to the special knowledge and skill of their lawyer with respect to the means to be used to accomplish their objectives, particularly with respect to technical, legal and tactical matters. Conversely, lawyers usually defer to the client regarding such questions as the expense to be incurred and concern for third persons who might be adversely affected. Because of the varied nature of the matters about which a lawyer and client might disagree and because the actions in question may implicate the interests of a tribunal or other persons, this Rule does not prescribe how such disagreements are to be resolved. Other law, however, may be applicable and should be consulted by the lawyer. The lawyer should also consult with the client and seek a mutually acceptable resolution of the disagreement. If such efforts are unavailing and the lawyer has a fundamental disagreement with the client, the lawyer may withdraw from the representation. See Rule 1.16(b)(4). Conversely, the client may resolve the disagreement by discharging the lawyer. See Rule 1.16(a)(3).

At the outset of a representation, the client may authorize the lawyer to take specific action on the client's behalf without further consultation. Absent a material change in circumstances and subject to Rule 1.4, a lawyer may rely on such an advance authorization. The client may, however, revoke such authority at any time.

In a case in which the client appears to be suffering mental disability diminished capacity, the lawyer's duty to abide by the client's decisions is to be guided by reference to Rule 1.14.

Independence from Client's Views or Activities. Legal representation should not be denied to people who are unable to afford legal services, or whose cause is controversial or the subject of popular disapproval. By the same token, representing a client does not constitute approval of the client's views or activities.

Services Limited in Objectives or Means. Agreements Limiting Scope of Representation. The objectives or scope of services to be provided by a lawyer may be limited by agreement with the client or by the terms under which the lawyer's services are made available to the client. For example, a retainer may be for a specifically defined purpose. Representation provided through a legal aid agency may be subject to limitations on the types of cases the agency handles. For example, Wenen a lawyer has been retained by an insurer to represent an insured, the representation may be limited to matters related to the insurance coverage. The A limited representation may be appropriate because the client has limited objectives for the representation. In addition, the terms upon which representation is undertaken may exclude specific objectives or means that might otherwise be used to accomplish the client's objectives. Such limitations may exclude objectives or means actions that the client thinks are too costly or that the lawyer regards as repugnant or imprudent. Nothing in Rule 1.2 shall be construed to authorize limited appearances before any tribunal unless otherwise authorized by law or rule.

Although this Rule affords the lawyer and client substantial latitude to limit the scope of representation, the limitation must be reasonable under the circumstances. If, for example, a client's objective is limited to securing general information about the law the client needs in order to handle a common and typically uncomplicated legal problem, the lawyer and client may agree that the lawyer's services will be limited to a brief telephone consultation. Such a limitation, however, would not be reasonable if the time allotted was not sufficient to yield advice upon which the client could rely. Although an agreement for a limited representation does not exempt a lawyer from the duty to provide competent representation, the limitation is a factor to be considered when determining the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation. See Rule 1.1.

An agreement All agreements concerning the scope of a lawyer's representation of a client must accord with the Rules of Professional Conduct and other law. Thus, the client may not be asked to agree to representation so limited in scope as to violate Rule 1.1, or to surrender the right to terminate the lawyer's services or the right to settle litigation that the lawyer might wish to continue. See, e.g., Rules 1.1, 1.8 and 5.6.

Criminal, Fraudulent and Prohibited Transactions. A Subsection (d) prohibits a lawyer from knowingly counseling or assisting a client to commit a crime or fraud. This prohibition, however, does not preclude the lawyer is required to give from giving an honest opinion about the actual consequences that appear likely to result from a client's conduct. Nor does The fact that a client uses advice in a course of action that is criminal or fraudulent does not, of itself; make a lawyer a party to the course of action. However, a lawyer may not knowingly assist a client in criminal or fraudulent conduct. There is a critical distinction between presenting an analysis of legal aspects of questionable conduct and recommending the means by which a crime or fraud might be committed with impunity.

When the client's course of action has already begun and is continuing, the lawyer's responsibility is especially delicate. The lawyer is not permitted to reveal the client's wrongdoing, except where permitted by Rule 1.6. However, tThe lawyer is required to avoid furthering the purpose assisting the client, for example, by drafting or delivering documents that the lawyer knows are fraudulent or by

suggesting how it the wrongdoing might be concealed. A lawyer may not continue assisting a client in conduct that the lawyer originally believed supposes is legally proper but then discovers is criminal or fraudulent. Withdrawal The lawyer must, therefore, withdraw from the representation, therefore, may be required of the client in the matter. See Rule 1.16(a). In some cases, withdrawal alone might be insufficient. It may be necessary for the lawyer to give notice of the fact of withdrawal and to disaffirm any opinion, document, affirmation or the like. See Rule 4.1.

Where the client is a fiduciary, the lawyer may be charged with special obligations in dealings with a beneficiary.

Subsection (d) applies whether or not the defrauded party is a party to the transaction. Hence, a lawyer should <u>must</u> not participate in a sham transaction; for example, a transaction to effectuate criminal or fraudulent escape <u>avoidance</u> of tax liability. Subsection (d) does not preclude undertaking a criminal defense incident to a general retainer for legal services to a lawful enterprise. The last clause of subsection (d) recognizes that determining the validity or interpretation of a statute or regulation may require a course of action involving disobedience of the statute or regulation or of the interpretation placed upon it by governmental authorities.

If a lawyer comes to know or reasonably should know that a client expects assistance not permitted by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law or if the lawyer intends to act contrary to the client's instructions, the lawyer must consult with the client regarding the limitations on the lawyer's conduct. See Rule 1.4(a)(5).

Rule 1.3. Diligence

A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.

COMMENTARY: A lawyer should <u>must</u> pursue a matter on behalf of a client despite opposition, obstruction or personal inconvenience to the lawyer, and <u>may</u> take whatever lawful and ethical measures are required to vindicate a client's cause or endeavor. A lawyer should <u>must also</u> act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf. However, a A lawyer is not bound, however, to press for every advantage that might be realized for a client. For example, Aa lawyer has may have authority to exercise professional discretion in determining the means by which a matter should be pursued. See Rule 1.2. A lawyer's workload should be controlled so that each matter can be handled adequately. The lawyer's duty to act with reasonable diligence does not require the use of offensive tactics or preclude the treating of all persons involved in the legal process with courtesy and respect.

A lawyer's work load must be controlled so that each matter can be handled competently.

Perhaps no professional shortcoming is more widely resented than procrastination. A client's interests often can be adversely affected by the passage of time or the change of conditions; in extreme instances, as when a lawyer overlooks a statute of limitations, the client's legal position may be destroyed. Even when the client's interests are not affected in substance, however, unreasonable delay can cause a client needless anxiety and undermine confidence in the lawyer's trustworthiness. A lawyer's duty to act with reasonable promptness, however, does not preclude the lawyer from agreeing to a reasonable request for a postponement that will not prejudice the lawyer's client.

Unless the relationship is terminated as provided in Rule 1.16, a lawyer should carry through to conclusion all matters undertaken for a client. If a lawyer's employment is limited to a specific matter, the relationship terminates when the matter has been resolved. If a lawyer has served a client over a substantial period in a variety of matters, the client sometimes may assume that the lawyer will continue to serve on a continuing basis unless the lawyer gives notice of withdrawal. Doubt about whether a client-lawyer relationship still exists should be clarified by the lawyer, preferably in writing, so that the client will not mistakenly suppose the lawyer is looking after the client's affairs when the lawyer has ceased to do so. For example, if a lawyer has handled a judicial or administrative proceeding that produced a result adverse to the client but has not been specifically instructed concerning pursuit of an and the lawyer and the client have not agreed that the lawyer will handle the matter on appeal, the lawyer should advise must consult with the client of about the possibility of appeal before relinquishing responsibility for the matter. See Rule 1.4(a)(2). Whether the lawyer is obligated to prosecute the appeal for the client depends on the scope of the representation the lawyer has agreed to provide to the client.

To prevent neglect of client matters in the event of a sole practitioner's death or disability, the duty of diligence may require that each sole practitioner prepare a plan, in conformity with applicable rules, that designates another competent lawyer to review client files, notify each client of the lawyer's death or disability, and determine whether there is a need for immediate protective action. Cf. Rule 28 of the American Bar Association Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement (providing for court

appointment of a lawyer to inventory files and take other protective action in absence of a plan providing for another lawyer to protect the interests of the clients of a deceased or disabled lawyer).

Rule 1.4. Communication

- (a) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information.:
- (1) promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance with respect to which the client's informed consent, as defined in Rule 1.0(f), is required by these Rules:
- (2) reasonably consult with the client about the means by which the client's objectives are to be accomplished.
 - (3) keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter;
 - (4) promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; and
- (5) consult with the client about any relevant limitation on the lawyer's conduct when the lawyer knows that the client expects assistance not permitted by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law.
- (b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.

COMMENTARY: Reasonable communication between the lawyer and the client is necessary for the client effectively to participate in the representation.

Communicating with Client. If these Rules or other law require that a particular decision about the representation be made by the client, subsection (a)(1) requires that the lawyer promptly consult with and secure the client's consent prior to taking action. See Rule 1.2(a).

Subsection (a)(2) requires the lawyer to reasonably consult with the client about the means to be used to accomplish the client's objectives. In some situations - depending on both the importance of the action under consideration and the feasibility of consulting with the client - this duty will require consultation prior to taking action. In other circumstances, such as during a trial when an immediate decision must be made, the exigency of the situation may require the lawyer to act without prior consultation. In such cases the lawyer must nonetheless act reasonably to inform the client of actions the lawyer has taken on the client's behalf. Additionally, subsection (a)(3) requires that the lawyer keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter, such as significant developments affecting the timing or the substance of the representation.

A lawyer's regular communication with clients will minimize the occasions on which a client will need to request information concerning the representation. When a client makes a reasonable request for information, however, subsection (a)(4) requires prompt compliance with the request, or if a prompt response is not feasible, that the lawyer, or a member of the lawyer's staff, acknowledge receipt of the request and advise the client when a response may be expected. Client telephone calls should be promptly returned or acknowledged.

Explaining Matters. The client should have sufficient information to participate intelligently in decisions concerning the objectives of the representation and the means by which they are to be pursued, to the extent the client is willing and able to do so. For example, a lawyer negotiating on behalf of a client should provide the client with facts relevant to the matter, inform the client of communications from another party and take other reasonable steps that permit the client to make a decision regarding a serious offer from another party. A lawyer who receives from opposing counsel an offer of settlement in a civil controversy or a proffered plea bargain in a criminal case should promptly inform the client of its substance unless prior discussions with the client have left it clear that the proposal will be unacceptable. See Rule 1.2 (a). Even when a client delegates authority to the lawyer, the client should be kept advised of the status of the matter. Adequacy of communication depends in part on the kind of advice or assistance that is involved. For example, in negotiations where when there is time to explain a proposal made in a negotiation, the lawyer should review all important provisions with the client before proceeding to an agreement. In litigation a lawyer should explain the general strategy and prospects of success and ordinarily should consult the client on tactics that might are likely to result in significant expense or to injure or coerce others. On the other hand, a lawyer ordinarily eannot will not be expected to describe trial or negotiation strategy in detail. The guiding principle is that the lawyer should fulfill reasonable client expectations for information consistent with the duty to act in the client's best interests, and the client's overall requirements as to the character of representation. In certain circumstances, such as when a lawyer asks a client to consent to a representation affected by a conflict of interest, the client must give informed consent, as defined in Rule 1.0(f).

AMENDMENT NOTES: That part of the above paragraph that begins with the words "Adequacy of communication" was a separate paragraph in the rules.

Ordinarily, the information to be provided is that appropriate for a client who is a comprehending and responsible adult. However, fully informing the client according to this standard may be impracticable, for example, where the client is a child or suffers from mental disability diminished capacity. See Rule 1.14. When the client is an organization or group, it is often impossible or inappropriate to inform every one of its members about its legal affairs; ordinarily, the lawyer should address communications to the appropriate officials of the organization. See Rule 1.13. Where many routine matters are involved, a system of limited or occasional reporting may be arranged with the client. Practical exigency may also require a lawyer to act for a client without prior consultation.

Withholding Information. In some circumstances, a lawyer may be justified in delaying transmission of information when the client would be likely to react imprudently to an immediate communication. Thus, a lawyer might withhold a psychiatric diagnosis of a client when the examining psychiatrist indicates that disclosure would harm the client. A lawyer may not withhold information to serve the lawyer's own interest or convenience or the interests or convenience of another person. Rules or court orders governing litigation may provide that information supplied to a lawyer may not be disclosed to the client. Rule 3.4 (3) directs compliance with such rules or orders.

Rule 1.5. Fees

- (a) A lawyer's fee lawyer shall be reasonable not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses. The factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following:
- (1) The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;
- (2) The likelihood, if made known to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;
 - (3) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;
 - (4) The amount involved and the results obtained;
 - (5) The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;
 - (6) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
- (7) The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and
 - (8) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
- (b) When the lawyer has not regularly represented the client, The scope of the representation, the basis or rate of the fee and expenses for which the client will be responsible, whether and to what extent the client will be responsible for any court costs and expenses of litigation, and the scope of the matter to be undertaken shall be communicated to the client, in writing, before or within a reasonable time after commencing the representation, except when the lawyer will charge a regularly represented client on the same basis or rate. Any changes in the basis or rate of the fee or expenses shall also be communicated to the client in writing before the fees or expenses to be billed at higher rates are actually incurred. This subsection shall not apply to public defenders or in situations where the lawyer will be paid by the court or a state agency.
- (c) A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the matter for which the service is rendered, except in a matter in which a contingent fee is prohibited by subsection (d) or other law. A contingent fee agreement shall be in a writing signed by the client and shall state the method by which the fee is to be determined, including the percentage or percentages of the recovery that shall accrue to the lawyer as a fee in the event of settlement, trial or appeal, whether and to what extent the client will be responsible for any court costs and expenses of litigation, and whether such expenses are to be deducted before or after the contingent fee is calculated. The agreement must clearly notify the client of any expenses for which the client will be liable whether or not the client is the prevailing party. Upon conclusion of a contingent fee matter, the lawyer shall provide the client with a written statement

stating the outcome of the matter and, if there is a recovery, showing the remittance to the client and the method of its determination.

- (d) A lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge, or collect:
- (1) Any fee in a domestic relations matter, the payment or amount of which is contingent upon the securing of a dissolution of marriage <u>or civil union</u> or upon the amount of alimony or support, or property settlement in lieu thereof; or
 - (2) A contingent fee for representing a defendant in a criminal case.
- (e) A division of fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm may be made only if:
- (1) The client is advised <u>in writing</u> of the compensation sharing agreement and of the participation of all the lawyers involved, and does not object; and
 - (2) The total fee is reasonable.

COMMENTARY: Basis or Rate of Fee. Subsection (a) requires that lawyers charge fees that are reasonable under the circumstances. The factors specified in (1) through (8) are not exclusive. Nor will each factor be relevant in each instance. Subsection (a) also requires that expenses for which the client will be charged must be reasonable. A lawyer may seek reimbursement for the cost of services performed in-house, such as copying, or for other expenses incurred in-house, such as telephone charges, either by charging a reasonable amount to which the client has agreed in advance or by charging an amount that reasonably reflects the cost incurred by the lawyer.

When the lawyer has regularly represented a client, they the lawyer and the client ordinarily will have evolved an understanding concerning the basis or rate of the fee and the expenses for which the client will be responsible. In a new client-lawyer relationship, however, an understanding as to the fee fees and expenses should must be promptly established. It is sufficient, for example, to state that the basic rate is an hourly charge or a fixed amount or an estimated amount. When developments occur during the representation that render an earlier estimate substantially inaccurate, a revised estimate should be promptly provided to the client. Generally, it is desirable to furnish the client with at least a simple memorandum or copy of the lawyer's customary fee arrangements that states the general nature of the legal services to be provided, the basis, rate or total amount of the fee and whether and to what extent the client will be responsible for any costs, expenses or disbursements in the course of the representation. A written statement concerning the fee terms of the engagement reduces the possibility of misunderstanding. Furnishing the client with a simple memorandum or a copy of the lawyer's customary fee schedule is sufficient if the basis or rate of the fee, and whether and to what extent the client will be responsible for any court costs and expenses of litigation is set forth. Absent extraordinary circumstances the lawyer should send the written fee statement to the client before any substantial services are rendered, but in any event not later than ten days after commencing the representation.

Contingent fees, like any other fees, are subject to the reasonableness standard of subsection (a) of this Rule. In determining whether a particular contingent fee is reasonable, or whether it is reasonable to charge any form of contingent fee, a lawyer must consider the factors that are relevant under the circumstances. Applicable law may impose limitations on contingent fees, such as a ceiling on the percentage allowable, or may require a lawyer to offer clients an alternative basis for the fee. Applicable law also may apply to situations other than a contingent fee, for example, government regulations regarding fees in certain tax matters.

Terms of Payment. A lawyer may require advance payment of a fee, but is obliged to return any unearned portion. See Rule 1.16 (d). A lawyer may accept property in payment for services, such as an ownership interest in an enterprise, providing this does not involve acquisition of a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject matter of the litigation contrary to Rule 1.8 (i). However, a fee paid in property instead of money may be subject to special scrutiny because it involves questions concerning both the value of the services and the lawyer's special knowledge of the value of the property the requirements of Rule 1.8(a) because such fees often have the essential qualities of a business transaction with the client.

An agreement may not be made whose terms might induce the lawyer improperly to curtail services for the client or perform them in a way contrary to the client's interest. For example, a lawyer should not enter into an agreement whereby services are to be provided only up to a stated amount when it is foreseeable that more extensive services probably will be required, unless the situation is adequately explained to the client. Otherwise, the client might have to bargain for further assistance in the midst of a proceeding or transaction. However, it is proper to define the extent of services in light of the client's ability to pay. A lawyer should not exploit a fee arrangement based primarily on hourly charges by using wasteful procedures. When there is doubt whether a contingent fee is consistent with the client's

best interest, the lawyer should offer the client alternative bases for the fee and explain their implications. Applicable law may impose limitations on contingent fees, such as a ceiling on the percentage.

Prohibited Contingent Fees. Subsection (d) prohibits a lawyer from charging a contingent fee in a domestic relations matter when payment is contingent upon the securing of a divorce or upon the amount of alimony or support or property settlement to be obtained. This provision does not preclude a contract for a contingent fee for legal representation in connection with the recovery of post-judgment balances due under support, alimony or other financial orders because such contracts do not implicate the same policy concerns.

Division of Fee. A division of fee is a single billing to a client covering the fee of two or more lawyers who are not in the same firm. A division of fee facilitates association of more than one lawyer in a matter in which neither alone could serve the client as well, and most often is used when the fee is contingent and the division is between a referring lawyer and a trial specialist. Contingent fee agreements must be in writing signed by the client and must otherwise comply with subsection (c) of this Rule. A lawyer should only refer a matter to a lawyer whom the referring lawyer reasonably believes is competent to handle the matter. See Rule 1.1.

Subsection (e) does not prohibit or regulate divisions of fees to be received in the future for work done when lawyers were previously associated in a law firm.

Disputes over Fees. If an arbitration or mediation procedure such as that in Practice Book Section 2-32(a)(3) has been established for resolution of fee disputes, such as an arbitration or mediation procedure established by the bar, the lawyer must comply with the procedure when it is mandatory, and, even when it is voluntary, the lawyer should conscientiously consider submitting to it. Law may prescribe a procedure for determining a lawyer's fee, for example, in representation of an executor or administrator, a class or a person entitled to a reasonable fee as part of the measure of damages. The lawyer entitled to such a fee and a lawyer representing another party concerned with the fee should comply with the prescribed procedure.

Rule 1.6. Confidentiality of Information

- (a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent, the disclosure is consents after consultation, except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation, and except as stated in subsections (a), (b), (c), and (d) or the disclosure is permitted by subsection (b), (c), or (d).
- (b) A lawyer shall reveal such information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent the client from committing a criminal <u>or fraudulent</u> act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm.
- (c) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to:
- (1) Prevent the client from committing a criminal <u>or fraudulent</u> act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in substantial injury to the financial interest or property of another;
- (2) <u>Prevent, mitigate or rRectify</u> the consequence of a client's criminal or fraudulent act in the commission of which the lawyer's services had been used.
 - (3) Secure legal advice about the lawyer's compliance with these Rules;
 - (4) Comply with other law or a court order.
- (d) A lawyer may reveal such information to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of the client.

COMMENTARY: This Rule governs the disclosure by a lawyer of information relating to the representation of a client during the lawyer's representation of the client. See Rule 1.18 for the lawyer's duties with respect to information provided to the lawyer by a prospective client, Rule 1.9(c)(2) for the lawyer's duty not to reveal information relating to the lawyer's prior representation of a former client and Rules 1.8(b) and 1.9(c)(1) for the lawyer's duties with respect to the use of such information to the disadvantage of clients and former clients.

A fundamental principle in the client-lawyer relationship is that, in the absence of the client's informed consent, the lawyer maintain confidentiality of must not reveal information relating to the representation.

See Rule 1.0(f) for the definition of informed consent. This contributes to the trust that is the hallmark of the client-lawyer relationship. The client is thereby encouraged to seek legal assistance and to communicate fully and frankly with the lawyer even as to embarrassing or legally damaging subject matter. The lawyer needs this information to represent the client effectively and, if necessary, to advise the client to refrain from wrongful conduct. Almost without exception, clients come to lawyers in order to determine their rights and what is, in the complex of laws and regulations, deemed to be legal and correct. Based upon experience, lawyers know that almost all clients follow the advice given, and the law is upheld.

The principle of <u>client-lawyer</u> confidentiality is given effect in two <u>by</u> related bodies of law, the attorney-client privilege, <u>the work product doctrine</u> in the law of evidence and the Rule of confidentiality established in professional ethics. The attorney-client privilege <u>applies</u> and <u>work-product doctrine</u> apply in judicial and other proceedings in which a lawyer may be called as a witness or otherwise required to produce evidence concerning a client. The Rule of client-lawyer confidentiality applies in situations other than those where evidence is sought from the lawyer through compulsion of law. The confidentiality Rule, <u>for example</u>, applies not <u>merely only</u> to matters communicated in confidence by the client but also to all information relating to the representation, whatever its source. A lawyer may not disclose such information except as authorized or required by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law. See also Scope.

Subsection (a) prohibits a lawyer from revealing information relating to the representation of a client. This prohibition also applies to disclosures by a lawyer that do not in themselves reveal protected information but could reasonably lead to the discovery of such information by a third person. A lawyer's use of a hypothetical to discuss issues relating to the representation is permissible so long as there is no reasonable likelihood that the listener will be able to ascertain the identity of the client or the situation involved.

Authorized Disclosure. Except to the extent that the client's instructions or special circumstances limit that authority, a A lawyer is impliedly authorized to make disclosures about a client when appropriate in carrying out the representation, except to the extent that the client's instructions or special circumstances limit that authority. In litigation some situations, for example, a lawyer may disclose information by admitting be impliedly authorized to admit a fact that cannot properly be disputed, or in negotiation by making to make a disclosure that facilitates a satisfactory conclusion to a matter. Lawyers in a firm may, in the course of the firm's practice, disclose to each other information relating to a client of the firm, unless the client has instructed that particular information be confined to specific lawyers.

AMENDMENT NOTES: That part of the above paragraph that begins with the words "Lawyers in a firm may," was previously a separate paragraph in the rules.

Disclosure Adverse to Client. Although the public interest is usually best served by a strict rule requiring lawyers to preserve the confidentiality of information relating to the representation of their clients, tThe confidentiality Rule is subject to limited exceptions. In becoming privy to information about a client, a lawyer may foresee that the client intends serious and perhaps irreparable harm to another person. To the extent a lawyer is prohibited from making disclosure, the interests of the potential victim are sacrificed in favor of preserving the client's confidences even though the client's purpose is eriminal. To the extent a lawyer is required to disclose a client's purposes, the client may be inhibited from revealing facts which would enable the lawyer to counsel against a wrongful course of action. A rule governing disclosure of threatened harm thus involves balancing the interests of one group of potential victims against those of another. On the assumption that lawyers fulfill their duty to advise against the commission of deliberately wrongful acts, the public is better protected if full and open communication by the client is encouraged than if it is inhibited. Subsection (b) recognizes the overriding value of life and physical integrity and requires disclosure in certain circumstances.

Generally speaking, information relating to the representation must be kept confidential, as stated in subsection (a). However, when the client is or will be engaged in criminal conduct, where the client has used the lawyer to perpetuate a fraud, or the integrity of the lawyer's own conduct is involved, the principle of confidentiality may have to yield, depending on the lawyer's knowledge about and relationship to the conduct in question, and the seriousness of that conduct. Several situations must be distinguished.

First, the lawyer may not counsel or assist a client in conduct that is criminal or fraudulent. See Rule 1.2 (d). As noted in the Commentary to that Rule, there can be situations where the lawyer may have to reveal information relating to the representation to avoid assisting a client's criminal or fraudulent conduct. The same is true of compliance with Rule 4.1 concerning truthfulness of a lawyer's own representations.

Second, the lawyer may have been innocently involved in past conduct by the client that was criminal or fraudulent. In such a situation the lawyer has not violated Rule 1.2 (d), because to "counsel or assist" eriminal or fraudulent conduct requires knowing that the conduct is of that character. Even if the involvement was innocent, however, the fact remains that the lawyer's professional services were made the instrument of the client's crime or fraud. The lawyer, therefore, has a legitimate interest in being

able to rectify the consequences of such conduct, and has the professional right, although not a professional duty, to rectify the situation. Exercising that right may require revealing information relating to the representation. Subsection (c) (2) gives the lawyer professional discretion to reveal such information to the extent necessary to accomplish rectification.

Third, the lawyer may learn that a client intends prospective conduct that is criminal. Inaction by the lawyer is not in violation of Rule 1.2 (d) except in the limited circumstances where failure to act constitutes assisting the client. See Commentary to Rule 1.2 (d). However, the lawyer's knowledge of the client's purpose may enable the lawyer to prevent commission of the prospective crime. If the prospective crime is likely to result in substantial injury, the lawyer may feel a moral obligation to take preventive action. When threatened injury is grave, such as homicide or serious bodily injury, the lawyer may have an obligation under tort or criminal law to take reasonable measures. Subsection (b) requires a lawyer to reveal confidences when reasonably necessary to prevent a client from committing a criminal act that is likely to cause death or serious injury to the person of another. In determining whether disclosure of confidences is required, the lawyer should consider the proximity and likelihood of the client's committing the criminal act, and the nature of the lawyer's relationship with the client. Where practical, the lawyer should seek to persuade the client to take suitable action. Disclosure adverse to the client should be no greater than the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to the purpose.

Subsection (e) (1) permits a lawyer to reveal a client's intent to commit a criminal act that is likely to cause substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another. The lawyer's exercise of discretion requires consideration of factors discussed above, and the magnitude of the effect of the act on the prospective victim, if within the lawyer's knowledge. Disclosure adverse to the client should be no greater than the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to the purpose, and, if practical, should follow an attempt by the lawyer to persuade the client to follow a lawful course. A lawyer's decision not to take preventive action under subsection (e) does not violate this Rule.

Where the client is an organization, the lawyer may be in doubt whether contemplated conduct will actually be carried out by the organization. When necessary to guide conduct in connection with this Rule, the lawyer should make inquiry within the organization as indicated in Rule 1.13 (b). The term "another" in subsection (c) (1) includes a person, organization and government.

Subsection (e) does not apply where a lawyer is employed after a crime or fraud has been committed to represent the client in matters ensuing therefrom.

Withdrawal. If the lawyer's services will be used by the client in materially furthering a course of eriminal or fraudulent conduct, the lawyer must withdraw, as stated in Rule 1.16 (a) (1).

After withdrawal the lawyer is required to refrain from making disclosure of the client's confidences, except as otherwise provided in Rule 1.6. Neither this Rule nor Rule 1.8 (b) nor Rule 1.16 (d) prevents the lawyer from giving notice of the fact of withdrawal, and the lawyer may also withdraw or disaffirm any opinion, document, affirmation, or the like.

Where the client is an organization, the lawyer may be in doubt whether contemplated conduct will actually be carried out by the organization. Where necessary to guide conduct in connection with this Rule, the lawyer may make inquiry within the organization as indicated in Rule 1.13 (b).

Subsection (c)(1) is a limited exception to the rule of confidentiality that permits the lawyer to reveal information to the extent necessary to enable affected persons or appropriate authorities to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud, as defined in Rule 1.0(e), that is likely to result in substantial injury to the financial or property interests of another. Such a serious abuse of the client-lawyer relationship by the client forfeits the protection of this Rule. The client can, of course, prevent such disclosure by refraining from the wrongful conduct. Although subsection (c) (1) does not require the lawyer to reveal the client's misconduct, the lawyer may not counsel or assist the client in conduct the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent. See Rule 1.2(d). See also Rule 1.16 with respect to the lawyer's obligation or right to withdraw from the representation of the client in such circumstances, and Rule 1.13(c), which permits the lawyer, where the client is an organization, to reveal information relating to the representation in limited circumstances.

Subsection (c)(2) addresses the situation in which the lawyer does not learn of the client's crime or fraud until after it has been consummated. Although the client no longer has the option of preventing disclosure by refraining from the wrongful conduct, there will be situations in which the loss suffered by the affected person can be prevented, rectified or mitigated. In such situations, the lawyer may disclose information relating to the representation to the extent necessary to enable the affected persons to prevent or mitigate reasonably certain losses or to attempt to recoup their losses. Subsection (c)(2) does not apply when a person who has committed a crime or fraud thereafter employs a lawyer for representation concerning that offense.

A lawyer's confidentiality obligations do not preclude a lawyer from securing confidential legal advice about the lawyer's personal responsibility to comply with these Rules. In most situations, disclosing information to secure such advice will be impliedly authorized for the lawyer to carry out the representation. Even when the disclosure is not impliedly authorized, subsection (c)(3) permits such disclosure because

of the importance of a lawyer's compliance with the Rules of Professional Conduct. The lawyer's right to disclose such information to a second lawyer pursuant to subsection (c)(3) does not give the second lawyer the duty or right to disclose such information under subsections (b), (c) and (d). The first lawyer's client does not become the client of the second lawyer just because the first lawyer seeks the second lawyer's advice under (c)(3).

Dispute concerning Lawyer's Conduct. Where a legal claim or disciplinary charge alleges complicity of the lawyer in a client's conduct or other misconduct of the lawyer involving representation of the client, the lawyer may respond to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to establish a defense. The same is true with respect to a claim involving the conduct or representation of a former client. Such a charge can arise in a civil, criminal, disciplinary or other proceeding and can be based on a wrong allegedly committed by the lawyer against the client or on a wrong alleged by a third person, for example, a person claiming to have been defrauded by the lawyer and client acting together. The lawyer's right to respond arises when an assertion of such complicity has been made. Subsection (d) does not require the lawyer to await the commencement of an action or proceeding that charges such complicity, so that the defense may be established by responding directly to a third party who has made such an assertion. The right to defend also applies, of course, applies where a proceeding has been commenced. Where practicable and not prejudicial to the lawyer's ability to establish the defense, the lawyer should advise the client of the third party's assertion and request that the client respond appropriately. In any event, disclosure should be no greater than the lawyer reasonably believes is necessary to vindicate innocence, the disclosure should be made in a manner which limits access to the information to the tribunal or other persons having a need to know it, and appropriate protective orders or other arrangements should be sought by the lawyer to the fullest extent practicable.

If the lawyer is charged with wrongdoing in which the client's conduct is implicated, the Rule of confidentiality should not prevent the lawyer from defending against the charge. Such a charge can arise in a civil, criminal or professional disciplinary proceeding, and can be based on a wrong allegedly committed by the lawyer against the client, or on a wrong alleged by a third person; for example, a person claiming to have been defrauded by the lawyer and client acting together. A lawyer entitled to a fee is permitted by subsection (d) to prove the services rendered in an action to collect it. This aspect of the rule expresses the principle that the beneficiary of a fiduciary relationship may not exploit it to the detriment of the fiduciary. As stated above, the lawyer must make every effort practicable to avoid innecessary disclosure of information relating to a representation, to limit disclosure to those having the need to know it, and to obtain protective orders or make other arrangements minimizing the risk of disclosure.

Other law may require that a lawyer disclose information about a client. Whether such a law supersedes Rule 1.6 is a question of law beyond the scope of these Rules. When disclosure of information relating to the representation appears to be required by other law, the lawyer must discuss the matter with the client to the extent required by Rule 1.4. If, however, the other law supersedes this Rule and requires disclosure, subsection (c)(6) permits the lawyer to make such disclosures as are necessary to comply with the law.

A lawyer may be ordered to reveal information relating to the representation of a client by a court or by another tribunal or governmental entity claiming authority pursuant to other law to compel the disclosure. Absent informed consent of the client to do otherwise, the lawyer should assert on behalf of the client all nonfrivolous claims that the order is not authorized by other law or that the information sought is protected against disclosure by the attorney-client privilege or other applicable law. In the event of an adverse ruling, the lawyer must consult with the client about the possibility of appeal to the extent required by Rule 1.4. Unless review is sought, however, subsection (c)(4) permits the lawyer to comply with the court's order.

Subsection (b) requires and subsection (c) permits disclosure only to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes the disclosure is necessary to accomplish one of the purposes specified. Where practicable, the lawyer should first seek to persuade the client to take suitable action to obviate the need for disclosure. In any case, a disclosure adverse to the client's interest should be no greater than the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to accomplish the purpose. If the disclosure will be made in connection with a judicial proceeding, the disclosure should be made in a manner that limits access to the information to the tribunal or other persons having a need to know it and appropriate protective orders or other arrangements should be sought by the lawyer to the fullest extent practicable.

Subsection (c) permits but does not require the disclosure of information relating to a client's representation to accomplish the purposes specified in subsections (c)(1) through (c)(4). In exercising the discretion conferred by this Rule, the lawyer may consider such factors as the nature of the lawyer's relationship with the client and with those who might be injured by the client, the lawyer's own involvement in the transaction and factors that may extenuate the conduct in question. A lawyer's decision not to disclose as permitted by subsection (c) does not violate this Rule. Disclosure may be required, however, by other Rules. Some Rules require disclosure only if such disclosure would be

permitted by subsection (b). See Rules 1.2(d), 4.1(b), 8.1 and 8.3. Rule 3.3, on the other hand, requires disclosure in some circumstances regardless of whether such disclosure is permitted by this Rule. See Rule 3.3(c).

Disclosures Otherwise Required or Authorized. The attorney-client privilege is differently defined in various jurisdictions. If a lawyer is called as a witness to give testimony concerning a client, absent waiver by the client, subsection (a) requires the lawyer to invoke the privilege when it is applicable. The lawyer must comply with the final orders of a court or other tribunal of competent jurisdiction requiring the lawyer to give information about the client.

The Rules of Professional Conduct in various circumstances permit or require a lawyer to disclose information relating to the representation. See Rules 2.2, 2.3, 3.3 and 4.1. In addition to these provisions, a lawyer may be obligated or permitted by other provisions of law to give information about a client. Whether another provision of law supersedes Rule 1.6 is a matter of interpretation beyond the scope of these Rules, but a presumption should exist against such a supersession.

Acting Competently to Preserve Confidentiality. A lawyer must act competently to safeguard information relating to the representation of a client against inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure by the lawyer or other persons who are participating in the representation of the client or who are subject to the lawyer's supervision. See Rules 1.1, 5.1 and 5.3.

When transmitting a communication that includes information relating to the representation of a client, the lawyer must take reasonable precautions to prevent the information from coming into the hands of unintended recipients. This duty, however, does not require that the lawyer use special security measures if the method of communication affords a reasonable expectation of privacy. Special circumstances, however, may warrant special precautions. Factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of the lawyer's expectation of confidentiality include the sensitivity of the information and the extent to which the privacy of the communication is protected by law or by a confidentiality agreement. A client may require the lawyer to implement special security measures not required by this Rule or may give informed consent to the use of a means of communication that would otherwise be prohibited by this Rule.

Former Client. The duty of confidentiality continues after the client-lawyer relationship has terminated. See Rule 1.9(c)(2). See Rule 1.9(c)(1) for the prohibition against using such information to the disadvantage of the former client.

Rule 1.7. Conflict of Interest: General Rule Current Clients

- (a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client will be directly adverse to another client, unless:
- (1) The lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not adversely affect the relationship with the other client; and
 - (2) Each client consents after consultation.
- (b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third person, or by the lawyer's own interests, unless:
- (1) The lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely affected; and
- (2) The client consents after consultation. When representation of multiple clients in a single matter is undertaken, the consultation shall include explanation of the implications of the common representation and the advantages and risks involved.
- (a) Except as provided in subsection (b), a lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict of interest exists if:
 - (1) the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client; or
- (2) there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer.
- (b) Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of interest under subsection (a), a lawyer may represent a client if:
- (1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent representation to each affected client;
 - (2) the representation is not prohibited by law;

- (3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one client against another client represented by the lawyer in the same litigation or the same proceeding before any tribunal; and
 - (4) each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.

COMMENTARY: Loyalty to a Client General Principles. Loyalty is an and independent judgment are essential elements in the lawyer's relationship to a client. Concurrent conflicts of interest can arise from the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person or from the lawyer's own interests. For specific Rules regarding certain concurrent conflicts of interest, see Rule 1.8. For former client conflicts of interest, see Rule 1.9. For conflicts of interest involving prospective clients, see Rule 1.18. For definitions of "informed consent" and "confirmed in writing," see Rule 1.0(f) and (c).

Resolution of a conflict of interest problem under this Rule requires the lawyer to: 1) clearly identify the client or clients; 2) determine whether a conflict of interest exists; 3) decide whether the representation may be undertaken despite the existence of a conflict, i.e., whether the conflict is consentable; and 4) if so, consult with the clients affected under subsection (a) and obtain their informed consent, confirmed in writing. The clients affected under subsection (a) include both of the clients referred to in subsection (a)(1) and the one or more clients whose representation might be materially limited under subsection (a)(2).

An impermissible A conflict of interest may exist before representation is undertaken, in which event the representation should must be declined, unless the lawyer obtains the informed consent of each client under the conditions of subsection (b). To determine whether a conflict of interest exists, a lawyer should adopt reasonable procedures, appropriate for the size and type of firm and practice, to determine in both litigation and nonlitigation matters the persons and issues involved. See also Commentary to Rule 5.1. Ignorance caused by a failure to institute such procedures will not excuse a lawyer's violation of this Rule. As to whether a client-lawyer relationship exists or, having once been established, is continuing, see Commentary to Rule 1.3 and Scope.

AMENDMENT NOTES: That part of the below paragraph that begins with "If a conflict arises" was previously part of the above paragraph in the rules.

If such a conflict arises after representation has been undertaken, the lawyer should ordinarily must withdraw from the representation, unless the lawyer has obtained the informed consent of the client under the conditions of subsection (b). See Rule 1.16. Where more than one client is involved and the lawyer withdraws because a conflict arises after representation, whether the lawyer may continue to represent any of the clients is determined both by the lawyer's ability to comply with duties owed to the former client and by the lawyer's ability to represent adequately the remaining client or clients, given the lawyer's duties to the former client. See Rule 1.9. See also Rule 2.2 (e) the next paragraph in this Commentary and the first paragraph under the Special Considerations in Common Representation heading, below. As to whether a client-lawyer relationship exists or, having once been established, is continuing, see Commentary to Rule 1.3 and Scope.

Unforeseeable developments, such as changes in corporate and other organizational affiliations or the addition or realignment of parties in litigation, might create conflicts in the midst of a representation, as when a company sued by the lawyer on behalf of one client is bought by another client represented by the lawyer in an unrelated matter. Depending on the circumstances, the lawyer may have the option to withdraw from one of the representations in order to avoid the conflict. The lawyer must seek court approval where necessary and take steps to minimize harm to the clients. See Rule 1.16. The lawyer must continue to protect the confidences of the client from whose representation the lawyer has withdrawn. See Rule 1.9(c).

As a general proposition, loyalty to a client prohibits undertaking representation directly adverse to that client without that client's consent. Subsection (a) expresses that general rule. Thus, a lawyer ordinarily may not act as advocate against a person the lawyer represents in some other matter, even if it is wholly unrelated. On the other hand, simultaneous representation in unrelated matters of clients whose interests are only generally adverse, such as competing economic enterprises, does not require consent of the respective clients. Subsection (a) applies only when the representation of one client would be directly adverse to the other.

AMENDMENT NOTES: The above paragraph has been amended and moved below in this Commentary and titled "Identifying Conflicts of Interest: Directly Adverse."

Loyalty to a client is also impaired when a lawyer cannot consider, recommend or carry out an appropriate course of action for the client because of the lawyer's other responsibilities or interests. The conflict in effect forecloses alternatives that would otherwise be available to the client. Subsection (b) addresses such situations. A possible conflict does not itself preclude the representation. The critical questions are the likelihood that a conflict will eventuate and, if it does, whether it will materially interfere with the lawyer's independent professional judgment in considering alternatives or foreclose courses of action

that reasonably should be pursued on behalf of the client. Consideration should be given to whether the client wishes to accommodate the other interest involved.

AMENDMENT NOTES: The above paragraph has been amended and moved below in this Commentary and titled "Identifying Conflicts of Interest: Material Limitation."

Identifying Conflicts of Interest: Directly Adverse. As a general proposition, IL oyalty to a current client prohibits undertaking representation directly adverse to that client without that client's informed consent. Subsection (a) expresses that general rule. Thus, absent consent, a lawyer ordinarily may not act as advocate in one matter against a person the lawyer represents in some other matter, even if it is when the matters are wholly unrelated. The client as to whom the representation is directly adverse is likely to feel betrayed, and the resulting damage to the client-lawyer relationship is likely to impair the lawyer's ability to represent the client effectively. In addition, the client on whose behalf the adverse representation is undertaken reasonably may fear that the lawyer will pursue that client's case less effectively out of deference to the other client, i.e., that the representation may be materially limited by the lawyer's interest in retaining the current client. Similarly, a directly adverse conflict may arise when a lawyer is required to cross-examine a client who appears as a witness in a lawsuit involving another client, as when the testimony will be damaging to the client who is represented in the lawsuit. On the other hand, simultaneous representation in unrelated matters of clients whose interests are only generally economically adverse, such as representation of competing economic enterprises in unrelated litigation, does not ordinarily constitute a conflict of interest and thus may not require consent of the respective clients. Subsection (a) applies only when the representation of one client would be directly adverse to the other.

AMENDMENT NOTES: The above paragraph was previously under the "Loyalty to a Client" heading in this Commentary.

Directly adverse conflicts can also arise in transactional matters. For example, if a lawyer is asked to represent the seller of a business in negotiations with a buyer represented by the lawyer, not in the same transaction but in another, unrelated matter, the lawyer could not undertake the representation without the informed consent of each client.

Identifying Conflicts of Interest: Material Limitation. Loyalty to a client is also impaired when Even where there is no direct adverseness, a conflict of interest exists if there is a significant risk that a lawyer eannot lawyer's ability to consider, recommend or carry out an appropriate course of action for the client because will be materially limited as a result of the lawyer's other responsibilities or interests. For example, a lawyer asked to represent several individuals seeking to form a joint venture is likely to be materially limited in the lawyer's ability to recommend or advocate all possible positions that each might take because of the lawyer's duty of loyalty to the others. The conflict in effect forecloses alternatives that would otherwise be available to the client. Subsection (b) addresses such situations. A possible conflict The mere possibility of subsequent harm does not itself preclude the representation require disclosure and consent. The critical questions are the likelihood that a conflict difference in interests will eventuate and, if it does, whether it will materially interfere with the lawyer's independent professional judgment in considering alternatives or foreclose courses of action that reasonably should be pursued on behalf of the client. Consideration should be given to whether the client wishes to accommodate the other interest involved.

AMENDMENT NOTES: The above paragraph was previously under the "Loyalty to Client" heading in this Commentary.

Lawyer's Interests Responsibilities to Former Clients and Other Third Persons. In addition to conflicts with other current clients, a lawyer's duties of loyalty and independence may be materially limited by responsibilities to former clients under Rule 1.9 or by the lawyer's responsibilities to other persons, such as fiduciary duties arising from a lawyer's service as a trustee, executor or corporate director.

Consultation and Consent. A client may consent to representation notwithstanding a conflict. However, as indicated in subsection (a) (1) with respect to representation directly adverse to a client, and subsection (b) (1) with respect to material limitations on representation of a client, when a disinterested lawyer would conclude that the client should not agree to the representation under the circumstances, the lawyer cannot properly ask for such agreement or provide representation on the basis of the client's consent. When more than one client is involved, the question of conflict must be resolved as to each client. Moreover, there may be circumstances where it is impossible to make the disclosure necessary to obtain consent. For example, when the lawyer represents different clients in related matters and one of the clients refuses to consent to the disclosure necessary to permit the other client to make an informed decision, the lawyer cannot properly ask the latter to consent.

AMENDMENT NOTES: The above paragraph has been amended and moved below in this Commentary under the "Prohibited Representations" heading.

Lawyer's Interests. The lawyer's own interests should not be permitted to have adverse effect on representation of a client. For example, a lawyer's need for income should not lead the lawyer to undertake matters that cannot be handled competently and at a reasonable fee. See Rules 1.1 and 1.5.

If the probity of a lawyer's own conduct in a transaction is in serious question, it may be difficult or impossible for the lawyer to give a client detached advice. A lawyer may not allow related business interests to affect representation, for example, by referring clients to an enterprise in which the lawyer has an undisclosed interest.

AMENDMENT NOTES: The above paragraph has been amended and moved below in this Commentary under the "Personal Interest Conflicts" heading.

Personal Interest Conflicts. The lawyer's own interests should must not be permitted to have an adverse effect on representation of a client. For example, a lawyer's need for income should not lead the lawyer to undertake matters that cannot be handled competently and at a reasonable fee. See Rules 1.1 and 1.5. If if the probity of a lawyer's own conduct in a transaction is in serious question, it may be difficult or impossible for the lawyer to give a client detached advice. A Similarly, when a lawyer has discussions concerning possible employment with an opponent of the lawyer's client, or with a law firm representing the opponent, such discussions could materially limit the lawyer's representation of the client. In addition, a lawyer may not allow related business interests to affect representation, for example, by referring clients to an enterprise in which the lawyer has an undisclosed financial interest. See Rule 1.8 for specific Rules pertaining to a number of personal interest conflicts, including business transactions with clients. See also Rule 1.10 (personal interest conflicts under Rule 1.7 ordinarily are not imputed to other lawyers in a law firm).

AMENDMENT NOTES: The above paragraph was previously titled "Lawyer's Interests" and was located later in the Commentary for this rule.

When lawyers representing different clients in the same matter or in substantially related matters are closely related by blood or marriage, there may be a significant risk that client confidences will be revealed and that the lawyer's family relationship will interfere with both loyalty and independent professional judgment. As a result, each client is entitled to know of the existence and implications of the relationship between the lawyers before the lawyer agrees to undertake the representation. Thus, a lawyer related to another lawyer, e.g., as parent, child, sibling or spouse, ordinarily may not represent a client in a matter where that lawyer is representing another party, unless each client gives informed consent. The disqualification arising from a close family relationship is personal and ordinarily is not imputed to members of firms with whom the lawyers are associated. See Rule 1.10.

A lawyer is prohibited from engaging in a sexual relationship with a client unless the sexual relationship predates the formation of the client-lawyer relationship. See Rule 1.8(j).

Conflicts in Litigation. Subsection (a) prohibits representation of opposing parties in litigation. Simultaneous representation of parties whose interests in litigation may conflict, such as coplaintiffs or codefendants, is governed by subsection (b). An impermissible conflict may exist by reason of substantial discrepancy in the parties' testimony, incompatibility in positions in relation to an opposing party or the fact that there are substantially different possibilities of settlement of the claims or liabilities in question. Such conflicts can arise in criminal cases as well as civil. The potential for conflict of interest in representing multiple defendants in a criminal case is so grave that ordinarily a lawyer should decline to represent more than one codefendant. On the other hand, common representation of persons having similar interests is proper if the risk of adverse effect is minimal and the requirements of subsection (b) are met. Compare Rule 2.2 involving intermediation between clients.

Ordinarily, a lawyer may not act as advocate against a client the lawyer represents in some other matter, even if the other matter is wholly unrelated. However, there are circumstances in which a lawyer may act as advocate against a client. For example, a lawyer representing an enterprise with diverse operations may accept employment as an advocate against the enterprise in an unrelated matter if doing so will not adversely affect the lawyer's relationship with the enterprise or conduct of the suit and if both clients consent upon consultation. By the same token, government lawyers in some circumstances may represent government employees in proceedings in which a government agency is the opposing party. The propriety of concurrent representation can depend on the nature of the litigation. For example, a suit charging fraud entails conflict to a degree not involved in a suit for a declaratory judgment concerning statutory interpretation.

A lawyer may represent parties having antagonistic positions on a legal question that has arisen in different cases, unless representation of either client would be adversely affected. Thus, it is ordinarily not improper to assert such positions in cases pending in different trial courts, but it may be improper to do so in cases pending at the same time in an appellate court.

AMENDMENT NOTES: The above three paragraphs have been amended and moved later in the Commentary for this Rule.

Interest of Person Paying for a Lawyer's Service. A lawyer may be paid from a source other than the client, including a co-client, if the client is informed of that fact and consents and the arrangement does not compromise the lawyer's duty of loyalty or independent judgment to the client. See Rule 1.8(f). For example, when an insurer and its insured have conflicting interests in a matter arising from a liability insurance agreement, and the insurer is required to provide special counsel for the insured, the arrangement

should assure the special counsel's professional independence. So also, when a corporation and its directors or employees are involved in a controversy in which they have conflicting interests, the corporation may provide funds for separate legal representation of the directors or employees, if the elients consent after consultation and the arrangement ensures the lawyer's professional independence. If acceptance of the payment from any other source presents a significant risk that the lawyer's representation of the client will be materially limited by the lawyer's own interest in accommodating the person paying the lawyer's fee or by the lawyer's responsibilities to a payer who is also a co-client, then the lawyer must comply with the requirements of subsection (b) before accepting the representation, including determining whether the conflict is consentable and, if so, that the client has adequate information about the material risks of the representation.

AMENDMENT NOTES: The above paragraph was previously located later in the Commentary for this rule.

A lawyer for a corporation or other organization who is also a member of its board of directors should determine whether the responsibilities of the two roles may conflict. The lawyer may be called on to advise the corporation in matters involving actions of the directors. Consideration should be given to the frequency with which such situations may arise, the potential intensity of the conflict, the effect of the lawyer's resignation from the board and the possibility of the corporation's obtaining legal advice from another lawyer in such situations. If there is material risk that the dual role will compromise the lawyer's independence of professional judgment, the lawyer should not serve as a director.

AMENDMENT NOTES: The above paragraph has been amended and moved below in this Commentary under the "Organizational Clients" heading.

Consultation and ConsentProhibited Representations. A client Ordinarily, clients may consent to representation notwithstanding a conflict. However, as indicated in subsection (a)(1) with respect to representation directly adverse to a client, and subsection (b)(1) with respect to material limitations on representation of a client, when a disinterested lawyer would conclude that the client should not agree to the representation under the circumstances, some conflicts are nonconsentable, meaning that the lawyer involved cannot properly ask for such agreement or provide representation on the basis of the client's consent. When the lawyer is representing more than one client is involved, the question of eonfliet consentability must be resolved as to each client. Moreover, there may be circumstances where it is impossible to make the disclosure necessary to obtain consent. For example, when the lawyer represents different clients in related matters and one of the clients refuses to consent to the disclosure necessary to permit the other client to make an informed decision, the lawyer cannot properly ask the latter to consent.

AMENDMENT NOTES: The above paragraph was previously titled "Consultation and Consent" and was located earlier in the Commentary for this rule.

Consentability is typically determined by considering whether the interests of the clients will be adequately protected if the clients are permitted to give their informed consent to representation burdened by a conflict of interest. Thus, under subsection (b)(1), representation is prohibited if in the circumstances the lawyer cannot reasonably conclude that the lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent representation. See Rule 1.1 (competence) and Rule 1.3 (diligence).

Subsection (b)(2) describes conflicts that are nonconsentable because the representation is prohibited by applicable law.

Subsection (b)(3) describes conflicts that are nonconsentable because of the institutional interest in vigorous development of each client's position when the clients are aligned directly against each other in the same litigation or the same proceeding before any tribunal. Whether clients are aligned directly against each other within the meaning of this paragraph requires examination of the context of the proceeding. Although this paragraph does not preclude a lawyer's multiple representation of adverse parties to a mediation (because mediation is not a proceeding before a "tribunal" under Rule 1.0(n)), such representation may be precluded by subsection (b)(1).

Informed Consent. Informed consent requires that each affected client be aware of the relevant circumstances and of the material and reasonably foreseeable ways that the conflict could have adverse effects on the interests of that client. See Rule 1.0(f) (informed consent). The information required depends on the nature of the conflict and the nature of the risks involved. When representation of multiple clients in a single matter is undertaken, the information must include the implications of the common representation, including possible effects on loyalty, confidentiality and the attorney-client privilege and the advantages and risks involved. See second and third paragraphs under the Special Considerations in Common Representation heading in this Commentary, below (effect of common representation on confidentiality).

Under some circumstances it may be impossible to make the disclosure necessary to obtain consent. For example, when the lawyer represents different clients in related matters and one of the clients refuses to consent to the disclosure necessary to permit the other client to make an informed decision, the lawyer cannot properly ask the latter to consent. In some cases the alternative to common representation can be that each party may have to obtain separate representation with the possibility of incurring additional

costs. These costs, along with the benefits of securing separate representation, are factors that may be considered by the affected client in determining whether common representation is in the client's interests.

Consent Confirmed in Writing. Subsection (b) requires the lawyer to obtain the informed consent of the client, confirmed in writing. Such a writing may consist of a document executed by the client or one that the lawyer promptly records and transmits to the client following an oral consent. See Rule 1.0(c). See also Rule 1.0(o) (writing includes electronic transmission). If it is not feasible to obtain or transmit the writing at the time the client gives informed consent, then the lawyer must obtain or transmit it within a reasonable time thereafter. See Rule 1.0(c). The requirement of a writing does not supplant the need in most cases for the lawyer to talk with the client, to explain the risks and advantages, if any, of representation burdened with a conflict of interest, as well as reasonably available alternatives, and to afford the client a reasonable opportunity to consider the risks and alternatives and to raise questions and concerns. Rather, the writing is required in order to impress upon clients the seriousness of the decision the client is being asked to make and to avoid disputes or ambiguities that might later occur in the absence of a writing.

Revoking Consent. A client who has given consent to a conflict may revoke the consent and, like any other client, may terminate the lawyer's representation at any time. Whether revoking consent to the client's own representation precludes the lawyer from continuing to represent other clients depends on the circumstances, including the nature of the conflict, whether the client revoked consent because of a material change in circumstances, the reasonable expectations of the other clients and whether material detriment to the other clients or the lawyer would result.

Consent to Future Conflict. Whether a lawyer may properly request a client to waive conflicts that might arise in the future is subject to the test of subsection (b). The effectiveness of such waivers is generally determined by the extent to which the client reasonably understands the material risks that the waiver entails. The more comprehensive the explanation of the types of future conflicts that might arise and the actual and reasonably foreseeable adverse consequences of those conflicts, the greater the likelihood that the client will have the requisite understanding. Thus, if the client agrees to consent to a particular type of conflict with which the client is already familiar, then the consent ordinarily will be effective with regard to that type of conflict. If the consent is general and open-ended, then the consent ordinarily will be ineffective, because it is not reasonably likely that the client will have understood the material risks involved. On the other hand, if the client is an experienced user of the legal services involved and is reasonably informed regarding the risk that a conflict may arise, such consent is more likely to be effective, particularly if, e.g., the client is independently represented by other counsel in giving consent and the consent is limited to future conflicts unrelated to the subject of the representation. In any case, advance consent cannot be effective if the circumstances that materialize in the future are such as would make the conflict nonconsentable under subsection (b).

Conflicts in Litigation. Subsection (a) (b)(3) prohibits representation of opposing parties in the same litigation, regardless of the clients' consent. Simultaneous On the other hand, simultaneous representation of parties whose interests in litigation may conflict, such as coplaintiffs or codefendants, is governed by subsection (b)(a)(2). An impermissible \underline{A} conflict may exist by reason of substantial discrepancy in the parties' testimony, incompatibility in positions in relation to an opposing party or the fact that there are substantially different possibilities of settlement of the claims or liabilities in question. Such conflicts can arise in criminal cases as well as civil. The potential for conflict of interest in representing multiple defendants in a criminal case is so grave that ordinarily a lawyer should decline to represent more than one codefendant. On the other hand, common representation of persons having similar interests in civil litigation is proper if the risk of adverse effect is minimal and the requirements of subsection (b) are met. Compare Rule 2.2 involving intermediation between clients.

Ordinarily, a lawyer may not act as advocate against a client the lawyer represents in some other matter, even if the other matter is wholly unrelated. However, there are circumstances in which a lawyer may act as advocate against a client. For example, a lawyer representing an enterprise with diverse operations may accept employment as an advocate against the enterprise in an unrelated matter if doing so will not adversely affect the lawyer's relationship with the enterprise or conduct of the suit and if both clients consent upon consultation. By the same token, government lawyers in some circumstances may represent government employees in proceedings in which a government agency is the opposing party. The propriety of concurrent representation can depend on the nature of the litigation. For example, a suit charging fraud entails conflict to a degree not involved in a suit for a declaratory judgment concerning statutory interpretation.

A lawyer may represent parties having antagonistic positions on a legal question that has arisen in different cases, unless representation of either client would be adversely affected. Thus, it is ordinarily not improper to assert such positions in cases pending in different trial courts, but it may be improper to do so in cases pending at the same time in an appellate court.

AMENDMENT NOTES: The above three paragraphs were previously located earlier in the Commentary for this rule.

Ordinarily a lawyer may take inconsistent legal positions in different tribunals at different times on behalf of different clients. The mere fact that advocating a legal position on behalf of one client might create precedent adverse to the interests of a client represented by the lawyer in an unrelated matter does not create a conflict of interest. A conflict of interest exists, however, if there is a significant risk that a lawyer's action on behalf of one client will materially limit the lawyer's effectiveness in representing another client in a different case; for example, when a decision favoring one client will create a precedent likely to seriously weaken the position taken on behalf of the other client. Factors relevant in determining whether the clients need to be advised of the risk include: where the cases are pending, whether the issue is substantive or procedural, the temporal relationship between the matters, the significance of the issue to the immediate and long-term interests of the clients involved and the clients' reasonable expectations in retaining the lawyer. If there is significant risk of material limitation, then absent informed consent of the affected clients, the lawyer must refuse one of the representations or withdraw from one or both matters.

When a lawyer represents or seeks to represent a class of plaintiffs or defendants in a class-action lawsuit, unnamed members of the class are ordinarily not considered to be clients of the lawyer for purposes of applying subsection (a)(1) of this Rule. Thus, the lawyer does not typically need to get the consent of such a person before representing a client suing the person in an unrelated matter. Similarly, a lawyer seeking to represent an opponent in a class action does not typically need the consent of an unnamed member of the class whom the lawyer represents in an unrelated matter.

AMENDMENT NOTES: The following paragraph has been amended and moved to an earlier section of this Commentary.

Interest of Person Paying for a Lawyer's Service. A lawyer may be paid from a source other than the client, if the client is informed of that fact and consents and the arrangement does not compromise the lawyer's duty of loyalty to the client. See Rule 1.8 (f). For example, when an insurer and its insured have conflicting interests in a matter arising from a liability insurance agreement, and the insurer is required to provide special counsel for the insured, the arrangement should assure the special counsel's professional independence. So also, when a corporation and its directors or employees are involved in a controversy in which they have conflicting interests, the corporation may provide funds for separate legal representation of the directors or employees, if the client's consent after consultation and the arrangement ensures the lawyer's professional independence.

Other Conflict Situations Nonlitigation Conflicts. Conflicts of interest under subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) arise in contexts other than litigation sometimes may be difficult to assess. For a discussion of directly adverse conflicts in transactional matters, see second paragraph under Identifying Conflicts of Interest: Directly Adverse heading in this Commentary, above. Relevant factors in determining whether there is significant potential for risk of adverse effect material limitation include the duration and intimacy of the lawyer's relationship with the client or clients involved, the functions being performed by the lawyer, the likelihood that actual conflict disagreements will arise and the likely prejudice to the client from the conflict if it does arise. The question is often one of proximity and degree. See first paragraph under Identifying Conflicts of Interest: Material Limitation heading in this Commentary, above.

Conflict For example, conflict questions may also arise in estate planning and estate administration. A lawyer may be called upon to prepare wills for several family members, such as husband and wife, and, depending upon the circumstances, a conflict of interest may arise be present. In estate administration the identity of the client may be unclear under the law of a particular jurisdiction. Under one view, the client is the fiduciary; under another view the client is the estate or trust, including its beneficiaries. The In order to comply with conflict of interest rules, the lawyer should make clear the lawyer's relationship to the parties involved.

Whether a conflict is consentable depends on the circumstances. For example, a lawyer may not represent multiple parties to a negotiation whose interests are fundamentally antagonistic to each other, but common representation is permissible where the clients are generally aligned in interest even though there is some difference in interest among them. Thus, a lawyer may seek to establish or adjust a relationship between clients on an amicable and mutually advantageous basis; for example, in helping to organize a business in which two or more clients are entrepreneurs, working out the financial reorganization of an enterprise in which two or more clients have an interest or arranging a property distribution in settlement of an estate. The lawyer seeks to resolve potentially adverse interests by developing the parties' mutual interests. Otherwise, each party might have to obtain separate representation, with the possibility of incurring additional cost, complication or even litigation. Given these and other relevant factors, the clients may prefer that the lawyer act for all of them.

AMENDMENT NOTES: The following paragraph has been moved to the end of this Commentary.

Conflict Charged by an Opposing Party. Resolving questions of conflict of interest is primarily the responsibility of the lawyer undertaking the representation. In litigation, a court may raise the question when there is reason to infer that the lawyer has neglected the responsibility. In a criminal case, inquiry by the court is generally required when a lawyer represents multiple defendants. Where the conflict is

such as clearly to call in question the fair or efficient administration of justice, opposing counsel may properly raise the question. Such an objection should be viewed with caution, however, for it can be misused as a technique of harassment. See Scope.

Special Considerations in Common Representation. In considering whether to represent multiple clients in the same matter, a lawyer should be mindful that if the common representation fails because the potentially adverse interests cannot be reconciled, the result can be additional cost, embarrassment and recrimination. Ordinarily, the lawyer will be forced to withdraw from representing all of the clients if the common representation fails. In some situations, the risk of failure is so great that multiple representation is plainly impossible. For example, a lawyer cannot undertake common representation of clients where contentious litigation or negotiations between them are imminent or contemplated. Moreover, because the lawyer is required to be impartial between commonly represented clients, representation of multiple clients is improper when it is unlikely that impartiality can be maintained. Generally, if the relationship between the parties has already assumed antagonism, the possibility that the clients' interests can be adequately served by common representation is not very good. Other relevant factors are whether the lawyer subsequently will represent both parties on a continuing basis and whether the situation involves creating or terminating a relationship between the parties.

A particularly important factor in determining the appropriateness of common representation is the effect on client-lawyer confidentiality and the attorney-client privilege.

As to the duty of confidentiality, continued common representation will almost certainly be inappropriate if one client asks the lawyer not to disclose to the other client information relevant to the common representation. This is so because the lawyer has an equal duty of loyalty to each client, and the lawyer should inform each client that each client has the right to be informed of anything bearing on the representation that might affect that client's interests and the right to expect that the lawyer will use that information to that client's benefit. See Rule 1.4. To that end, the lawyer must, at the outset of the common representation and as part of the process of obtaining each client's informed consent, advise each client that information will be shared and that the lawyer will have to withdraw if one client decides prior to disclosure that some matter material to the representation should be disclosed to the lawyer but be kept from the other. In limited circumstances, it may be appropriate for the lawyer to proceed with the representation when the clients have agreed, after being properly informed, that the lawyer will keep certain information confidential. For example, the lawyer may reasonably conclude that failure to disclose one client's trade secrets to another client will not adversely affect representation involving a joint venture between the clients and agree to keep that information confidential with the informed consent of both clients.

When seeking to establish or adjust a relationship between clients, the lawyer should make clear that the lawyer's role is not that of partisanship normally expected in other circumstances and, thus, that the clients may be required to assume greater responsibility for decisions than when each client is separately represented. Any limitations on the scope of the representation made necessary as a result of the common representation should be fully explained to the clients at the outset of the representation. See Rule 1.2(c).

Subject to the above limitations, each client in the common representation has the right to loyal and diligent representation and the protection of Rule 1.9 concerning the obligations to a former client. The client also has the right to discharge the lawyer as stated in Rule 1.16.

Organizational Clients. A lawyer who represents a corporation or other organization does not, by virtue of that representation, necessarily represent any constituent or affiliated organization, such as a parent or subsidiary. See Rule 1.13(a). Thus, the lawyer for an organization is not barred from accepting representation adverse to an affiliate in an unrelated matter, unless the circumstances are such that the affiliate should also be considered a client of the lawyer, there is an understanding between the lawyer and the organizational client that the lawyer will avoid representation adverse to the client's affiliates, or the lawyer's obligations to either the organizational client or the new client are likely to limit materially the lawyer's representation of the other client.

A lawyer for a corporation or other organization who is also a member of its board of directors should determine whether the responsibilities of the two roles may conflict. The lawyer may be called on to advise the corporation in matters involving actions of the directors. Consideration should be given to the frequency with which such situations may arise, the potential intensity of the conflict, the effect of the lawyer's resignation from the board and the possibility of the corporation's obtaining legal advice from another lawyer in such situations. If there is material risk that the dual role will compromise the lawyer's independence of professional judgment, the lawyer should not serve as a director or should cease to act as the corporation's lawyer when conflicts of interest arise. The lawyer should advise the other members of the board that in some circumstances matters discussed at board meetings while the lawyer is present in the capacity of director might not be protected by the attorney-client privilege and that conflict of interest considerations might require the lawyer's recusal as a director or might require the lawyer and the lawyer's firm to decline representation of the corporation in a matter.

AMENDMENT NOTES: The above paragraph was previously included under the "Other Conflict Situations" heading located earlier in the Commentary for this rule.

Conflict Charged by an Opposing Party. Resolving questions of conflict of interest is primarily the responsibility of the lawyer undertaking the representation. In litigation, a court may raise the question when there is reason to infer that the lawyer has neglected the responsibility. In a criminal case, inquiry by the court is generally required when a lawyer represents multiple defendants. Where the conflict is such as clearly to call in question the fair or efficient administration of justice, opposing counsel may properly raise the question. Such an objection should be viewed with caution, however, for it can be misused as a technique of harassment. See Scope.

Rule 1.8. Conflict of Interest: Prohibited Transactions

- (a) A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction, including investment services, with a client or former client or knowingly acquire an ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary interest adverse to a client or former client unless:
- (1) The transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires the interest are fair and reasonable to the client or former client and are fully disclosed and transmitted in writing to the client or former client in a manner which that can be reasonably understood by the client or former client;
- (2) The client or former client is advised in writing that the client or former client should consider seeking the desirability of seeking and is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent <u>legal</u> counsel in the transaction is given a reasonable opportunity to do so;
- (3) The client or former client gives informed consent consents in writing signed by the client or former client, to the essential terms of the transaction and the lawyer's role in the transaction, including whether the lawyer is representing the client in the transaction thereto;
- (4) With regard to a business transaction, the lawyer advises the client or former client in writing either (A) that the lawyer will provide legal services to the client or former client concerning the transaction, or (B) that the lawyer will not provide legal services to the client or former client and that the lawyer is involved as a business person only and not as a lawyer representing the client or former client and that the lawyer is not one to whom the client or former client can turn for legal advice concerning the transaction; and
- (5) With regard to the providing of investment services, the lawyer advises the client or former client in writing (A) whether such services are covered by legal liability insurance or other insurance, and either (B) that the lawyer will provide legal services to the client or former client concerning the transaction, or (C) that the lawyer will not provide legal services to the client or former client and that the lawyer is involved as a business person only and not as a lawyer representing the client or former client and that the lawyer is not one to whom the client or former client can turn to for legal services concerning the transaction. Investment services shall only apply where the lawyer has either a direct or indirect control over the invested funds and a direct or indirect interest in the underlying investment.

For purposes of subsection (a)(1) through (a)(5), the phrase "former client" shall mean a client for whom the two-year period starting from the conclusion of representation has not expired.

- (b) A lawyer shall not use information relating to representation of a client to the disadvantage of the client unless the client consents after consultation gives informed consent, except as permitted or required by these Rules.
- (c) A lawyer shall not solicit any substantial gift from a client, including a testamentary gift, or prepare on behalf of a client an instrument giving the lawyer or a person related to the lawyer as parent, child, sibling or spouse any substantial gift, from a client, including a testamentary gift, except where the client unless the lawyer or other recipient of the gift is related to the client donee. For purposes of this

paragraph, related persons include a spouse, child, grandchild, parent, grandparent or other relative or individual with whom the lawyer or the client maintains a close, familial relationship spouse any substantial gift from a client, including a testamentary gift, except where the client is related to the donee.

- (d) Prior to the conclusion of representation of a client, a lawyer shall not make or negotiate an agreement giving the lawyer literary or media rights to a portrayal or account based in substantial part on information relating to the representation.
- (e) A lawyer shall not provide financial assistance to a client in connection with pending or contemplated litigation, except that:
- (1) A lawyer may pay court costs and expenses of litigation on behalf of a client, the repayment of which may be contingent on the outcome of the matter;
- (2) A lawyer representing an indigent client may pay court costs and expenses of litigation on behalf of the client.
- (f) A lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing a client from one other than the client unless:
 - (1) The client consents after consultation gives informed consent;
- (2) There is no interference with the lawyer's independence of professional judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship; and
- (3) Information relating to representation of a client is protected as required by Rule 1.6.
- (g) A lawyer who represents two or more clients shall not participate in making an aggregate settlement of the claims of or against the clients, or in a criminal case an aggregated agreement as to guilty or nolo contendere pleas, unless each client gives informed consent, in a writing signed by the client. The lawyer's consents after consultation, including disclosure shall include of the existence and nature of all the claims or pleas involved and of the participation of each person in the settlement.
 - (h) A lawyer shall not:
- (1) Make an agreement prospectively limiting the lawyer's liability to a client for malpractice unless permitted by law and the client is independently represented in making the agreement; or
- (2) Settle a claim or potential claim for such liability with an unrepresented client or former client without first advising unless that person is advised in writing of the desirability of seeking and is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of that independent representation legal counsel is appropriate in connection therewith.
- (i) A lawyer related to another lawyer as parent, child, sibling or spouse shall not represent a client in a representation directly adverse to a person who the lawyer knows is represented by the other lawyer except upon consent by the client after consultation regarding the relationship.
- (j)(i) A lawyer shall not acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject matter of litigation the lawyer is conducting for a client, except that the lawyer may:
 - (1) Acquire a lien granted by law to secure the lawyer's fee or expenses; and
 - (2) Contract with a client for a reasonable contingent fee in a civil case.
- (j) A lawyer shall not have sexual relations with a client unless a consensual sexual relationship existed between them when the client-lawyer relationship commenced.
- (k) While lawyers are associated in a firm, a prohibition in the foregoing subsection (a) through (i) that applies to any one of them shall apply to all of them.

COMMENTARY: <u>Business</u> Transactions Between Client and Lawyer. Subsection (a) expressly applies to former clients as well as existing clients. As a general principle, lawyers engaged in the private practice of law are discouraged from entering into business transactions with clients. All transactions between client and lawyer should be fair and reasonable to the client. Because there is a risk that a

elient may not understand the lawyer's role and the extent to which a lawyer's professional obligations obtain in the types of transactions covered by the Rule, the lawyer has the burden of establishing the precise nature of his or her role in the transaction. In such transactions a review by independent counsel on behalf of the client is often advisable. The written disclosure is evidence of the lawyer's attempt to satisfy the burden but is not intended to operate as a waiver or release. Furthermore, a lawyer may not exploit information relating to the representation to the client's disadvantage. For example, a lawyer who has learned that the client is investing in specific real estate may not, without the client's consent, seek to acquire nearby property where doing so would adversely affect the client's plan for investment. A lawyer's legal skill and training, together with the relationship of trust and confidence between lawyer and client, create the possibility of overreaching when the lawyer participates in a business, property or financial transaction with a client, for example, a loan or sales transaction or a lawyer investment on behalf of a client. The requirements of subsection (a) must be met even when the transaction is not closely related to the subject matter of the representation, as when a lawyer drafting a will for a client learns that the client needs money for unrelated expenses and offers to make a loan to the client. It also applies to lawyers purchasing property from estates they represent. It does not apply to ordinary fee arrangements between client and lawyer, which are governed by Rule 1.5, although its requirements must be met when the lawyer accepts an interest in the client's business or other nonmonetary property as payment of all or part of a fee. In addition, the Rule Subsection (a) does not, however, apply to standard commercial transactions between the lawyer and the client for products or services that the client generally markets to others, for example, banking or brokerage services, medical services, products manufactured or distributed by the client, and utilities' services. Similarly, subsection (a) does not apply to transactions in which the lawyer has no role in structuring the transaction or as an underwriter, a promoter, broker, solicitor, or distributor. Further, subsection (a) is not intended to apply to transactions in which a lawyer may not be able to determine the identity of all the participants because of the nature of the transaction (e.g., a public offering). In such transactions, the lawyer has no advantage in dealing with the client, and the restrictions in subsection (a) are unnecessary and impracticable.

A lawyer may accept a gift from a client, if the transaction meets general standards of fairness. For example, a simple gift such as a present given at a holiday or as a token of appreciation is permitted. If effectuation of a substantial gift requires preparing a legal instrument such as a will or conveyance, however, the client should have the detached advice that another lawyer can provide. Subsection (c) recognizes an exception where the client is a relative of the donce or the gift is not substantial.

AMENDMENT NOTES: The above paragraph has been amended and moved below in this Commentary under the "Gifts to Lawyers" heading.

Subsection (a)(1) requires that the transaction itself be fair to the client and that its essential terms be communicated to the client, in writing, in a manner that can be reasonably understood. Subsection (a)(2) requires that the client also be advised, in writing, of the desirability of seeking the advice of independent legal counsel. It also requires that the client be given a reasonable opportunity to obtain such advice. Subsection (a)(3) requires that the lawyer obtain the client's informed consent, in a writing signed by the client, both to the essential terms of the transaction and to the lawyer's role. When necessary, the lawyer should discuss both the material risks of the proposed transaction, including any risk presented by the lawyer's involvement, and the existence of reasonably available alternatives and should explain why the advice of independent legal counsel is desirable. See Rule 1.0(f) (definition of informed consent).

The risk to a client is greatest when the client expects the lawyer to represent the client in the transaction itself or when the lawyer's financial interest otherwise poses a significant risk that the lawyer's representation of the client will be materially limited by the lawyer's financial interest in the transaction. Here the lawyer's role requires that the lawyer must comply, not only with the requirements of subsection (a), but also with the requirements of Rule 1.7. Under that Rule, the lawyer must disclose the risks associated with the lawyer's dual role as both legal adviser and participant in the transaction, such as the risk that the lawyer will structure the transaction or give legal advice in a way that favors the lawyer's interests at the expense of the client. Moreover, the lawyer must obtain the client's informed consent. In some cases, the lawyer's interest may be such that Rule 1.7 will preclude the lawyer from seeking the client's consent to the transaction.

If the client is independently represented in the transaction, paragraph (a)(2) of this Rule is inapplicable, and the subsection (a)(1) requirement for full disclosure is satisfied either by a written disclosure by the lawyer involved in the transaction or by the client's independent counsel. The fact that the client was independently represented in the transaction is relevant in determining whether the agreement was fair and reasonable to the client as subsection (a)(1) further requires.

Use of Information Related to Representation. Use of information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the client violates the lawyer's duty of loyalty. Subsection (b) applies when the information is used to benefit either the lawyer or a third person, such as another client or business associate of the lawyer. For example, if a lawyer learns that a client intends to purchase and develop

several parcels of land, the lawyer may not use that information to purchase one of the parcels in competition with the client or to recommend that another client make such a purchase. The Rule does not prohibit uses that do not disadvantage the client. For example, a lawyer who learns a government agency's interpretation of trade legislation during the representation of one client may properly use that information to benefit other clients. Subsection (b) prohibits disadvantageous use of client information unless the client gives informed consent, except as permitted or required by these Rules. See Rules 1.2(d), 1.6, 1.9(c), 3.3, 4.1(b), 8.1 and 8.3.

Gifts to Lawyers. A lawyer may accept a gift from a client, if the transaction meets general standards of fairness. For example, a simple gift such as a present given at a holiday or as a token of appreciation is permitted. If a client offers the lawyer a more substantial gift, subsection (c) does not prohibit the lawyer from accepting it, although such a gift may be voidable by the client under the doctrine of undue influence, which treats client gifts as presumptively fraudulent. In any event, due to concerns about overreaching and imposition on clients, a lawyer may not suggest that a substantial gift be made to the lawyer or for the lawyer's benefit, except where the lawyer is related to the client as set forth in paragraph (c).

If effectuation of a substantial gift requires preparing a legal instrument such as a will or conveyance, however, the client should have the detached advice that another lawyer can provide. Subsection (e) recognizes an The sole exception to this Rule is where the client is a relative of the done or the gift is not substantial.

AMENDMENT NOTES: The above two paragraphs were previously included under the "Transactions Between Client and Lawyer" heading located earlier in the Commentary for this rule.

This Rule does not prohibit a lawyer from seeking to have the lawyer or a partner or associate of the lawyer named as executor of the client's estate or to another potentially lucrative fiduciary position. Nevertheless, such appointments will be subject to the general conflict of interest provision in Rule 1.7 when there is a significant risk that the lawyer's interest in obtaining the appointment will materially limit the lawyer's independent professional judgment in advising the client concerning the choice of an executor or other fiduciary. In obtaining the client's informed consent to the conflict, the lawyer should advise the client concerning the nature and extent of the lawyer's financial interest in the appointment, as well as the availability of alternative candidates for the position.

Literary Rights. An agreement by which a lawyer acquires literary or media rights concerning the conduct of the representation creates a conflict between the interests of the client and the personal interests of the lawyer. Measures suitable in the representation of the client may detract from the publication value of an account of the representation. Subsection (d) does not prohibit a lawyer representing a client in a transaction concerning literary property from agreeing that the lawyer's fee shall consist of a share in ownership in the property, if the arrangement conforms to Rule 1.5 and subsection (j) subsections (a) and (i).

Financial Assistance. Lawyers may not subsidize lawsuits or administrative proceedings brought on behalf of their clients, including making or guaranteeing loans to their clients for living expenses, because to do so would encourage clients to pursue lawsuits that might not otherwise be brought and because such assistance gives lawyers too great a financial stake in the litigation. These dangers do not warrant a prohibition on a lawyer lending a client court costs and litigation expenses, including the expenses of medical examination and the costs of obtaining and presenting evidence, because these advances are virtually indistinguishable from contingent fees and help ensure access to the courts. Similarly, an exception allowing lawyers representing indigent clients to pay court costs and litigation expenses regardless of whether these funds will be repaid is warranted.

Person Paying for a Lawyer's Services. Subsection (f) requires disclosure of the fact that the lawyer's services are being paid for by a third party. Such an arrangement must also conform to the requirements of Rule 1.6 concerning confidentiality and Rule 1.7 concerning conflict of interest. Where the client is a class, consent may be obtained on behalf of the class by court-supervised procedure.

Lawyers are frequently asked to represent a client under circumstances in which a third person will compensate the lawyer, in whole or in part. The third person might be a relative or friend, an indemnitor (such as a liability insurance company) or a co-client (such as a corporation sued along with one or more of its employees). Because third-party payers frequently have interests that differ from those of the client, including interests in minimizing the amount spent on the representation and in learning how the representation is progressing, lawyers are prohibited from accepting or continuing such representations unless the lawyer determines that there will be no interference with the lawyer's independent professional judgment and there is informed consent from the client. See also Rule 5.4(c) (prohibiting interference with a lawyer's professional judgment by one who recommends, employs or pays the lawyer to render legal services for another).

Sometimes, it will be sufficient for the lawyer to obtain the client's informed consent regarding the fact of the payment and the identity of the third-party payer. If, however, the fee arrangement creates a conflict of interest for the lawyer, then the lawyer must comply with Rule. 1.7. The lawyer must also

conform to the requirements of Rule 1.6 concerning confidentiality. Under Rule 1.7(a), a conflict of interest exists if there is significant risk that the lawyer's representation of the client will be materially limited by the lawyer's own interest in the fee arrangement or by the lawyer's responsibilities to the third-party payer (for example, when the third-party payer is a co-client). Under Rule 1.7(b), the lawyer may accept or continue the representation with the informed consent of each affected client, unless the conflict is nonconsentable under that subsection. Under Rule 1.7(b), the informed consent must be confirmed in writing.

Limiting Liability. Subsection (h) is not intended to apply to customary qualifications and limitations in legal opinions and memoranda.

Family Relationships between Lawyers. Subsection (i) applies to related lawyers who are in different firms. Related lawyers in the same firm are governed by Rules 1.7, 1.9, and 1.10. The disqualification stated in subsection (i) is personal and is not imputed to members of firms with whom the lawyers are associated.

Aggregate Settlements. Differences in willingness to make or accept an offer of settlement are among the risks of common representation of multiple clients by a single lawyer. Under Rule 1.7, this is one of the risks that should be discussed before undertaking the representation, as part of the process of obtaining the clients' informed consent. In addition, Rule 1.2(a) protects each client's right to have the final say in deciding whether to accept or reject an offer of settlement and in deciding whether to enter a guilty or nolo contendere plea in a criminal case. The rule stated in this paragraph is a corollary of both these Rules and provides that, before any settlement offer or plea bargain is made or accepted on behalf of multiple clients, the lawyer must inform each of them about all the material terms of the settlement, including what the other clients will receive or pay if the settlement or plea offer is accepted. See also Rule 1.0(f) (definition of informed consent). Lawyers representing a class of plaintiffs or defendants, or those proceeding derivatively, may not have a full client-lawyer relationship with each member of the class; nevertheless, such lawyers must comply with applicable rules regulating notification of class members and other procedural requirements designed to ensure adequate protection of the entire class.

Limiting Liability and Settling Malpractice Claims. Agreements prospectively limiting a lawyer's liability for malpractice are prohibited unless the client is independently represented in making the agreement because they are likely to undermine competent and diligent representation. Also, many clients are unable to evaluate the desirability of making such an agreement before a dispute has arisen, particularly if they are then represented by the lawyer seeking the agreement. This subsection does not, however, prohibit a lawyer from entering into an agreement with the client to arbitrate legal malpractice claims, provided such agreements are enforceable and the client is fully informed of the scope and effect of the agreement. Nor does this subsection limit the ability of lawyers to practice in the form of a limited-liability entity, where permitted by law, provided that each lawyer remains personally liable to the client for his or her own conduct and the firm complies with any conditions required by law, such as provisions requiring client notification or maintenance of adequate liability insurance. Nor does it prohibit an agreement in accordance with Rule 1.2 that defines the scope of the representation, although a definition of scope that makes the obligations of representation illusory will amount to an attempt to limit liability.

Agreements settling a claim or a potential claim for malpractice are not prohibited by this Rule. Nevertheless, in view of the danger that a lawyer will take unfair advantage of an unrepresented client or former client, the lawyer must first advise such a person in writing of the appropriateness of independent representation in connection with such a settlement. In addition, the lawyer must give the client or former client a reasonable opportunity to find and consult independent counsel.

Acquisition of Acquiring Proprietary Interest in Litigation. Subsection (i) (i) states the traditional general rule that lawyers are prohibited from acquiring a proprietary interest in litigation. Like subsection (e), the This general rule, which has its basis in common law champerty and maintenance, is designed to avoid giving the lawyer too great an interest in the representation. In addition, when the lawyer acquires an ownership interest in the subject of the representation, it will be more difficult for a client to discharge the lawyer if the client so desires. The Rule is subject to specific exceptions developed in decisional law and continued in these Rules, such as the exception for reasonable contingent fees set forth in Rule 1.5 and the exception for certain advances of the costs of litigation set forth in subsection (e) The exception for certain advances of the costs of litigation is set forth in subsection (e). In addition, subsection (i) sets forth exceptions for liens authorized by law to secure the lawyer's fees or expenses and contracts for reasonable contingent fees. The law of each jurisdiction determines which liens are authorized by law. These may include liens granted by statute, liens originating in common law and liens acquired by contract with the client. When a lawyer acquires by contract a security interest in property other than that recovered through the lawyer's efforts in the litigation, such an acquisition is a business or financial transaction with a client and is governed by the requirements of subsection (a). Contracts for contingent fees in civil cases are governed by Rule 1.5.

Client-Lawyer Sexual Relationships. The relationship between lawyer and client is a fiduciary one in which the lawyer occupies the highest position of trust and confidence. The relationship is almost always unequal; thus, a sexual relationship between lawyer and client can involve unfair exploitation of the lawyer's fiduciary role, in violation of the lawyer's basic ethical obligation not to use the trust of the client to the client's disadvantage. In addition, such a relationship presents a significant danger that, because of the lawyer's emotional involvement, the lawyer will be unable to represent the client without impairment of the exercise of independent professional judgment. Moreover, a blurred line between the professional and personal relationships may make it difficult to predict to what extent client confidences will be protected by the attorney-client evidentiary privilege, since client confidences are protected by privilege only when they are imparted in the context of the client-lawyer relationship. Because of the significant danger of harm to client interest and because the client's own emotional involvement renders it unlikely that the client could give adequate informed consent, this Rule prohibits the lawyer from having sexual relations with a client regardless of whether the relationship is consensual and regardless of the absence of prejudice to the client.

Sexual relationships that predate the client-lawyer relationship are not prohibited. Issues relating to the exploitation of the fiduciary relationship and client dependency are diminished when the sexual relationship existed prior to the commencement of the client-lawyer relationship. However, before proceeding with the representation in these circumstances, the lawyer should consider whether the lawyer's ability to represent the client will be materially limited by the relationship. See Rule 1.7(a)(2).

Imputation of Prohibitions. Under subsection (k), a prohibition on conduct by an individual lawyer in subsections (a) through (i) also applies to all lawyers associated in a firm with the personally prohibited lawyer. The prohibition set forth in subsection (j) is personal and is not applied to associated lawyers.

Rule 1.9. Conflict of Interest: <u>Duties To</u> Former Clients

- (a) A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter: (1) Rrepresent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former client consents after consultation; or gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.
- (b) A lawyer shall not knowingly represent a person in the same or a substantially related matter in which a firm with which the lawyer formerly was associated had previously represented a client
 - (1) whose interests are materially adverse to that person; and
- (2) about whom the lawyer had acquired information protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c) that is material to the matter; unless the former client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.
- (c) A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter or whose present or former firm has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter:
- (2) U(1) use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the former client except as Rule 1.6 these Rules would permit or require with respect to a client, or when the information has become generally known; or
- (2) reveal information relating to the representation except as these Rules would permit or require with respect to a client.

COMMENTARY: After termination of a client-lawyer relationship, a lawyer <u>has certain continuing duties with respect to confidentiality and conflicts of interest and thus</u> may not represent another client except in conformity with this Rule. The principles in Rule 1.7 determine whether the interests of the present and former client are adverse. Thus <u>Under this Rule, for example</u>, a lawyer could not properly seek to rescind on behalf of a new client a contract drafted on behalf of the former client. So also a lawyer who has prosecuted an accused person could not properly represent the accused in a subsequent civil action against the government concerning the same transaction. Nor could a lawyer who has represented multiple clients in a matter represent one of the clients against the interest of the others in the same or a substantially related matter after a dispute arose among the clients in that matter, unless all affected clients give informed consent. See last paragraph of this Commentary, below. Current and former government lawyers must comply with this Rule to the extent required by Rule 1.11.

The scope of a "matter" for purposes of subdivision (1) this Rule may depend depends on the facts of a particular situation or transaction. The lawyer's involvement in a matter can also be a question of degree. When a lawyer has been directly involved in a specific transaction, subsequent representation of other clients with materially adverse interests in that transaction clearly is prohibited. On the other

hand, a lawyer who recurrently handled a type of problem for a former client is not precluded from later representing another client in a wholly factually distinct problem of that type even though the subsequent representation involves a position adverse to the prior client. Similar considerations can apply to the reassignment of military lawyers between defense and prosecution functions within the same military jurisdictions. The underlying question is whether the lawyer was so involved in the matter that the subsequent representation can be justly regarded as a changing of sides in the matter in question.

Matters are "substantially related" for purposes of this Rule if they involve the same transaction or legal dispute or if there otherwise is a substantial risk that confidential factual information as would normally have been obtained in the prior representation would materially advance the client's position in the subsequent matter. For example, a lawyer who has represented a businessperson and learned extensive private financial information about that person may not then represent that person's spouse in seeking a divorce. Similarly, a lawyer who has previously represented a client in securing environmental permits to build a shopping center would be precluded from representing neighbors seeking to oppose rezoning of the property on the basis of environmental considerations; however, the lawyer would not be precluded, on the grounds of substantial relationship, from defending a tenant of the completed shopping center in resisting eviction for nonpayment of rent. Information that has been disclosed to the public or to other parties adverse to the former client ordinarily will not be disqualifying. Information acquired in a prior representation may have been rendered obsolete by the passage of time, a circumstance that may be relevant in determining whether two representations are substantially related. In the case of an organizational client, general knowledge of the client's policies and practices ordinarily will not preclude a subsequent representation; on the other hand, knowledge of specific facts gained in a prior representation that are relevant to the matter in question ordinarily will preclude such a representation. A former client is not required to reveal the confidential information learned by the lawyer in order to establish a substantial risk that the lawyer has confidential information to use in the subsequent matter. A conclusion about the possession of such information may be based on the nature of the services the lawyer provided the former client and information that would in ordinary practice be learned by a lawyer providing such services.

Lawyers Moving Between Firms. When lawyers have been associated within a firm but then end their association, the question of whether a lawyer should undertake representation is more however, the problem is more complicated. There are several competing considerations. The fiction that the law firm is the same as a single is no longer wholly realistic. First, the client previously represented by the former firm must be reasonably assured that the principle of loyalty to the client is not compromised. Second, the rule of disqualification should not be so broadly cast as to preclude other persons from having reasonable choice of legal counsel. Third, the rule should not unreasonably hamper lawyers from forming new associations and taking on new clients after having left a previous association. In this connection, it should be recognized that today many lawyers practice in firms, that many lawyers to some degree limit their practice to one field or another, and that many move from one association to another several times in their careers. If the concept of imputation imputed disqualification were applied with unqualified rigor, the result would be radical curtailment of the opportunity of lawyers to move from one practice setting to another and of the opportunity of clients to change counsel.

Reconciliation of these competing principles in the past has been attempted under two rubries. One approach has been to seek per se rules of disqualification. For example, it has been held that a partner in a law firm is conclusively presumed to have access to all confidences concerning all clients of the firm. Under this analysis, if a lawyer has been a partner in one law firm and then becomes a partner in another law firm, there is a presumption that all confidences known by a partner in the first firm are known to all partners in the second firm. This presumption might properly be applied in some circumstances, especially where the client has been extensively represented, but may be unrealistic where the client was represented only for limited purposes. Furthermore, such a rigid rule exaggerates the difference between a partner and an associate in modern law firms.

The other rubric formerly used for dealing with vicarious disqualification is the appearance of impropriety proscribed in Canon 9 of the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility. This rubric has a twofold problem. First, the appearance of impropriety can be taken to include any new client-lawyer relationship that might make a former client feel anxious. If that meaning were adopted, disqualification would become little more than a question of subjective judgment by the former client. Second, since ''impropriety'' is undefined, the term ''appearance of impropriety'' is question-begging. It therefore has to be recognized that the problem of imputed disqualification cannot be properly resolved either by simple analogy to a lawyer practicing alone or by the very general concept of appearance of impropriety.

A rule based on a functional analysis is more appropriate for determining the question of vicarious disqualification. Two functions are involved: preserving confidentiality and avoiding positions adverse to a client.

AMENDMENT NOTES: The above section entitled "Lawyers Moving Between Firms" was previously a Commentary to Rule 1.10.

Confidentiality

Subsection (b) and (e) operates to disqualify the <u>lawyer firm</u> only when the lawyer involved has actual knowledge of information protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(b)(c). Thus, if a lawyer while with one firm acquired no knowledge or information relating to a particular client of the firm, and that lawyer later joined another firm, neither the lawyer individually nor the second firm is disqualified from representing another client in the same or a related matter even though the interests of the two clients conflict. See Rule 1.10(b) for the restrictions on a firm once a lawyer has terminated association with the firm.

Preserving confidentiality is a question of access to information. Access to information, in turn, is essentially a question of fact in Application of subsection (b) depends on a situation's particular eireumstances facts, aided by inferences, deductions or working presumptions that reasonably may be made about the way in which lawyers work together. A lawyer may have general access to files of all clients of a law firm and may regularly participate in discussions of their affairs; it should be inferred that such a lawyer in fact is privy to all information about all the firm's clients. In contrast, another lawyer may have access to the files of only a limited number of clients and participate in discussions of the affairs of no other clients; in the absence of information to the contrary, it should be inferred that such a lawyer in fact is privy to information about the clients actually served but not those of other clients. In such an inquiry, the burden of proof rests upon the firm whose disqualification is sought.

Application of subsections (b) and (c) depends on a situation's particular facts. In any such inquiry, the burden of proof should rest upon the firm whose disqualification is sought.

Independent of the question of disqualification of a firm, a lawyer changing professional association has a continuing duty to preserve confidentiality of information about a client formerly represented. See Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c).

AMENDMENT NOTES: The above four paragraphs were previously located under the "Confidentiality" heading under the Commentary to Rule 1.10.

Information Subsection (c) provides that information acquired by the lawyer in the course of representing a client may not subsequently be used or revealed by the lawyer to the disadvantage of the client. However, the fact that a lawyer has once served a client does not preclude the lawyer from using generally known information about that client when later representing another client.

Disqualification from subsequent representation is The provisions of this Rule are for the protection of former clients and can be waived by them. A waiver is effective only if there is disclosure of the eircumstances, including the lawyer's intended role in behalf of the new client if the client gives informed consent, which consent must be confirmed in writing under subsections (a) and (b). See Rule 1.0(f).

AMENDMENT NOTES: The following sentence used to be the beginning of a new paragraph. With regard to an opposing party's raising a question of conflict of interestthe effectiveness of an advance waiver, see Commentary to Rule 1.7. With regard to disqualification of a firm with which a lawyer is or was formerly associated, see Rule 1.10.

Rule 1.10. Imputed Disqualification Imputation of Conflicts of Interest: General Rule

- (a) While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a client when any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so by Rules 1.7, 1.8(c), or 1.9 or 2.2, unless the prohibition is based on a personal interest of the prohibited lawyer and does not present a significant risk of materially limiting the representation of the client by the remaining lawyers in the firm.
- (b) When a lawyer becomes associated with a firm, the firm may not knowingly represent a person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that lawyer, or a firm with which the lawyer was associated, had previously represented a client whose interests are materially adverse to that person and about whom the lawyer had acquired information protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(2) that is material to the matter.
- (b)(e) When a lawyer has terminated an association with a firm, the firm is not prohibited from thereafter representing a person with interests materially adverse to those of a client represented by the formerly associated lawyer and not currently represented by the firm, unless:

- (1) The matter is the same or substantially related to that in which the formerly associated lawyer represented the client; and
- (2) Any lawyer remaining in the firm has information protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(2) that is material to the matter.
- (d)(c) A disqualification prescribed by this Rule may be waived by the affected client under the conditions stated in Rule 1.7.
- (d) The disqualification of lawyers associated in a firm with former or current government lawyers is governed by Rule 1.11.

COMMENTARY: Definition of "Firm." For purposes of the Rules of Professional Conduct, the term "firm" includes denotes lawyers in a private firm, and law partnership, professional corporation, sole proprietorship or other association authorized to practice law; or lawyers employed in a legal services organization or the legal department of a corporation or other organization, or in a legal services organization. See Rule 1.0(d). Whether two or more lawyers constitute a firm within this definition can depend on the specific facts. For example, two practitioners who share office space and oceasionally consult or assist each other ordinarily would not be regarded as constituting a firm. However, if they present themselves to the public in a way suggesting that they are a firm or conduct themselves as a firm, they should be regarded as a firm for purposes of the Rules. The terms of any formal agreement between associated lawyers are relevant in determining whether they are a firm, as is the fact that they have mutual access to information concerning the clients they serve. Furthermore, it is relevant in doubtful cases to consider the underlying purpose of the rule that is involved. A group of lawyers could be regarded as a firm for purposes of the rule that is involved. A group of lawyers could be regarded as a firm for purposes of the rule that the same lawyer should not represent opposing parties in litigation, while it might not be so regarded for purposes of the rule that information acquired by one lawyer is attributed to another. See Rule 1.0 and its Commentary.

With respect to the law department of an organization, there is ordinarily no question that the members of the department constitute a firm within the meaning of the Rules of Professional Conduct. However, there can be uncertainty as to the identity of the client. For example, it may not be clear whether the law department of a corporation represents a subsidiary or an affiliated corporation, as well as the corporation by which the members of the department are directly employed. A similar question can arise concerning an unincorporated association and its local affiliates.

Similar questions can also arise with respect to lawyers in legal aid. Lawyers employed in the same unit of a legal service organization constitute a firm, but not necessarily those employed in separate units. As in the case of independent practitioners, whether the lawyers should be treated as associated with each other can depend on the particular rule that is involved, and on the specific facts of the situation.

Where a lawyer has joined a private firm after having represented the government, the situation is governed by Rule 1.11(a) and (b); where a lawyer represents the government after having served private elients, the situation is governed by Rule 1.11(c)(1). The individual lawyer involved is bound by the Rules generally, including Rules 1.6, 1.7, and 1.9.

AMENDMENT NOTES: The above paragraph has been amended and moved to later in this Commentary.

Different provisions are thus made for movement of a lawyer from one private firm to another and for movement of a lawyer between a private firm and the government. The government is entitled to protection of its client confidences and, therefore, to the protections provided in Rules 1.6, 1.9 and 1.11. However, if the more extensive disqualification in Rule 1.10 were applied to former government lawyers, the potential effect on the government would be unduly burdensome. The government deals with all private citizens and organizations and, thus, has a much wider circle of adverse legal interests than does any private law firm. In these circumstances, the government's recruitment of lawyers would be seriously impaired if Rule 1.10 were applied to the government. On balance, therefore, the government is better served in the long run by the protections stated in Rule 1.11.

Principles of Imputed Disqualification. The rule of imputed disqualification stated in subsection (a) gives effect to the principle of loyalty to the client as it applies to lawyers who practice in a law firm. Such situations can be considered from the premise that a firm of lawyers is essentially one lawyer for purposes of the rules governing loyalty to the client, or from the premise that each lawyer is vicariously bound by the obligation of loyalty owed by each lawyer with whom the lawyer is associated. Subsection (a) operates only among the lawyers currently associated in a firm. When a lawyer moves from one firm to another, the situation is governed by subsections (b) and (c) Rules 1.9(b) and 1.10(b).

The rule in subsection (a) does not prohibit representation where neither questions of client loyalty nor protection of confidential information are presented. Where one lawyer in a firm could not effectively represent a given client because of strong political beliefs, for example, but that lawyer will do no work on the case and the personal beliefs of the lawyer will not materially limit the representation by others in the firm, the firm should not be disqualified. On the other hand, if an opposing party in a case were

owned by a lawyer in the law firm, and others in the firm would be materially limited in pursuing the matter because of loyalty to that lawyer, the personal disqualification of the lawyer would be imputed to all others in the firm.

The rule in subsection (a) also does not prohibit representation by others in the law firm where the person prohibited from involvement in a matter is a nonlawyer, such as a paralegal or legal secretary. Nor does subsection (a) prohibit representation if the lawyer is prohibited from acting because of events before the person became a lawyer, for example, work that the person did while a law student. Such persons, however, must be screened from any personal participation in the matter to avoid communication to others in the firm of confidential information that both the nonlawyers and the firm have a legal duty to protect. See Rules 1.0(k) and 5.3.

Rule 1.10(b) operates to permit a law firm, under certain circumstances, to represent a person with interests directly adverse to those of a client represented by a lawyer who formerly was associated with the firm. The Rule applies regardless of when the formerly associated lawyer represented the client. However, the law firm may not represent a person with interests adverse to those of a present client of the firm, which would violate Rule 1.7. Moreover, the firm may not represent the person where the matter is the same or substantially related to that in which the formerly associated lawyer represented the client and any other lawyer currently in the firm has material information protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c).

Rule 1.10(c) removes imputation with the informed consent of the affected client or former client under the conditions stated in Rule 1.7. The conditions stated in Rule 1.7 require the lawyer to determine that the representation is not prohibited by Rule 1.7(b) and that each affected client or former client has given informed consent to the representation, confirmed in writing. In some cases, the risk may be so severe that the conflict may not be cured by client consent. For a discussion of the effectiveness of client waivers of conflicts that might arise in the future, see Rule 1.7 and its Commentary. For a definition of informed consent, see Rule 1.0(f).

Where a lawyer has joined a private firm after having represented the government, the situation imputation is governed by Rule 1.11(a) and (b) and (c); not this Rule. Under Rule 1.11(d), where a lawyer represents the government after having served private clients; the situation is governed by Rule 1.11(e)(1). The individual lawyer involved is bound by the Rules generally, including Rules 1.6, 1.7 and 1.9 in private practice, nongovernmental employment or in another government agency, formerclient conflicts are not imputed to government lawyers associated with the individually disqualified lawyer.

AMENDMENT NOTES: The above paragraph was previously located earlier in the Commentary to this Rule under the "Definition of 'Firm" heading.

Where a lawyer is prohibited from engaging in certain transactions under Rule 1.8, subsection (k) of that Rule, and not this Rule, determines whether that prohibition also applies to other lawyers associated in a firm with the personally prohibited lawyer.

Lawyers Moving Between Firms. When lawyers have been associated in a firm but then end their association, however, the problem is more complicated. The fiction that the law firm is the same as a single lawyer is no longer wholly realistic. There are several competing considerations. First, the client previously represented must be reasonably assured that the principle of loyalty to the client is not compromised. Second, the rule of disqualification should not be so broadly east as to preclude other persons from having reasonable choice of legal counsel. Third, the rule of disqualification should not unreasonably hamper lawyers from forming new associations and taking on new clients after having left a previous association. In this connection, it should be recognized that today many lawyers practice in firms, that many to some degree limit their practice to one field or another, and that many move from one association to another several times in their careers. If the concept of imputed disqualification were defined with unqualified rigor, the result would be radical curtailment of the opportunity of lawyers to move from one practice setting to another and of the opportunity of clients to change counsel.

Reconciliation of these competing principles in the past has been attempted under two rubries. One approach has been to seek per se rules of disqualification. For example, it has been held that a partner in a law firm is conclusively presumed to have access to all confidences concerning all clients of the firm. Under this analysis, if a lawyer has been a partner in one law firm and then becomes a partner in there is a presumption that all confidences known by a partner in the first firm are known to all partners in the second firm. This presumption might properly be applied in some circumstances, especially where the client has been extensively represented, but may be unrealistic where the client was represented only for limited purposes. Furthermore, such a rigid rule exaggerates the difference between a partner and an associate in modern law firms.

The other rubric formerly used for dealing with vicarious disqualification is the appearance of impropriety proscribed in Canon 9 of the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility. This rubric has a twofold problem. First, the appearance of impropriety can be taken to include any new client-lawyer relationship that might make a former client feel anxious. If that meaning were adopted, disqualification would become little more than a question of subjective judgment by the former client. Second,

since "impropriety" is undefined, the term "appearance of impropriety" is question-begging. It therefore has to be recognized that the problem of imputed disqualification cannot be properly resolved either by simple analogy to a lawyer practicing alone or by the very general concept of appearance of impropriety.

A rule based on a functional analysis is more appropriate for determining the question of vicarious disqualification. Two functions are involved: preserving confidentiality and avoiding positions adverse to a client.

Confidentiality. Preserving confidentiality is a question of access to information. Access to information, in turn, is essentially a question of fact in particular circumstances, aided by inferences, deductions or working presumptions that reasonably may be made about the way in which lawyers work together. A lawyer may have general access to files of all clients of a law firm and may regularly participate in discussions of their affairs; it should be inferred that such a lawyer in fact is privy to all information about all the firm's clients. In contrast, another lawyer may have access to the files of only a limited number of clients and participate in discussion of the affairs of no other clients; in the absence of information to the contrary, it should be inferred that such a lawyer in fact is privy to information about the clients actually served but not those of other clients:

Application of subsections (b) and (c) depends on a situation's particular facts. In any such inquiry, the burden of proof should rest upon the firm whose disqualification is sought.

Subsections (b) and (c) operate to disqualify the firm only when the lawyer involved has actual knowledge of information protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9 (2). Thus, if a lawyer while with one firm acquired no knowledge of information relating to a particular client of the firm, and that lawyer later joined another firm, neither the lawyer individually nor the second firm is disqualified from representing another client in the same or a related matter even though the interests of the two clients conflict.

Independent of the question of disqualification of a firm, a lawyer changing professional association has a continuing duty to preserve confidentiality of information about a client formerly represented. See Rules 1.6 and 1.9.

AMENDMENT NOTES: The sections entitled "Lawyers Moving Between Firms," and "Confidentiality" have been amended and relocated as a Commentary to Rule 1.9.

Adverse Positions. The second aspect of loyalty to a client is the lawyer's obligation to decline subsequent representations involving positions adverse to a former client arising in substantially related matters. This obligation requires abstention from adverse representation by the individual lawyer involved, but does not properly entail abstention of other lawyers through imputed disqualification. Hence, this aspect of the problem is governed by Rule 1.9 (1). Thus, if a lawyer left one firm for another, the new affiliation would not preclude the firms involved from continuing to represent clients with adverse interests in the same or related matters, so long as the conditions of subsections (b) and (e) concerning confidentiality have been met.

Rule 1.11. Successive Special Conflicts of Interest For Former and Current Government Officers and Private Employment Employees

- (a) Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer who has formerly served as a public officer or employee of the government:
 - (1) is subject to Rule 1.9(c); and
- (2) shall not otherwise represent a private client in connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a public officer or employee, unless the appropriate government agency consents after consultation gives its informed consent, confirmed in writing, to the representation.
- (b) No When a lawyer is disqualified from representation under subsection (a), no lawyer in a firm with which that lawyer is associated may knowingly undertake or continue representation in such a matter unless:
- (1) The disqualified lawyer is <u>timely</u> screened from any participation in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom; and
- (2) Written notice is promptly given to the appropriate government agency to enable it to ascertain compliance with the provisions of this Rule.
- (b)(c) Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer having information that the lawyer knows is confidential government information about a person acquired when the lawyer was a public officer or employee, may not represent a private client whose interests are adverse to that person in a matter in which the information could be used to the material disadvantage of that person. As used in this Rule, the term "confidential government information" means information that

has been obtained under governmental authority and which, at the time this Rule is applied, the government is prohibited by law from disclosing to the public or has a legal privilege not to disclose and which is not otherwise available to the public. A firm with which that lawyer is associated may undertake or continue representation in the matter only if the disqualified lawyer is timely screened from any participation in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom.

- (e)(d) Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer <u>currently</u> serving as a public officer or employee:
 - (1) Is subject to Rules 1.7 and 1.9; and
 - (2) Shall not:
- (1)(i) Participate in a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially while in private practice or nongovernmental employment, unless under applicable law no one is, or by lawful delegation may be, authorized to act in the lawyer's stead in the matter the appropriate government agency gives its informed consent, confirmed in writing; or
- (2) (ii) Negotiate for private employment with any person who is involved as a party or as attorney lawyer for a party in a matter in which the lawyer is participating personally and substantially—; except that a lawyer serving as a law clerk to a judge, other adjudicative officer or arbitrator may negotiate for private employment as permitted by Rule 1.12(b) and subject to the conditions stated in Rule 1.12(b).
 - (d) (e) As used in this Rule, the term "matter" includes:
- (1) Any judicial or other proceeding, application, request for a ruling or other determination, contract, claim, controversy, investigation, charge, accusation, arrest or other particular matter involving a specific party or parties, and
- (2) Any other matter covered by the conflict of interest rules of the appropriate government agency.
- (e) As used in this Rule, the term "confidential government information" means information which has been obtained under governmental authority and which, at the time this Rule is applied, the government is prohibited by law from disclosing to the public or has a legal privilege not to disclose, and which is not otherwise available to the public.

COMMENTARY: This Rule prevents a lawyer from exploiting public office for the advantage of a private client. It is a counterpart of Rule 1.10(b), which applies to lawyers moving from one firm to another.

A lawyer representing a government agency, whether employed or specially retained by the government, who has served or is currently serving as a public officer or employee is personally subject to the Rules of Professional Conduct, including the prohibition against representing adverse interests concurrent conflicts of interest stated in Rule 1.7 and the protections afforded former clients in Rule 1.9. In addition, such a lawyer is may be subject to Rule 1.11 and to statutes and government regulations regarding conflict of interest. Such statutes and regulations may circumscribe the extent to which the government agency may give consent under this Rule. See Rule 1.0(f) for the definition of informed consent.

Subsections (a)(1), (a)(2) and (d)(1) restate the obligations of an individual lawyer who has served or is currently serving as an officer or employee of the government toward a former government or private client. Rule 1.10 is not applicable to the conflicts of interest addressed by this Rule. Rather, subsection (b) sets forth a special imputation rule for former government lawyers that provides for screening and notice. Because of the special problems raised by imputation within a government agency, subsection (d) does not impute the conflicts of a lawyer currently serving as an officer or employee of the government to other associated government officers or employees, although ordinarily it will be prudent to screen such lawyers.

Subsections (a)(2) and (d)(2) apply regardless of whether a lawyer is adverse to a former client and are thus designed not only to protect the former client, but also to prevent a lawyer from exploiting public office for the advantage of another client. For example, a lawyer who has pursued a claim on behalf of the government may not pursue the same claim on behalf of a later private client after the lawyer has left government service, except when authorized to do so by the government agency under paragraph (a). Similarly, a lawyer who has pursued a claim on behalf of a private client may not pursue the claim on behalf of the government, except when authorized to do so by subsection (d). As with

subsections (a)(1) and (d)(1), Rule 1.10 is not applicable to the conflicts of interest addressed by these subsections.

Where This Rule represents a balancing of interests. On the one hand, where the successive clients are a public government agency and a private another client, public or private, the risk exists that power or discretion vested in that agency public authority might be used for the special benefit of a private the other client. A lawyer should not be in a position where benefit to a private the other client might affect performance of the lawyer's professional functions on behalf of the government public authority. Also, unfair advantage could accrue to the private other client by reason of access to confidential government information about the client's adversary, obtainable only through the lawyer's government service. However On the other hand, the rules governing lawyers presently or formerly employed by a government agency should not be so restrictive as to inhibit transfer of employment to and from the government. The government has a legitimate need to attract qualified lawyers as well as to maintain high ethical standards. Thus a former government lawyer is disqualified only from particular matters in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially. The provisions for screening and waiver in subsection (b) are necessary to prevent the disqualification rule from imposing too severe a deterrent against entering public service. The limitation of disqualification in subsections (a)(2) and (d)(2) to matters involving a specific party or parties, rather than extending disqualification to all substantive issues on which the lawyer worked, serves a similar function.

When the client is an agency of a lawyer has been employed by one government agency and then moves to a second government agency, it may be appropriate to treat that second agency should be treated as a private another client for purposes of this Rule if the lawyer thereafter represents an agency of another government, as when a lawyer represents is employed by a city and subsequently is employed by a federal agency. However, because the conflict of interest is governed by subsection (d), the latter agency is not required to screen the lawyer as subsection (b) requires a law firm to do. The question of whether two government agencies should be regarded as the same or different clients for conflict of interest purposes is beyond the scope of these Rules. See Rule 1.13 Commentary.

<u>Subsections</u> (a)(1) and (b) and (c) contemplate a screening arrangement. See Rule 1.0(*l*) (requirements for screening procedures). These subsections do not prohibit a lawyer from receiving a salary or partnership share established by prior independent agreement. They prohibit, but that lawyer may not receive compensation directly relating the lawyer's compensation to the fee in the matter in which the lawyer is disqualified.

Notice, including a description of the screened lawyer's prior representation and of the screening procedures employed, generally should be given as soon as practicable after the need for screening becomes apparent.

Subsection (a)(2) does not require that a lawyer give notice to the government agency at a time when premature disclosure would injure the client; a requirement for premature disclosure might preclude engagement of the lawyer. Such notice is, however, required to be given as soon as practicable in order that the government agency will have a reasonable opportunity to ascertain that the lawyer is complying with Rule 1.11 and to take appropriate action if it believes the lawyer is not complying.

Subsection (b) (c) operates only when the lawyer in question has knowledge of the information, which means actual knowledge; it does not operate with respect to information that merely could be imputed to the lawyer.

Subsections (a) and (e) (d) do not prohibit a lawyer from jointly representing a private party and a government agency when doing so is permitted by Rule 1.7 and is not otherwise prohibited by law.

Subsection (c) does not disqualify other lawyers in the agency with which the lawyer in question has become associated.

For purposes of subsection (e) of this Rule, a "matter" may continue in another form. In determining whether two particular matters are the same, the lawyer should consider the extent to which the matters involve the same basic facts, the same or related parties, and the time elapsed.

Rule 1.12. Former Judge, of Arbitrator, <u>Mediator or Other Third-Party</u> Neutral

- (a) Except as stated in subsection (d), a lawyer shall not represent anyone in connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a judge or other adjudicative officer, arbitrator or law clerk to such a person or as an arbitrator, mediator or other third-party neutral, unless all parties to the proceeding give informed consent after disclosure, confirmed in writing.
- (b) A lawyer shall not negotiate for employment with any person who is involved as a party or as attorney lawyer for a party in a matter in which the lawyer is participating personally and substantially as a judge or other adjudicative officer,

or <u>as an</u> arbitrator, <u>mediator or other third-party neutral</u>. A lawyer serving as a law clerk to a judge, <u>or</u> other adjudicative officer or arbitrator may negotiate for employment with a party or <u>attorney lawyer</u> involved in a matter in which the clerk is participating personally <u>and substantially</u>, but only after the lawyer has notified the judge, <u>or</u> other adjudicative officer or arbitrator.

- (c) If a lawyer is disqualified by subsection (a), no lawyer in a firm with which that lawyer is associated may knowingly undertake or continue representation in the matter unless:
- (1) The disqualified lawyer is <u>timely</u> screened from any participation in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom; and
- (2) Written notice is promptly given to the <u>parties and any</u> appropriate tribunal to enable it <u>them</u> to ascertain compliance with the provisions of this Rule.
- (d) An arbitrator selected as a partisan of a party in a multi-member arbitration panel is not prohibited from subsequently representing that party.

COMMENTARY: This Rule generally parallels Rule 1.11. The term "personally and substantially" signifies that a judge who was a member of a multi-member court, and thereafter left judicial office to practice law, is not prohibited from representing a client in a matter pending in the court, but in which the former judge did not participate. So also the fact that a former judge exercised administrative responsibility in a court does not prevent the former judge from acting as a lawyer in a matter where the judge had previously exercised remote or incidental administrative responsibility that did not affect the merits. Compare the Commentary to Rule 1.11. The term "adjudicative officer" includes such officials as judges pro tempore, referees, special masters, hearing officers and other parajudicial officers, and also lawyers who serve as part-time judges. Compliance Canons A(2), B(2) and C of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct provide that a part-time judge, judge pro tempore or retired judge recalled to active service, may not "act as a lawyer in any proceeding in which he served as a judge or in any other proceeding related thereto." Although phrased differently from this Rule, those Rules correspond in meaning.

Like former judges, lawyers who have served as arbitrators, mediators or other third-party neutrals may be asked to represent a client in a matter in which the lawyer participated personally. This Rule forbids such representation unless all of the parties to the proceedings give their informed consent, confirmed in writing. See Rule 1.0(e) and (b). Other law or codes of ethics governing third-party neutrals may impose more stringent standards of personal or imputed disqualification. See Rule 2.4.

Although lawyers who serve as third-party neutrals do not have information concerning the parties that is protected under Rule 1.6, they typically owe the parties an obligation of confidentiality under law or codes of ethics governing third-party neutrals. Thus, subsection (c) provides that conflicts of the personally disqualified lawyer will be imputed to other lawyers in a law firm unless the conditions of this subsection are met.

Requirements for screening procedures are stated in Rule 1.0(*I*). Subsection (c)(1) does not prohibit the screened lawyer from receiving a salary or partnership share established by prior independent agreement, but that lawyer may not receive compensation directly related to the matter in which the lawyer is disqualified.

Notice, including a description of the screened lawyer's prior representation and of the screening procedures employed, generally should be given as soon as practicable after the need for screening becomes apparent.

Rule 1.13. Organization as Client

- (a) A lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the organization acting through its duly authorized constituents.
- (b) If a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer, employee or other person associated with the organization is engaged in action, intends to act or refuses to act in a matter related to the representation that is a violation of a legal obligation to the organization, or a violation of law which that reasonably might be imputed to the organization, and that is likely to result in substantial injury to the organization, then the lawyer shall proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization. In determining how to proceed, the lawyer shall give due consideration to the seriousness of the violation and its consequences, the scope and nature of the lawyer's representation, the responsibility in the organization and the apparent

motivation of the person involved, the policies of the organization concerning such matters and any other relevant considerations. Any measures taken shall be designed to minimize disruption of the organization and the risk of revealing information relating to the representation to persons outside the organization. Such measures may include among others:

- (1) Asking reconsideration of the matter;
- (2) Advising that a separate legal opinion on the matter be sought for presentation to appropriate authority in the organization; and
- (3) Referring the matter to higher Unless the lawyer reasonably believes that it is not in the best interest of the organization to do so, the lawyer shall refer the matter to higher authority in the organization, including, if warranted by the seriousness of the matter, referral circumstances, to the highest authority that can act in behalf of the organization as determined by applicable law.
 - (c) If, Except as provided in subsection (d), if
- (1) Despite the lawyer's efforts in accordance with subsection (b), the highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization insists upon or fails to address in a timely and appropriate manner an action, or a refusal to act, that is clearly a violation of law and is likely to result in substantial injury to the organization, the lawyer may resign in accordance with Rule 1.16, as he or she may do under any of the other circumstances set out in Rule 1.16.
- (2) The lawyer reasonably believes that the violation is reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the organization, then the lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation whether or not Rule 1.6 permits such disclosure, but only if and to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent substantial injury to the organization.
- (d) Subsection (c) shall not apply with respect to information relating to a lawyer's representation of an organization to investigate an alleged violation of law, or to defend the organization or an officer, employee or other constituent associated with the organization against a claim arising out of an alleged violation of law.
- (e) A lawyer who reasonably believes that he or she has been discharged because of the lawyer's actions taken pursuant to subsections (b) or (c), or who withdraws under circumstances that require or permit the lawyer to take action under either of those subsections, shall proceed as the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to assure that the organization's highest authority is informed of the lawyer's discharge or withdrawal.
- (d)(f) In dealing with an organization's directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders or other constituents, a lawyer shall explain the identity of the client when it is apparent the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the organization's interests are adverse to those of the constituents with whom the lawyer is dealing.
- (e)(g) A lawyer representing an organization may also represent any of its directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders or other constituents, subject to the provisions of Rule 1.7. If the organization's consent to the dual representation is required by Rule 1.7, the consent shall be given by an appropriate official of the organization other than the individual who is to be represented, or by the shareholders.

COMMENTARY: **The Entity as the Client.** An organizational client is a legal entity, but it cannot act except through its officers, directors, employees, shareholders and other constituents. Officers, directors, employees and shareholders are the constituents of the corporate organizational client. The duties defined in this Commentary apply equally to unincorporated associations. "Other constituents" as used in this Commentary means the positions equivalent to officers, directors, employees and shareholders held by persons acting for organizational clients that are not corporations.

AMENDMENT NOTES: The second sentence in the above paragraph was previously the beginning of a new paragraph.

When one of the constituents of an organizational client communicates with the organization's lawyer in that person's organizational capacity, the communication is protected by Rule 1.6. Thus, by way of example, if an organizational client requests its lawyer to investigate allegations of wrongdoing, interviews made in the course of that investigation between the lawyer and the client's employees or other constituents are covered by Rule 1.6. This does not mean, however, that constituents of an organizational client are the clients of the lawyer. The lawyer may not disclose to such constituents information relating to the representation except for disclosures explicitly or impliedly authorized by the organizational client in order to carry out the representation or as otherwise permitted by Rule 1.6.

When constituents of the organization make decisions for it, the decisions ordinarily must be accepted by the lawyer even if their utility or prudence is doubtful. Decisions concerning policy and operations, including ones entailing serious risk, are not as such in the lawyer's province. However, different eonsiderations arise Subsection (b) makes clear, however, that when the lawyer knows that the organization may is likely to be substantially injured by action of a an officer or other constituent that violates a legal obligation to the organization or is in violation of law. In such a circumstance, it may be reasonably necessary for the lawyer to ask the constituent to reconsider the matter. If that fails, or if the matter is of sufficient seriousness and importance to the organization, it may be reasonably necessary for the lawyer to take steps to have the matter reviewed by a higher authority in the organization. Clear justification should exist for seeking review over the head of the constituent normally responsible for it. The stated policy of the organization may define circumstances and prescribe channels for such review, and a lawyer should encourage the formulation of such a policy. Even in the absence of organization policy, however, the lawyer may have an obligation to refer a matter to higher authority, depending on the seriousness of the matter and whether the constituent in question has apparent motives to act at variance with the organization's interest. Review by the chief executive officer or by the board of directors may be required when the matter is of importance commensurate with their authority. At some point it may be useful or essential to obtain an independent legal opinion, that might be imputed to the organization, the lawyer must proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization. As defined in Rule 1.0(g), knowledge can be inferred from circumstances, and a lawyer cannot ignore the obvious.

In determining how to proceed under subsection (b), the lawyer should give due consideration to the seriousness of the violation and its consequences, the responsibility in the organization and the apparent motivation of the persons involved, the policies of the organization concerning such matters, and any other relevant considerations. Ordinarily, referral to a higher authority would be necessary. In some circumstances, however, it may be appropriate for the lawyer to ask the constituent to reconsider the matter; for example, if the circumstances involve a constituent's innocent misunderstanding of law and subsequent acceptance of the lawyer's advice, the lawyer may reasonably believe that the best interest of the organization does not require that the matter be referred to higher authority. If a constitute persists in conduct contrary to the lawyer's advice, it will be necessary for the lawyer to take steps to have the matter reviewed by a higher authority in the organization. If the matter is of sufficient seriousness and importance or urgency to the organization, referral to higher authority in the organization may be necessary even if the lawyer has not communicated with the constituent. Any measures taken should, to the extent practicable, minimize the risk of revealing information relating to the representation to persons outside the organization. Even in circumstances where a lawyer is not obligated by Rule 1.13 to proceed, a lawyer may bring to the attention of an organizational client, including its highest authority, matters that the lawyer reasonably believes to be of sufficient importance to warrant doing so in the best interest of the organization.

In an extreme case, it may be reasonably necessary for the lawyer to refer the matter to the Subsection (b) also makes clear that when it is reasonably necessary to enable the organization to address the matter in a timely and appropriate manner, the lawyer must refer the matter to higher authority, including, if warranted by the circumstances, the highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization under applicable law. The organization's highest authority. Ordinarily, that is to whom a matter may be referred ordinarily will be the board of directors or similar governing body. However, applicable law may prescribe that under certain conditions the highest authority reposes elsewhere; for example, in the independent directors of a corporation.

Relation to Other Rules. The authority and responsibility provided in subsections (b) this Rule are concurrent with the authority and responsibility provided in other Rules. In particular, this Rule does not limit or expand the lawyer's responsibility under Rules 1.6, 1.8, 1.16, 3.3 and 4.1. Subsection (c) of this Rule supplements Rule 1.6(b) by providing an additional basis upon which the lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation, but does not modify, restrict, or limit the provisions of Rule 1.6(b)(1) - (6). Under subsection (c) the lawyer may reveal such information only when the organization's highest authority insists upon or fails to address threatened or ongoing action that is clearly a violation of law, and then only to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent reasonably certain substantial injury to the organization. It is not necessary that the lawyer's services be used in furtherance

of the violation, but it is required that the matter be related to the lawyer's representation of the organization. If the lawyer's services are being used by an organization to further a crime or fraud by the organization, Rules 1.6(b)(2) and 1.6(b)(3) may permit the lawyer to disclose confidential information. In such circumstances Rule 1.2(d) ean may also be applicable, in which event, withdrawal from the representation under Rule 1.6(a)(1) may be required.

Subsection (d) makes clear that the authority of a lawyer to disclose information relating to a representation in circumstances described in subsection (c) does not apply with respect to information relating to a lawyer's engagement by an organization to investigate an alleged violation of law or to defend the organization or an officer, employee or other person associated with the organization against a claim arising out of an alleged violation of law. This is necessary in order to enable organizational clients to enjoy the full benefits of legal counsel in conducting an investigation or defending against a claim.

A lawyer who reasonably believes that he or she has been discharged because of the lawyer's actions taken pursuant to subsection (b) or (c), or who withdraws in circumstances that require or permit the lawyer to take action under either of these subsections, must proceed as the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to assure that the organization's highest authority is informed of the lawyer's discharge or withdrawal.

Government Agency. The duty defined in this Rule applies to governmental organizations. However, when the client is a governmental organization, a different balance may be appropriate between maintaining confidentiality and assuring that the wrongful official act is prevented or rectified, for public business is involved. In addition, duties of lawyers employed by the government or lawyers in military service may be defined by statutes and regulations. Therefore, defining Defining precisely the identity of the client and prescribing the resulting obligations of such lawyers may be more difficult in the government context and is a matter beyond the scope of these Rules. See Scope. Although in some circumstances the client may be a specific agency, it is generally may also be a branch of government, such as the executive branch, or the government as a whole. For example, if the action or failure to act involves the head of a bureau, either the department of which the bureau is a part or the relevant branch of government as a whole may be the client for purpose purposes of this Rule. Moreover, in a matter involving the conduct of government officials, a government lawyer may have authority under applicable law to question such conduct more extensively than that of a lawyer for a private organization in similar circumstances. Thus, when the client is a governmental organization, a different balance may be appropriate between maintaining confidentiality and assuring that the wrongful act is prevented or rectified, for public business is involved. In addition, duties of lawyers employed by the government or lawyers in military service may be defined by statutes and regulations. This Rule does not limit that authority. See note on Scope.

Clarifying the Lawyer's Role. There are times when the organization's interest may be or become adverse to those of one or more of its constituents. In such circumstances the lawyer should advise any constituent, whose interest the lawyer finds adverse to that of the organization of the conflict or potential conflict of interest, that the lawyer cannot represent such constituent, and that such person may wish to obtain independent representation. Care must be taken to assure that the individual understands that, when there is such adversity of interest, the lawyer for the organization cannot provide legal representation for that constituent individual, and that discussions between the lawyer for the organization and the individual may not be privileged.

Whether such a warning should be given by the lawyer for the organization to any constituent individual may turn on the facts of each case.

Dual Representation. Subsection (e) recognizes that a lawyer for an organization may also represent a principal officer or major shareholder.

Derivative Actions. Under generally prevailing law, the shareholders or members of a corporation may bring suit to compel the directors to perform their legal obligations in the supervision of the organization. Members of unincorporated associations have essentially the same right. Such an action may be brought nominally by the organization, but usually is, in fact, a legal controversy over management of the organization.

The question can arise whether counsel for the organization may defend such an action. The proposition that the organization is the lawyer's client does not alone resolve the issue. Most derivative actions are a normal incident of an organization's affairs, to be defended by the organization's lawyer like any other suit. However, if the claim involves serious charges of wrongdoing by those in control of the organization, a conflict may arise between the lawyer's duty to the organization and the lawyer's relationship with the board. In those circumstances, Rule 1.7 governs who should represent the directors and the organization.

Rule 1.14. Client under a Disability with Diminished Capacity

(a) When a client's ability capacity to make adequately considered decisions in connection with the a representation is impaired diminished, whether because of

minority, mental disability impairment or for some other reason, the lawyer shall, as far as reasonably possible, maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship with the client.

- (b) A lawyer may seek the appointment of a guardian or take other protective action with respect to a client, only when When the lawyer reasonably believes that the client has diminished capacity, is at risk of substantial physical, financial or other harm unless action is taken and cannot adequately act in the client's own interest, the lawyer may take reasonably necessary protective action, including consulting with individuals or entities that have the ability to take action to protect the client and, in appropriate cases, seeking the appointment of a guardian ad litem, conservator or guardian.
- (c) Information relating to the representation of a client with diminished capacity is protected by Rule 1.6. When taking protective action pursuant to subsection (b), the lawyer is impliedly authorized under Rule 1.6(a) to reveal information about the client, but only to the extent reasonably necessary to protect the client's interests.

COMMENTARY: The normal client-lawyer relationship is based on the assumption that the client, when properly advised and assisted, is capable of making decisions about important matters. When the client is a minor or suffers from a diminished mental capacity disorder or disability, however, maintaining the ordinary client-lawyer relationship may not be possible in all respects. In particular, and a severely incapacitated person may have no power to make legally binding decisions. Nevertheless, a client lacking legal competence with diminished capacity often has the ability to understand, deliberate upon, and reach conclusions about matters affecting the client's own well-being. Furthermore, to an increasing extent the law recognizes intermediate degrees of competence: For example, children as young as five or six years of age, and certainly those of ten or twelve, are regarded as having opinions that are entitled to weight in legal proceedings concerning their custody. So also, it is recognized that some persons of advanced age can be quite capable of handling routine financial matters while needing special legal protection concerning major transactions.

The fact that a client suffers a disability does not diminish the lawyer's obligation to treat the client with attention and respect. If the person has no guardian or legal representative, the lawyer often must act as de facto guardian. Even if the person does have has a legal representative, the lawyer should as far as possible accord the represented person the status of client, particularly in maintaining communication.

The client may wish to have family members or other persons participate in discussions with the lawyer. When necessary to assist in the representation, the presence of such persons generally does not constitute a waiver of the attorney-client evidentiary privilege. Nevertheless, the lawyer must keep the client's interests foremost and, except for protective action authorized under subsection (b), must look to the client, and not family members, to make decisions on the client's behalf.

If a legal representative has already been appointed for the client, the lawyer should ordinarily look to the representative for decisions on behalf of the client. If a legal representative has not been appointed, the lawyer should see to such an appointment where it would serve the client's best interests. Thus, if a disabled client has substantial property that should be sold for the client's benefit, effective completion of the transaction ordinarily requires appointment of a legal representative. In many circumstances, however, appointment of a legal representative may be expensive or traumatic for the client. Evaluation of these considerations is a matter of professional judgment on the lawyer's part. In matters involving a minor, whether the lawyer should look to the parents as natural guardians may depend on the type of proceeding or matter in which the lawyer is representing the minor. If the lawyer represents the guardian as distinct from the ward, and is aware that the guardian is acting adversely to the ward's interest, the lawyer may have an obligation to prevent or rectify the guardian's misconduct. See Rule 1.2(d).

Taking Protective Action. If a lawyer reasonably believes that a client is at risk of substantial physical, financial or other harm unless action is taken, and that a normal client-lawyer relationship cannot be maintained as provided in subsection (a) because the client lacks sufficient capacity to communicate or to make adequately considered decisions in connection with the representation, then subsection (b) permits the lawyer to take protective measures deemed necessary. Such measures could include: consulting with family members, using a reconsideration period to permit clarification or improvement of circumstances, using voluntary surrogate decisionmaking tools such as durable powers of attorney or consulting with support groups, professional services, adult-protective agencies or other individuals or entities that have the ability to protect the client. In taking any protective action, the lawyer should be guided by such factors as the wishes and values of the client to the extent known, the

client's best interests and the goals of intruding into the client's decisionmaking autonomy to the least extent feasible, maximizing client capacities and respecting the client's family and social connections.

In determining the extent of the client's diminished capacity, the lawyer should consider and balance such factors as: the client's ability to articulate reasoning leading to a decision, variability of state of mind and ability to appreciate consequences of a decision; the substantive fairness of a decision; and the consistency of a decision with the known long-term commitments and values of the client. In appropriate circumstances, the lawyer may seek guidance from an appropriate diagnostician.

If a legal representative has not been appointed, the lawyer should consider whether appointment of a guardian ad litem, conservator or guardian is necessary to protect the client's interests. Thus, if a client with diminished capacity has substantial property that should be sold for the client's benefit, effective completion of the transaction may require appointment of a legal representative. In addition, rules of procedure in litigation sometimes provide that minors or persons with diminished capacity must be represented by a guardian or next friend if they do not have a general guardian. In many circumstances, however, appointment of a legal representative may be more expensive or traumatic for the client than circumstances in fact require. Evaluation of such circumstances is a matter entrusted to the professional judgment of the lawyer. In considering alternatives, however, the lawyer should be aware of any law that requires the lawyer to advocate the least restrictive action on behalf of the client.

Disclosure of the Client's Condition. Rules of procedure in litigation generally provide that minors or persons suffering mental disability shall be represented by a guardian or next friend if they do not have a general guardian. However, disclosure Disclosure of the client's disability can diminished capacity could adversely affect the client's interests. For example, raising the question of disability diminished capacity could, in some circumstances, lead to proceedings for involuntary commitment. Information relating to the representation is protected by Rule 1.6. Therefore, unless authorized to do so by these rules or other law, the lawyer may not disclose such information. When taking protective action pursuant to subsection (b), the lawyer is impliedly authorized to make the necessary disclosures, even when the client directs the lawyer to the contrary. Nevertheless, given the risks of disclosure, subsection (c) limits what the lawyer may disclose in consulting with other individuals or entities or seeking the appointment of a legal representative. At the very least, the lawyer should determine whether it is likely that the person or entity consulted with will act adversely to the client's interests before discussing matters related to the client. The lawyer's position in such cases is an unavoidably difficult one. The lawyer may seek guidance from an appropriate diagnostician.

Emergency Legal Assistance. In an emergency where the health, safety or a financial interest of a person with diminished capacity is threatened with imminent and irreparable harm, a lawyer may take legal action on behalf of such a person even though the person is unable to establish a client-lawyer relationship or to make or express considered judgments about the matter, when the person or another acting in good faith on that person's behalf has consulted with the lawyer. Even in such an emergency, however, the lawyer should not act unless the lawyer reasonably believes that the person has no other lawyer, agent or other representative available. The lawyer should take legal action on behalf of the person only to the extent reasonably necessary to maintain the status quo or otherwise avoid imminent and irreparable harm. A lawyer who undertakes to represent a person in such an exigent situation has the same duties under these Rules as the lawyer would with respect to a client.

A lawyer who acts on behalf of a person with diminished capacity in an emergency should keep the confidences of the person as if dealing with a client, disclosing them only to the extent necessary to accomplish the intended protective action. The lawyer should disclose to any tribunal involved and to any other counsel involved the nature of his or her relationship with the person. The lawyer should take steps to regularize the relationship or implement other protective solutions as soon as possible. Normally, a lawyer would not seek compensation for such emergency actions taken.

Rule 1.15. Safekeeping Property

- (a) As used in this rule, the terms below shall have the following meanings:
- (1) "Allowable reasonable fees" for IOLTA accounts are per check charges, per deposit charges, a fee in lieu of a minimum balance, federal deposit insurance fees, sweep fees, and a reasonable IOLTA account administrative or maintenance fee.
- (2) An "eligible institution" means (i) a bank or savings and loan association authorized by federal or state law to do business in Connecticut, the deposits of which are insured by an agency of the federal government, or (ii) an open-end investment company registered with the federal Securities and Exchange Commission and authorized by federal or state law to do business in Connecticut. In addition, an eligible institution shall meet the requirements set forth in paragraph (e)(4) below. The determination of whether or not an institution is an eligible institution shall be

made by the organization designated by the judges of the superior court to administer the program pursuant to subsection (g)(5) below.

- (3) "Interest- or dividend-bearing account" means (i) an interest-bearing checking account, or (ii) an investment product which is a daily (overnight) financial institution repurchase agreement or an open-end money-market fund. A daily financial institution repurchase agreement must be fully collateralized by U.S. Government Securities and may be established only with an eligible institution that is "well-capitalized" or "adequately capitalized" as those terms are defined by applicable federal statutes and regulations. An open-end money-market fund must be invested solely in U.S. Government Securities or repurchase agreements fully collateralized by U.S. Government Securities, must hold itself out as a "money-market fund" as that term is defined by federal statutes and regulations under the Investment Company Act of 1940, and, at the time of the investment, must have total assets of at least \$250,000,000.
- (4) "IOLTA account" means an interest- or dividend-bearing account established by a lawyer or law firm for clients' funds at an eligible institution from which funds may be withdrawn upon request by the depositor without delay. An IOLTA account shall include only client or third person funds, except as permitted by subsection (g)(7) below. The determination of whether or not an interest- or dividend-bearing account meets the requirements of an IOLTA account shall be made by the organization designated by the judges of the superior court to administer the program pursuant to paragraph (g)(5) below.
- (5) "Non-IOLTA account" means an interest- or dividend-bearing account, other than an IOLTA account, from which funds may be withdrawn upon request by the depositor without delay.
- (a)(b) A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that is in a lawyer's possession in connection with a representation separate from the lawyer's own property. Funds shall be kept in a separate account maintained in the state where the lawyer's office is situated, or elsewhere with the consent of the client or third person. Other property shall be identified as such and appropriately safeguarded. Complete records of such account funds and other property shall be kept by the lawyer and shall be preserved for such period of time as may be required under applicable law after termination of the representation for a period of seven years after termination of the representation.
- (c) A lawyer may deposit the lawyer's own funds in a client trust account for the sole purpose of paying bank service charges on that account, but only in an amount necessary for that purpose.
- (d) Absent a written agreement with the client otherwise, a lawyer shall deposit into a client trust account legal fees and expenses that have been paid in advance, to be withdrawn by the lawyer only as fees are earned or expenses incurred.
- (b)(e) Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person. Except as stated in this rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client or third person, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property that the client or third person is entitled to receive and, upon request by the client or third person, shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property.
- (e)(f) When in the course of representation a lawyer is in possession of property in which both the lawyer and another person two or more persons (one of whom may be the lawyer) claim interests, the property shall be kept separate by the lawyer until there is an accounting and severance of their interests. If a dispute arises concerning their respective interests, the portion in dispute shall be kept separate

by the lawyer until the dispute is resolved. The lawyer shall promptly distribute all portions of the property as to which the interests are not in dispute.

- (d)(g) Notwithstanding subsections (a), (b), and (c), (d), (e) and (f), a lawyer or law firms shall participate in a the statutory program for the use of interest earned on lawyers' clients' funds accounts to provide funding for (i) the delivery of legal services to the poor by nonprofit corporations whose principal purpose is providing legal services to the poor and (ii) law school scholarships based on financial need by placing clients'. Lawyers and law firms shall only place a client's or third person's funds which are less than \$10,000 in amount or are expected to be held for a period of not more than sixty business days in interest bearing trust accounts in compliance with the following provisions an IOLTA account and shall only establish IOLTA accounts at eligible institutions that meet the following requirements:
- (1) No earnings from such an the IOLTA account shall be made available to a lawyer or law firm.
- (2) The <u>IOLTA</u> account shall include only clients' <u>or a third person's</u> funds which are less than \$10,000 in amount or are expected to be held for a period of not more than sixty business days.
- (3) Any such interest bearing trust account may be established with any financial institution which is authorized by federal or state law to do business in Connecticut and is a member of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. At the direction of the lawyer, funds in such accounts may be temporarily invested by such financial institution in repurchase agreements fully collateralized by United States government obligations. Funds deposited in such accounts shall be subject to withdrawal upon request by the depositor and without delay.
- (4) The rate of interest payable on any interest bearing trust account shall not be less than the rate paid by the depository institution to other depositors. Higher rates offered by the institution to customers whose deposits meet certain time and/or amount requirements, such as those offered in certificates of deposit, may be obtained by a lawyer or law firm on some or all of the deposit funds, so long as there is no impairment of the right to withdraw or transfer principal immediately. Lawyers or law firms depositing elients' funds under this program a client's or third person's funds in an IOLTA account shall direct the depository institutions:
- (A) To remit interest or dividends, net of any service charges or allowable reasonable fees, if any, on the average monthly balance in the account, or as otherwise computed in accordance with an the institution's standard accounting practice, at least quarterly, to the organization designated by the judges of the superior court to administer this statutory program;
- (B) To transmit to the organization administering the program with each remittance to the organization a statement showing a report that identifies the name of the lawyer or law firm for whom the remittance is sent and the amount of remittance attributable to each IOLTA account, the rate and type of interest applied or dividends applied, the amount of interest or dividends earned, the amount and type of fees and service charges deducted, if any, and the average account balance for the period for which the report is made and such other information as is reasonably required by such organization; and
- (C) To transmit to the depositing lawyer or law firm at the same time a report showing the amount paid to the organization, and the rate and method of interest computation in accordance with the institution's normal procedures for reporting to its depositors.
- (4) Participation by banks, savings and loan associations, and investment companies in the IOLTA program is voluntary. An eligible institution that elects to offer and maintain IOLTA accounts shall meet the following requirements:

- (A) The eligible institution shall pay no less on its IOLTA accounts than the highest interest rate or dividend generally available from the institution to its non-IOLTA customers when the IOLTA account meets or exceeds the same minimum balance or other eligibility qualifications on its non-IOLTA accounts, if any. In determining the highest interest rate or dividend generally available from the institution to its non-IOLTA customers, an eligible institution may consider, in addition to the balance in the IOLTA account, factors customarily considered by the institution when setting interest rates or dividends for its non-IOLTA customers, provided that such factors do not discriminate between IOLTA accounts and non-IOLTA accounts and that these factors do not include the fact that the account is an IOLTA account. The eligible institution may offer, and the lawyer or law firm may request, a sweep account that provides a mechanism for the overnight investment of balances in the IOLTA account in an interest- or dividend-bearing account that is a daily financial institution repurchase agreement or a money-market fund. Nothing in this rule shall preclude an eligible institution from paying a higher interest rate or dividend than described above or electing to waive any fees and service charges on an IOLTA account. An eligible institution may choose to pay the higher interest or dividend rate on an IOLTA account in lieu of establishing it as a higher rate product.
- (B) Interest and dividends shall be calculated in accordance with the eligible institution's standard practices for non-IOLTA customers.
- (C) Allowable reasonable fees are the only fees and service charges that may be deducted by an eligible institution from interest earned on an IOLTA account. Allowable reasonable fees may be deducted from interest or dividends on an IOLTA account only at the rates and in accordance with the customary practices of the eligible institution for non-IOLTA customers. No fees or service charges other than allowable reasonable fees may be assessed against the accrued interest or dividends on an IOLTA account. Any fees and service charges other than allowable reasonable fees shall be the sole responsibility of, and may only be charged to, the lawyer or law firm maintaining the IOLTA account. Fees and service charges in excess of the interest or dividends earned on one IOLTA account for any period shall not be taken from interest or dividends earned on any other IOLTA account or accounts or from the principal of any IOLTA account.
- (5) The judges of the superior court, upon recommendation of the chief court administrator, shall designate an organization qualified under Sec. 501 (c) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code, or any subsequent corresponding Internal Revenue Code of the United States, as from time to time amended, to administer this program. The chief court administrator shall cause to be printed in the Connecticut Law Journal an appropriate announcement identifying the designated organization. The organization administering the program shall comply with the following:
- (A) Each June mail to each judge of the superior court and to each lawyer or law firm participating in the program a detailed annual report of all funds disbursed under the program including the amount disbursed to each recipient of funds;
- (B) Each June submit the following in detail to the chief court administrator for approval and comment by the Executive Committee of the Superior Court: (i) its proposed goals and objectives for the program; (ii) the procedures it has established to avoid discrimination in the awarding of grants; (iii) information regarding the insurance and fidelity bond it has procured; (iv) a description of the recommendations and advice it has received from the Advisory Panel established by General Statutes § 51-81c and the action it has taken to implement such recommendations and advice; (v) the method it utilizes to allocate between the two uses of funds provided for in § 51-81c and the frequency with which it disburses funds for such purposes; (vi) the procedures it has established to monitor grantees to ensure that any limitations or restrictions on the use of the granted funds have been observed by the grantees,

such procedures to include the receipt of annual audits of each grantee showing compliance with grant awards and setting forth quantifiable levels of services that each grantee has provided with grant funds; (vii) the procedures it has established to ensure that no funds that have been awarded to grantees are used for lobbying purposes; and (viii) the procedures it has established to segregate funds to be disbursed under the program from other funds of the organization;

- (C) Allow the judicial branch access to its books and records upon reasonable notice; and
 - (D) Submit to audits by the judicial branch.
- (6) Before an organization may be designated to administer this program, it shall file with the chief court administrator, and the judges of the superior court shall have approved, a resolution of the board of directors of such an organization which includes provisions:
- (A) Establishing that all funds the organization might receive pursuant to subsection (d) (g) (4) (3) (A) above will be exclusively devoted to provide providing funding for the delivery of legal services to the poor by nonprofit corporations whose principal purpose is providing legal services to the poor and for law school scholarships based on financial need and to the collection, management and distribution of such funds:
- (B) Establishing that all interest or <u>and</u> dividends earned on such funds, net of <u>any service charges or less allowable reasonable</u> fees, <u>if any</u>, shall additionally be used exclusively for such purposes.
- (C) Establishing and describing the methods the organization will utilize to implement and administer the program and to allocate funds to be disbursed under the program, the frequency with which the funds will be disbursed by the organization for such purposes, and the segregation of such funds from other funds of the organization:
- (D) Establishing that the organization shall consult with and receive recommendations from the advisory panel Advisory Panel established by General Statutes § 51-81c regarding the implementation and administration of the program, including the method of allocation and the allocation of funds to be disbursed under such program.
- (E) Establishing that the organization shall comply with the requirements of this Rule-; and
- (F) Establishing that said resolution will not be amended, and the facts and undertakings set forth in it will not be altered, until the same <u>shall</u> have been approved by the judges of the superior court and ninety days have elapsed after publication by the chief court administrator of the notice of such approval in the Connecticut Law Journal.
- (7) A lawyer's or law firm's own funds may only be deposited in a clients' funds account in an amount that the lawyer or law firm reasonably determines to be necessary to pay financial institution fees or service charges on the account or to obtain a waiver of fees and service charges on the account.
- (8) Nothing in this section subsection (g) shall prevent a lawyer or law firm from depositing a client's or third person's funds, regardless of the amount of such funds or the period for which such funds are expected to be held, in a separate interestbearing non-IOLTA account established on behalf of and for the benefit of the client or third person. Such an account shall be established as:
- (A) A separate clients' funds account for the particular client or third person on which the interest or dividends will be paid to the client or third person; or
- (B) A pooled clients' funds account with subaccounting by the bank, savings and loan association or investment company or by the lawyer or law firm, which provides

for the computation of interest or dividends earned by each client's or third person's funds and the payment thereof to the client or third person.

COMMENTARY: A lawyer should hold property of others with the care required of a professional fiduciary. Securities should be kept in a safe deposit box, except when some other form of safekeeping is warranted by special circumstances. All property which that is the property of clients or third persons, including prospective clients, must should be kept separate from the lawyer's business and personal property and, if monies, in one or more trust accounts. Separate trust accounts may be warranted when administering estate monies or acting in similar fiduciary capacities. A lawyer should maintain on a current basis books and records in accordance with generally accepted accounting practices and comply with the requirements of Connecticut Practice Book Ch. 2, Sec. 2-27.

While normally it is impermissible to commingle the lawyer's own funds with client funds, subsection (c) provides that it is permissible when necessary to pay bank service charges on that account. Accurate records must be kept regarding which part of the funds are the lawyer's.

Lawyers often receive funds from third parties from which the lawyer's fee will be paid. If there is risk that the client may divert the funds without paying the fee, tThe lawyer is not required to remit the portion from which the fee is to be paid to the clients funds that the lawyer reasonably believes represent fees owed. However, a lawyer may not hold funds to coerce a client into accepting the lawyer's contention. The disputed portion of the funds should must be kept in a trust account and the lawyer should suggest means for prompt resolution of the dispute, such as arbitration. The undisputed portion of the funds shall be promptly distributed.

Subsection (f) also recognizes that Tthird parties, such as a client's creditors who has a lien on funds recovered in a personal injury action, may have just lawful claims against specific funds or other property in a lawyer's custody. A lawyer may have a duty under applicable law to protect such third-party claims against wrongful interference by the client, and accordingly may In such cases, when the third-party claim is not frivolous under applicable law, the lawyer must refuse to surrender the property to the client until the claims are resolved. However, a A lawyer should not unilaterally assume to arbitrate a dispute between the client and the third party, but, when there are substantial grounds for dispute as to the person entitled to the funds, the lawyer may file an action to have a court resolve the dispute.

The obligations of a lawyer under this Rule are independent of those arising from activity other than rendering legal services. For example, a lawyer who serves <u>only</u> as an escrow agent is governed by the applicable law relating to fiduciaries even though the lawyer does not render legal services in the transaction <u>and is not governed by this rule</u>.

A "elients' security fund" "lawyers' fund" for client protection provides a means through the collective efforts of the bar to reimburse persons who have lost money or property as a result of dishonest conduct of a lawyer. Where such a fund has been established, a lawyer must participate where it is mandatory, and, even when it is voluntary, the lawyer should participate.

Rule 1.16. Declining or Terminating Representation

- (a) Except as stated in subsection (c), a lawyer shall not represent a client or, where representation has commenced, shall withdraw from the representation of a client if:
- (1) The representation will result in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law;
- (2) The lawyer's physical or mental condition materially impairs the lawyer's ability to represent the client; or
 - (3) The lawyer is discharged.
- (b) Except as stated in subsection (c), a lawyer may withdraw from representing a client if:
- (1) withdrawal can be accomplished without material adverse effect on the interests of the client; , or if:
- (1)(2) The client persists in a course of action involving the lawyer's services that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent;
 - (2)(3) Tthe client has used the lawyer's services to perpetrate a crime or fraud;
- (3)(4)Tthe client insists upon pursuing an objective taking action that the lawyer considers repugnant or imprudent with which the lawyer has a fundamental disagreement;

- (4)(5) The client fails substantially to fulfill an obligation to the lawyer regarding the lawyer's services and has been given reasonable warning that the lawyer will withdraw unless the obligation is fulfilled;
- (5)(6) Fithe representation will result in an unreasonable financial burden on the lawyer or has been rendered unreasonably difficult by the client; or
 - (6)(7) Oother good cause for withdrawal exists.
- (c) A lawyer must comply with applicable law requiring notice to or permission of a tribunal when terminating a representation. When ordered to do so by a tribunal, a lawyer shall continue representation notwithstanding good cause for terminating the representation.
- (d) Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled and refunding any advance payment of fee that has not been earned. The lawyer may retain papers relating to the client to the extent permitted by other law. If the representation of the client is terminated either by the lawyer withdrawing from representation or by the client discharging the lawyer, the lawyer shall confirm the termination in writing to the client before or within a reasonable time after the termination of the representation.

COMMENTARY: A lawyer should not accept representation in a matter unless it can be performed competently, promptly, without improper conflict of interest and to completion. <u>Ordinarily, a representation in a matter is completed when the agreed upon assistance has been concluded. See Rules 1.2 (c) and 6.5. See also Rule 1.3, Commentary.</u>

Mandatory Withdrawal. A lawyer ordinarily must decline or withdraw from representation if the client demands that the lawyer engage in conduct that is illegal or violates the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law. The lawyer is not obliged to decline or withdraw simply because the client suggests such a course of conduct; a client may make such a suggestion in the hope that a lawyer will not be constrained by a professional obligation.

When a lawyer has been appointed to represent a client, withdrawal ordinarily requires approval of the appointing authority. See also Rule 6.2. Similarly, court approval or notice to the court is often required by applicable law before a lawyer withdraws from pending litigation. Difficulty may be encountered if withdrawal is based on the client's demand that the lawyer engage in unprofessional conduct. The court may wish request an explanation for the withdrawal, while the lawyer may be bound to keep confidential the facts that would constitute such an explanation. The lawyer's statement that professional considerations require termination of the representation ordinarily should be accepted as sufficient. Lawyers should be mindful of their obligations to both clients and the court under Rules 1.6 and 3.3.

Discharge. A client has a right to discharge a lawyer at any time, with or without cause, subject to liability for payment for the lawyer's services. Where future dispute about the withdrawal may be anticipated, it may be advisable to prepare a written statement reciting the circumstances.

Whether a client can discharge appointed counsel may depend on applicable law. A client seeking to do so should be given a full explanation of the consequences. These consequences may include a decision by the appointing authority that appointment of successor counsel is unjustified, thus requiring the client to represent himself or herself.

If the client is mentally incompetent, has diminished capacity, the client may lack the legal capacity to discharge the lawyer, and in any event the discharge may be seriously adverse to the client's interests. The lawyer should make special effort to help the client consider the consequences and, in an extreme case, may take reasonably necessary protective action as provided in initiate proceedings for a conservatorship or similar protection of the client. See Rule 1.14.

Optional Withdrawal. A lawyer may withdraw from representation in some circumstances. The lawyer has the option to withdraw if it can be accomplished without material adverse effect on the elient's interests. Withdrawal is also justified if the client persists in a course of action that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent, for a lawyer is not required to be associated with such conduct even if the lawyer does not further it. Withdrawal is also permitted if the lawyer's services were misused in the past even if that would materially prejudice the client. The lawyer also may withdraw where the client insists on a repugnant or imprudent objective.

A lawyer may withdraw if the client refuses to abide by the terms of an agreement relating to the representation, such as an agreement concerning fees or court costs or an agreement limiting the objectives of the representation.

Assisting the Client upon Withdrawal. Even if the lawyer has been unfairly discharged by the client, a lawyer must take all reasonable steps to mitigate the consequences to the client. The lawyer may retain papers as security for a fee only to the extent permitted by law. See Rule 1.5.

Whether or not a lawyer for an organization may under certain unusual circumstances have a legal obligation to the organization after withdrawing or being discharged by the organization's highest authority is beyond the scope of these Rules.

Confirmation in Writing. A written statement to the client confirming the termination of the relationship and the basis of the termination reduces the possibility of misunderstanding the status of the relationship. The written statement should be sent to the client before or within a reasonable time after the termination of the relationship.

(NEW) Rule 1.17. Sale Of Law Practice

A lawyer or a law firm may sell or purchase a law practice, or an area of practice, including good will, if the following conditions are satisfied:

- (a) The seller ceases to engage in the private practice of law, or in the area of practice that has been sold, in Connecticut;
- (b) The entire practice, or the entire area of practice, is sold to one or more lawyers or law firms;
 - (c) The seller gives written notice to each of the seller's clients regarding:
 - (1) the proposed sale;
 - (2) the client's right to retain other counsel or to take possession of the file; and
- (3) the fact that the client's consent to the transfer of the client's files will be presumed if the client does not take any action or does not otherwise object within ninety (90) days of receipt of the notice.

If a client cannot be given notice, the representation of that client may be transferred to the purchaser only upon entry of an order so authorizing by a court having jurisdiction. The seller may disclose to the court in camera information relating to the representation only to the extent necessary to obtain an order authorizing the transfer of a file.

(d) The fees charged clients shall not be increased by reason of the sale.

COMMENTARY: The practice of law is a profession, not merely a business. Clients are not commodities that can be purchased and sold at will. Pursuant to this Rule, when a lawyer or an entire firm ceases to practice, or ceases to practice in an area of law, and other lawyers or firms take over the representation, the selling lawyer or firm may obtain compensation for the reasonable value of the practice as may withdrawing partners of law firms. See Rules 5.4 and 5.6.

Termination of Practice by the Seller. The requirement that all of the private practice, or all of an area of practice, be sold is satisfied if the seller in good faith makes the entire practice, or the area of practice, available for sale to the purchasers. The fact that a number of the seller's clients decide not to be represented by the purchasers but take their matters elsewhere, therefore, does not result in a violation.

The requirement that the seller cease to engage in the private practice of law does not prohibit employment as a lawyer on the staff of a public agency or a legal services entity that provides legal services to the poor, or as in-house counsel to a business.

The Rule permits a sale of an entire practice attendant upon retirement from the private practice of law within the jurisdiction. Its provisions, therefore, accommodate the lawyer who sells the practice upon the occasion of moving to another state. Some states are so large that a move from one locale therein to another is tantamount to leaving the jurisdiction in which the lawyer has engaged in the practice of law. To also accommodate lawyers so situated, states may permit the sale of the practice when the lawyer leaves the geographic area rather than the jurisdiction. The alternative desired should be indicated by selecting one of the two provided for in Rule 1.17(a).

This Rule also permits a lawyer or law firm to sell an area of practice. If an area of practice is sold and the lawyer remains in the active practice of law, the lawyer must cease accepting any matters in the area of practice that has been sold, either as counsel or co-counsel or by assuming joint responsibility for a matter in connection with the division of a fee with another lawyer as would otherwise be permitted by Rule 1.5(e). For example, a lawyer with a substantial number of estate planning matters and a substantial number of probate administration cases may sell the estate planning portion of the practice but remain in the practice of law by concentrating on probate administration; however, that practitioner may not thereafter accept any estate planning matters. Although a lawyer who leaves a jurisdiction or geographical area typically would sell the entire practice, this Rule permits the lawyer to limit the sale

to one or more areas of the practice, thereby preserving the lawyer's right to continue practice in the areas of the practice that were not sold.

Sale of Entire Practice or Entire Area of Practice. The Rule requires that the seller's entire practice, or an entire area of practice, be sold. The prohibition against sale of less than an entire practice area protects those clients whose matters are less lucrative and who might find it difficult to secure other counsel if a sale could be limited to substantial fee-generating matters. The purchasers are required to undertake all client matters in the practice or practice area, subject to client consent. This requirement is satisfied, however, even if a purchaser is unable to undertake a particular client matter because of a conflict of interest

Client Confidences, Consent and Notice. Negotiations between seller and prospective purchaser prior to disclosure of information relating to a specific representation of an identifiable client no more violate the confidentiality provisions of Rule 1.6 than do preliminary discussions concerning the possible association of another lawyer or mergers between firms, with respect to which client consent is not required. Providing the purchaser access to client-specific information relating to the representation and to the file, however, requires client consent. The Rule provides that before such information can be disclosed by the seller to the purchaser the client must be given actual written notice of the contemplated sale, including the identity of the purchaser and must be told that the decision to consent or make other arrangements must be made within 90 days. If nothing is heard from the client within that time, consent to the sale is presumed.

A lawyer or law firm ceasing to practice cannot be required to remain in practice because some clients cannot be given actual notice of the proposed purchase. Since these clients cannot themselves consent to the purchase or direct any other disposition of their files, the Rule requires an order from a court having jurisdiction authorizing their transfer or other disposition. The Court can be expected to determine whether reasonable efforts to locate the client have been exhausted, and whether the absent client's legitimate interests will be served by authorizing the transfer of the file so that the purchaser may continue the representation. Preservation of client confidences requires that the petition for a court order be considered in camera. This procedure is contemplated as an in camera review of privileged materials.

All the elements of client autonomy, including the client's absolute right to discharge a lawyer and transfer the representation to another, survive the sale of the practice or area of practice.

Fee Arrangements Between Client and Purchaser. The sale may not be financed by increases in fees charged exclusively to the clients of the purchased practice. Existing agreements between the seller and the client as to fees and the scope of the work must be honored by the purchaser.

Other Applicable Ethical Standards. Lawyers participating in the sale of a law practice or a practice area are subject to the ethical standards applicable to involving another lawyer in the representation of a client. These include, for example, the seller's obligation to exercise competence in identifying a purchaser qualified to assume the practice and the purchaser's obligation to undertake the representation competently (see Rule 1.1); the obligation to avoid disqualifying conflicts, and to secure the client's informed consent for those conflicts that can be agreed to (see Rule 1.7 regarding conflicts and Rule 1.0(f) for the definition of informed consent); and the obligation to protect information relating to the representation (see Rules 1.6 and 1.9).

If approval of the substitution of the purchasing lawyer for the selling lawyer is required by the rules of any tribunal in which a matter is pending, such approval must be obtained before the matter can be included in the sale (see Rule 1.16).

Applicability of the Rule. This Rule applies to the sale of a law practice by representatives of a deceased, disabled or disappeared lawyer. Thus, the seller may be represented by a non-lawyer representative not subject to these Rules. Since, however, no lawyer may participate in a sale of a law practice which does not conform to the requirements of this Rule, the representatives of the seller as well as the purchasing lawyer can be expected to see to it that they are met.

Admission to or retirement from a law partnership or professional association, retirement plans and similar arrangements, and a sale of tangible assets of a law practice, do not constitute a sale or purchase governed by this Rule.

This Rule does not apply to the transfers of legal representation between lawyers when such transfers are unrelated to the sale of a practice or an area of practice.

(NEW) Rule 1.18. Duties To Prospective Client

- (a) A person who discusses or communicates with a lawyer concerning the possibility of forming a client-lawyer relationship with respect to a matter is a prospective client.
- (b) Even when no client-lawyer relationship ensues, a lawyer who has had discussions with a prospective client shall not use or reveal information learned in the

consultation, except as Rule 1.9 would permit with respect to information of a former client.

- (c) A lawyer subject to subsection (b) shall not represent a client with interests materially adverse to those of a prospective client in the same or a substantially related matter if the lawyer received information from the prospective client that could be significantly harmful to that person in the matter, except as provided in subsection (d). If a lawyer is disqualified from representation under this paragraph, no lawyer in a firm with which that lawyer is associated may knowingly undertake or continue representation in such a matter, except as provided in subsection (d).
- (d) When the lawyer has received disqualifying information as defined in subsection (c), representation is permissible if:
- (1) both the affected client and the prospective client have given informed consent, confirmed in writing, or
- (2) the lawyer who received the information took reasonable measures to avoid exposure to more disqualifying information than was reasonably necessary to determine whether to represent the prospective client; and
- (i) the disqualified lawyer is timely screened from any participation in the matter; and
 - (ii) written notice is promptly given to the prospective client.

COMMENTARY: Prospective clients, like clients, may disclose information to a lawyer, place documents or other property in the lawyer's custody, or rely on the lawyer's advice. A lawyer's discussions with a prospective client usually are limited in time and depth and leave both the prospective client and the lawyer free (and sometimes required) to proceed no further. Hence, prospective clients should receive some but not all of the protection afforded clients.

Not all persons who transmit information to a lawyer are entitled to protection under this Rule. A person who transmits information unilaterally to a lawyer, without any reasonable expectation that the lawyer is willing to discuss the possibility of forming a client-lawyer relationship, is not a "prospective client" within the meaning of subsection (a).

It is often necessary for a prospective client to reveal information to the lawyer during an initial consultation prior to the decision about formation of a client-lawyer relationship. The lawyer often must learn such information to determine whether there is a conflict of interest with an existing client and whether the matter is one that the lawyer is willing to undertake. Subsection (b) prohibits the lawyer from using or revealing that information, except as permitted by Rule 1.9, even if the client or lawyer decides not to proceed with the representation. The duty exists regardless of how brief the initial conference may be.

In order to avoid acquiring disqualifying information from a prospective client, a lawyer considering whether or not to undertake a new matter should limit the initial interview to only such information as reasonably appears necessary for that purpose. Where the information indicates that a conflict of interest or other reason for non-representation exists, the lawyer should so inform the prospective client or decline the representation. If the prospective client wishes to retain the lawyer, and if consent is possible under Rule 1.7, then consent from all affected present or former clients must be obtained before accepting the representation.

A lawyer may condition conversations with a prospective client on the person's informed consent that no information disclosed during the consultation will prohibit the lawyer from representing a different client in the matter. See Rule 1.0(f) for the definition of informed consent. If the agreement expressly so provides, the prospective client may also consent to the lawyer's subsequent use of information received from the prospective client.

Even in the absence of an agreement, under subsection (c), the lawyer is not prohibited from representing a client with interests adverse to those of the prospective client in the same or a substantially related matter unless the lawyer has received from the prospective client information that could be significantly harmful if used in the matter.

Under subsection (c), the prohibition in this Rule is imputed to other lawyers as provided in Rule 1.10, but, under subsection (d)(1), imputation may be avoided if the lawyer obtains the informed consent, confirmed in writing, of both the prospective and affected clients. In the alternative, imputation may be avoided if the conditions of subsection (d)(2) are met and all disqualified lawyers are timely screened and written notice is promptly given to the prospective client. See Rule 1.0(l) (requirements for screening procedures).

Notice, including a general description of the subject matter about which the lawyer was consulted, and of the screening procedures employed, generally should be given as soon as practicable after the need for screening becomes apparent.

For the duty of competence of a lawyer who gives assistance on the merits of a matter to a prospective client, see Rule 1.1. For a lawyer's duties when a prospective client entrusts valuables or papers to the lawyer's care, see Rule 1.15.

COUNSELOR

Rule 2.1. Advisor

In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice. In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant to the client's situation.

COMMENTARY: Scope of Advice. A client is entitled to straightforward advice expressing the lawyer's honest assessment. Legal advice often involves unpleasant facts and alternatives that a client may be disinclined to confront. In presenting advice, a lawyer endeavors to sustain the client's morale and may put advice in as acceptable a form as honesty permits. However, a lawyer should not be deterred from giving candid advice by the prospect that the advice will be unpalatable to the client.

Advice couched in narrow legal terms may be of little value to a client, especially where practical considerations, such as cost or effects on other people, are predominant. Purely technical legal advice, therefore, can sometimes be inadequate. It is proper for a lawyer to refer to relevant moral and ethical considerations in giving advice. Although a lawyer is not a moral advisor as such, moral and ethical considerations impinge upon most legal questions and may decisively influence how the law will be applied.

A client may expressly or impliedly ask the lawyer for purely technical advice. When such a request is made by a client experienced in legal matters, the lawyer may accept it at face value. When such a request is made by a client inexperienced in legal matters, however, the lawyer's responsibility as advisor may include indicating that more may be involved than strictly legal considerations.

Matters that go beyond strictly legal questions may also be in the domain of another profession. Family matters can involve problems within the professional competence of psychiatry, clinical psychology or social work; business matters can involve problems within the competence of the accounting profession or of financial specialists. Where consultation with a professional in another field is itself something a competent lawyer would recommend, the lawyer should make such a recommendation. At the same time, a lawyer's advice at its best often consists of recommending a course of action in the face of conflicting recommendations of experts.

Offering Advice. In general, a lawyer is not expected to give advice until asked by the client. However, when a lawyer knows that a client proposes a course of action that is likely to result in substantial adverse legal consequences to the client, the lawyer's duty to the client under Rule 1.4 may require that the lawyer aet offer advice if the client's course of action is related to the representation. Similarly, when a matter is likely to involve litigation, it may be necessary under Rule 1.4 to inform the client of forms of dispute resolution that might constitute reasonable alternatives to litigation.

A lawyer ordinarily has no duty to initiate investigation of a client's affairs or to give advice that the client has indicated is unwanted, but a lawyer may initiate advice to a client when doing so appears to be in the client's interest.

(REPEALED) Rule 2.2. Intermediary

- (a) A lawyer may act as intermediary between clients if:
- (1) The lawyer consults with each client concerning the implications of the common representation, including the advantages and risks involved, and the effect on the attorney-client privileges, and obtains each client's consent to the common representation;
- (2) The lawyer reasonably believes that the matter can be resolved on terms compatible with the clients' best interests, that each client will be able to make adequately informed decisions in the matter and that there is little risk of material prejudice to the interests of any of the clients if the contemplated resolution is unsuccessful; and

- (3) The lawyer reasonably believes that the common representation can be undertaken impartially and without improper effect on other responsibilities the lawyer has to any of the clients.
- (b) While acting as intermediary, the lawyer shall consult with each client concerning the decisions to be made and the considerations relevant in making them, so that each client can make adequately informed decisions.
- (c) A lawyer shall withdraw as intermediary if any of the clients so requests, or if any of the conditions stated in subsection (a) is no longer satisfied. Upon withdrawal, the lawyer shall not continue to represent any of the clients in the matter that was the subject of the intermediation.

COMMENTARY: A lawyer acts as intermediary under this Rule when the lawyer represents two or more parties with potentially conflicting interests. A key factor in defining the relationship is whether the parties share responsibility for the lawyer's fee, but the common representation may be inferred from other circumstances. Because confusion can arise as to the lawyer's role where each party is not separately represented, it is important that the lawyer make clear the relationship.

The Rule does not apply to a lawyer acting as arbitrator or mediator between or among parties who are not clients of the lawyer, even where the lawyer has been appointed with the concurrence of the parties. In performing such a role the lawyer may be subject to applicable codes of ethics, such as the Code of Ethics for Arbitration in Commercial Disputes prepared by a joint Committee of the American Bar Association and the American Arbitration Association.

A lawyer acts as intermediary in seeking to establish or adjust a relationship between clients on an amicable and mutually advantageous basis; for example, in helping to organize a business in which two or more clients are entrepreneurs, working out the financial reorganization of an enterprise in which two or more clients have an interest, arranging a property distribution in settlement of an estate or mediating a dispute between clients. The lawyer seeks to resolve potentially conflicting interests by developing the parties' mutual interests. The alternative can be that each party may have to obtain separate representation, with the possibility in some situations of incurring additional cost, complication or even litigation. Given these and other relevant factors, all the clients may prefer that the lawyer act as intermediary.

In considering whether to act as intermediary between clients, a lawyer should be mindful that if the intermediation fails the result can be additional cost, embarrassment and recrimination. In some situations the risk of failure is so great that intermediation is plainly impossible. For example, a lawyer cannot undertake common representation of clients between whom contentious litigation is imminent or who contemplate contentious negotiations. More generally, if the relationship between the parties has already assumed definite antagonism, the possibility that the clients' interests can be adjusted by intermediation ordinarily is not very good.

The appropriateness of intermediation can depend on its form. Forms of intermediation range from informal arbitration, where each client's case is presented by the respective client and the lawyer decides the outcome, to mediation, to common representation where the clients' interests are substantially though not entirely compatible. One form may be appropriate in circumstances where another would not. Other relevant factors are whether the lawyer subsequently will represent both parties on a continuing basis and whether the situation involves creating a relationship between the parties or terminating one.

Confidentiality and Privilege. A particularly important factor in determining the appropriateness of intermediation is the effect on client-lawyer confidentiality and the attorney-client privilege. In a common representation, the lawyer is still required both to keep each client adequately informed and to maintain confidentiality of information relating to the representation. See Rules 1.4 and 1.6. Complying with both requirements while acting as intermediary requires a delicate balance. If the balance cannot be maintained, the common representation is improper. With regard to the attorney-client privilege, the prevailing rule is that as between commonly represented clients the privilege does not attach. Hence, it must be assumed that if litigation eventuates between the clients, the privilege will not protect any such communications, and the clients should be so advised.

Since the lawyer is required to be impartial between commonly represented clients, intermediation is improper when that impartiality cannot be maintained. For example, a lawyer who has represented one of the clients for a long period and in a variety of matters might have difficulty being impartial between that client and one to whom the lawyer has only recently been introduced.

Consultation. In acting as intermediary between clients, the lawyer is required to consult with the clients on the implications of doing so, and proceed only upon consent based on such a consultation. The consultation should make clear that the lawyer's role is not that of partisanship normally expected in other circumstances.

Subsection (b) is an application of the principle expressed in Rule 1.4. Where the lawyer is intermediary, the clients ordinarily must assume greater responsibility for decisions than when each client is independently represented.

Withdrawal. Common representation does not diminish the rights of each client in the client-lawyer relationship. Each has the right to loyal and diligent representation, the right to discharge the lawyer as stated in Rule 1.16, and the protection of Rule 1.9 concerning obligations to a former client.

Rule 2.3. Evaluation for Use by Third Persons

- (a) A lawyer may <u>undertake provide</u> an evaluation of a matter affecting a client for the use of someone other than the client if:—(1) the lawyer reasonably believes that making the evaluation is compatible with other aspects of the lawyer's relationship with the client; and.
- (2) (b) When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the evaluation is likely to affect the client's interests materially and adversely, the lawyer shall not provide the evaluation unless the The client consents after consultation gives informed consent.
- (b)(c) Except as disclosure is required authorized in connection with a report of an evaluation, information relating to the evaluation is otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.

COMMENTARY: **Definition.** An evaluation may be performed at the client's direction but or when impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation. See Rule 1.2. Such an evaluation may be for the primary purpose of establishing information for the benefit of third parties; for example, an opinion concerning the title of property rendered at the behest of a vendor for the information of a prospective purchaser, or at the behest of a borrower for the information of a prospective lender. In some situations, the evaluation may be required by a government agency; for example, an opinion concerning the legality of the securities registered for sale under the securities laws. In other instances, the evaluation may be required by a third person, such as a purchaser of a business.

Lawyers for the government may be called upon to give a formal opinion on the legality of contemplated government agency action. In making such an evaluation, the government lawyer acts at the behest of the government as the client but for the purpose of establishing the limits of the agency's authorized activity. Such an opinion is to be distinguished from confidential legal advice given agency officials. The critical question is whether the opinion is to be made public.

A legal evaluation should be distinguished from an investigation of a person with whom the lawyer does not have a client-lawyer relationship. A legal evaluation of a client should also be distinguished from a report by counsel for an insured to the insured's carrier on the status of the matter that is the subject of representation, provided the report does not contain matter that is detrimental to the client's relationship with the insurance carrier. For example, a lawyer retained by a purchaser to analyze a vendor's title to property does not have a client-lawyer relationship with the vendor. So also, an investigation into a person's affairs by a government lawyer, or by special counsel employed by the government, is not an evaluation as that term is used in this Rule. The question is whether the lawyer is retained by the person whose affairs are being examined. When the lawyer is retained by that person, the general rules concerning loyalty to client and preservation of confidences apply, which is not the case if the lawyer is retained by someone else. For this reason, it is essential to identify the person by whom the lawyer is retained. This should be made clear not only to the person under examination, but also to others to whom the results are to be made available.

Duty Duties Owed to Third Person and Client. When the evaluation is intended for the information or use of a third person, a legal duty to that person may or may not arise. That legal question is beyond the scope of this Rule. However, since such an evaluation involves a departure from the normal client-lawyer relationship, careful analysis of the situation is required. The lawyer must be satisfied as a matter of professional judgment that making the evaluation is compatible with other functions undertaken in behalf of the client. For example, if the lawyer is acting as advocate in defending the client against charges of fraud, it would normally be incompatible with that responsibility for the lawyer to perform an evaluation for others concerning the same or a related transaction. Assuming no such impediment is apparent, however, the lawyer should advise the client of the implications of the evaluation, particularly the lawyer's responsibilities to third persons and the duty to disseminate the findings.

Access to and Disclosure of Information. The quality of an evaluation depends on the freedom and extent of the investigation upon which it is based. Ordinarily a lawyer should have whatever latitude of investigation seems necessary as a matter of professional judgment. Under some circumstances, however, the terms of the evaluation may be limited. For example, certain issues or sources may be

categorically excluded, or the scope of search may be limited by time constraints or the noncooperation of persons having relevant information. Any such limitations that are material to the evaluation should be described in the report. If after a lawyer has commenced an evaluation, the client refuses to comply with the terms upon which it was understood the evaluation was to have been made, the lawyer's obligations are determined by law, having reference to the terms of the client's agreement and the surrounding circumstances. In no circumstances is the lawyer permitted to knowingly make a false statement of material fact or law in providing an evaluation under this Rule. See Rule 4.1.

Obtaining Client's Informed Consent. Information relating to an evaluation is protected by Rule 1.6. In many situations, providing an evaluation to a third party poses no significant risk to the client; thus, the lawyer may be impliedly authorized to disclose information to carry out the representation. See Rule 1.6(a). Where, however, it is reasonably likely that providing the evaluation will affect the client's interests materially and adversely, the lawyer must first obtain the client's consent after the client has been adequately informed concerning the important possible effects on the client's interests. See Rules 1.6(a) and 1.0(f).

Financial Auditors' Requests for Information. When a question concerning the legal situation of a client arises at the instance of the client's financial auditor and the question is referred to the lawyer, the lawyer's response may be made in accordance with procedures recognized in the legal profession. Such a procedure is set forth in the American Bar Association Statement of Policy Regarding Lawyers' Responses to Auditors' Requests for Information, adopted in 1975.

(NEW) Rule 2.4. Lawyer Serving as Third-Party Neutral

- (a) A lawyer serves as a third-party neutral when the lawyer assists two or more persons who are not clients of the lawyer to reach a resolution of a dispute or other matter that has arisen between them. Service as a third-party neutral may include service as an arbitrator, a mediator or in such other capacity as will enable the lawyer to assist the parties to resolve the matter.
- (b) A lawyer serving as a third-party neutral shall inform unrepresented parties that the lawyer is not representing them. When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that a party does not understand the lawyer's role in the matter, the lawyer shall explain the difference between the lawyer's role as a third-party neutral and a lawyer's role as one who represents a client.

COMMENTARY: Alternative dispute resolution has become a substantial part of the civil justice system. Aside from representing clients in dispute-resolution processes, lawyers often serve as third-party neutrals. A third-party neutral is a person, such as a mediator, arbitrator, conciliator or evaluator, who assists the parties, represented or unrepresented, in the resolution of a dispute or in the arrangement of a transaction. Whether a third-party neutral serves primarily as a facilitator, evaluator or decisionmaker depends on the particular process that is either selected by the parties or mandated by a court.

The role of a third-party neutral is not unique to lawyers, although, in some court-connected contexts, only lawyers are allowed to serve in this role or to handle certain types of cases. In performing this role, the lawyer may be subject to court rules or other law that apply either to third-party neutrals generally or to lawyers serving as third-party neutrals. Lawyer-neutrals may also be subject to various codes of ethics, such as the Code of Ethics for Arbitration in Commercial Disputes prepared by a joint committee of the American Bar Association and the American Arbitration Association or the Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators jointly prepared by the American Bar Association, the American Arbitration Association and the Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution.

Unlike nonlawyers who serve as third-party neutrals, lawyers serving in this role may experience unique problems as a result of differences between the role of a third-party neutral and a lawyer's service as a client representative. The potential for confusion is significant when the parties are unrepresented in the process. Thus, subsection (b) requires a lawyer-neutral to inform unrepresented parties that the lawyer is not representing them. For some parties, particularly parties who frequently use dispute-resolution processes, this information will be sufficient. For others, particularly those who are using the process for the first time, more information will be required. Where appropriate, the lawyer should inform unrepresented parties of the important differences between the lawyer's role as third-party neutral and a lawyer's role as a client representative, including the inapplicability of the attorney-client evidentiary privilege as well as the inapplicability of the duty of confidentiality. The extent of disclosure required under this paragraph will depend on the particular parties involved and the subject matter of the proceeding, as well as the particular features of the dispute-resolution process selected.

A lawyer who serves as a third-party neutral subsequently may be asked to serve as a lawyer representing a client in the same matter. The conflicts of interest that arise for both the individual lawyer and the lawyer's law firm are addressed in Rule 1.12.

Lawyers who represent clients in alternative dispute-resolution processes are governed by the Rules of Professional Conduct. When the dispute-resolution process takes place before a tribunal, as in binding arbitration (see Rule 1.0(n)), the lawyer's duty of candor is governed by Rule 3.3. Otherwise, the lawyer's duty of candor toward both the third-party neutral and other parties is governed by Rule 4.1.

ADVOCATE

Rule 3.1. Meritorious Claims and Contentions

A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law. A lawyer for the defendant in a criminal proceeding, or the respondent in a proceeding that could result in incarceration, may nevertheless so defend the proceeding as to require that every element of the case be established.

COMMENTARY: The advocate has a duty to use legal procedure for the fullest benefit of the client's cause, but also a duty not to abuse legal procedure. The law, both procedural and substantive, establishes the limits within which an advocate may proceed. However, the law is not always clear and never is static. Accordingly, in determining the proper scope of advocacy, account must be taken of the law's ambiguities and potential for change.

The filing of an action or defense or similar action taken for a client is not frivolous merely because the facts have not first been fully substantiated or because the lawyer expects to develop vital evidence only by discovery. What is required of lawyers, however, is that they inform themselves about the facts of their clients' cases and the applicable law and determine that they can make good faith arguments in support of their clients' positions. Such action is not frivolous even though the lawyer believes that the client's position ultimately will not prevail. The action is frivolous, however, if the elient desires to have the action taken primarily for the purpose of harassing or maliciously injuring a person, or, if the lawyer is unable either to make a good faith argument on the merits of the action taken or to support the action taken by a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law.

The lawyer's obligations under this Rule are subordinate to federal or state constitutional law that entitles a defendant in a criminal matter to the assistance of counsel in presenting a claim or contention that otherwise would be prohibited by this Rule.

Rule 3.2. Expediting Litigation

A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client.

COMMENTARY: Dilatory practices bring the administration of justice into disrepute. Delay should not be indulged merely for the convenience of the advocates, or Although there will be occasions when a lawyer may properly seek a postponement for personal reasons, it is not proper for a lawyer to routinely fail to expedite litigation solely for the convenience of the advocates. Nor will a failure to expedite be reasonable if done for the purpose of frustrating an opposing party's attempt to obtain rightful redress or repose. It is not a justification that similar conduct is often tolerated by the bench and bar. The question is whether a competent lawyer acting in good faith would regard the course of action as having some substantial purpose other than delay. Realizing financial or other benefit from otherwise improper delay in litigation is not a legitimate interest of the client.

Rule 3.3. Candor toward the Tribunal

- (a) A lawyer shall not knowingly:
- (1) Make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer;
- (2) Fail to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the client;
- (3)(2) Fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel; or

- (4)(3) Offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer, the lawyer's client, or a witness called by the lawyer, has offered material evidence and the lawyer comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures, including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal.
- (b) A lawyer who represents a client in an adjudicative proceeding and who knows that a person intends to engage, is engaging or has engaged in criminal or fraudulent conduct related to the proceeding shall take reasonable remedial measures, including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal.
- (b)(c) The duties stated in subsections (a) and (b) continue at least to the conclusion of the proceeding, and apply even if compliance requires disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.
- (c) A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence that the lawyer reasonably believes is false.
- (d) In an ex parte proceeding, a lawyer shall inform the tribunal of all material facts known to the lawyer that will enable the tribunal to make an informed decision, whether or not the facts are adverse.
- (e) When, prior to judgment, a lawyer becomes aware of discussion or conduct by a juror which violates the trial court's instructions to the jury, the lawyer shall promptly report that discussion or conduct to the trial judge.

COMMENTARY: This Rule governs the conduct of a lawyer who is representing a client in the proceedings of a tribunal. See Rule 1.0(n) for the definition of "tribunal." It also applies when the lawyer is representing a client in an ancillary proceeding conducted pursuant to the tribunal's adjudicative authority, such as a deposition. Thus, for example, subsection (a)(3) requires a lawyer to take reasonable remedial measures if the lawyer comes to know that a client who is testifying in a deposition has offered evidence that is false.

The advocate's task is This Rule sets forth the special duties of lawyers as officers of the court to avoid conduct that undermines the integrity of the adjudicative process. A lawyer acting as an advocate in an adjudicative proceeding has an obligation to present the client's case with persuasive force. Performance of that duty while maintaining confidences of the client, however, is qualified by the advocate's duty of candor to the tribunal. However Consequently, an advocate does although a lawyer in an adversary proceeding is not required to present an impartial exposition of the law or to vouch for the evidence submitted in a cause; the lawyer must not allow the tribunal is responsible for assessing its probative value to be misled by false statements of law or fact or evidence that the lawyer knows to be false.

Representations by a Lawyer. An advocate is responsible for pleadings and other documents prepared for litigation, but is usually not required to have personal knowledge of matters asserted therein, for litigation documents ordinarily present assertions by the client, or by someone on the client's behalf, and not assertions by the lawyer. Compare Rule 3.1. However, an assertion purporting to be on the lawyer's own knowledge, as in an affidavit by the lawyer or in a statement in open court, may properly be made only when the lawyer knows the assertion is true or believes it to be true on the basis of a reasonably diligent inquiry. There are circumstances where failure to make a disclosure is the equivalent of an affirmative misrepresentation. The obligation prescribed in Rule 1.2(d) not to counsel a client to commit or assist the client in committing a fraud applies in litigation. Regarding compliance with Rule 1.2(d), see the Commentary to that Rule. See also the Commentary to Rule 8.4(2).

Misleading Legal Argument. Legal argument based on a knowingly false representation of law constitutes dishonesty toward the tribunal. A lawyer is not required to make a disinterested exposition of the law, but must recognize the existence of pertinent legal authorities. Furthermore, as stated in subsection (a)(3)(2), an advocate has a duty to disclose directly adverse authority in the controlling jurisdiction which that has not been disclosed by the opposing party. The underlying concept is that legal argument is a discussion seeking to determine the legal premises properly applicable to the case.

False Offering Evidence. When evidence that a lawyer knows to be false is provided by a person who is not the client, the lawyer must refuse to offer it regardless of the client's wishes.

When false evidence is offered by the client, however, a conflict may arise between the lawyer's duty to keep the client's revelations confidential and the duty of candor to the court. Upon ascertaining that material evidence is false, the lawyer should seek to persuade the client that the evidence should not be offered or, if it has been offered, that its false character should immediately be disclosed. If the persuasion is ineffective, the lawyer must take reasonable remedial measures.

Except in the defense of a criminal accused, the rule generally recognized is that, if necessary to rectify the situation, an advocate must disclose the existence of the client's deception to the court or to the other party. Such a disclosure can result in grave consequences to the client, including not only a sense of betrayal but also loss of the case and perhaps a prosecution for perjury. But the alternative is that the lawyer cooperate in deceiving the court, thereby subverting the truth-finding process which the adversary system is designed to implement. See Rule 1.2 (d). Furthermore, unless it is clearly understood that the lawyer will act upon the duty to disclose the existence of false evidence, the client can simply reject the lawyer's advice to reveal the false evidence and insist that the lawyer keep silent. Thus the client could in effect coerce the lawyer into being a party to fraud on the court.

AMENDMENT NOTES: The above paragraph has been amended and moved below under the "Remedial Measures" heading.

Subsection (a)(3) requires that the lawyer refuse to offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false, regardless of the client's wishes. This duty is premised on the lawyer's obligation as an officer of the court to prevent the trier of fact from being misled by false evidence. A lawyer does not violate this Rule if the lawyer offers the evidence for the purpose of establishing its falsity.

If a lawyer knows that the client intends to testify falsely or wants the lawyer to introduce false evidence, the lawyer should seek to persuade the client that the evidence should not be offered. If the persuasion is ineffective and the lawyer continues to represent the client, the lawyer must refuse to offer the false evidence. If only a portion of a witness's testimony will be false, the lawyer may call the witness to testify but may not elicit or otherwise permit the witness to present the testimony that the lawyer knows is false.

The duties stated in subsections (a) and (b) apply to all lawyers, including defense counsel in criminal cases. In some jurisdictions, however, courts have required counsel to present the accused as a witness or to give a narrative statement if the accused so desires, even if counsel knows that the testimony or statement will be false. The obligation of the advocate under the Rules of Professional Conduct is subordinate to such requirements.

The prohibition against offering false evidence only applies if the lawyer knows that the evidence is false. A lawyer's reasonable belief that evidence is false does not preclude its presentation to the trier of fact. A lawyer's knowledge that evidence is false, however, can be inferred from the circumstances. See Rule 1.0(g). Thus, although a lawyer should resolve doubts about the veracity of testimony or other evidence in favor of the client, the lawyer cannot ignore an obvious falsehood.

Refusing to Offer Proof Believed to Be False. Generally speaking, a lawyer has authority to refuse to offer testimony or other proof that the lawyer believes is untrustworthy. Offering such proof may reflect adversely on the lawyer's ability to discriminate in the quality of evidence and thus impair the lawyer's effectiveness as an advocate. In criminal cases, however, a lawyer may, in some jurisdictions, be denied this authority by constitutional requirements governing the right to counsel. Because of the special protections historically provided criminal defendants, however, this Rule does not permit a lawyer to refuse to offer the testimony of such a client where the lawyer reasonably believes but does not know that the testimony will be false. Unless the lawyer knows the testimony will be false, the lawyer must honor the client's decision to testify.

AMENDMENT NOTES: The above paragraph was previously entitled "Refusing to Offer Proof Believed to Be False" and was located later in the Commentary for this rule.

Perjury by a Criminal Defendant. Whether an advocate for a criminally accused has the same duty of disclosure has been intensely debated. While it is agreed that the lawyer should seek to persuade the elient to refrain from perjurious testimony, there has been dispute concerning the lawyer's duty when that persuasion fails. If the confrontation with the client occurs before trial, the lawyer ordinarily can withdraw. Withdrawal before trial may not be possible, however, either because trial is imminent, or because the confrontation with the client does not take place until the trial itself, or because no other counsel is available.

The most difficult situation, therefore, arises in a criminal case where the accused insists on testifying when the lawyer knows that the testimony is perjurious. The lawyer's effort to rectify the situation can increase the likelihood of the client's being convicted as well as opening the possibility of a prosecution for perjury. On the other hand, if the lawyer does not exercise control over the proof, the lawyer participates, although in a merely passive way, in deception of the court.

Three resolutions of this dilemma have been proposed. One is to permit the accused to testify by a narrative without guidance through the lawyer's questioning. This compromises both contending principles; it exempts the lawyer from the duty to disclose false evidence but subjects the client to an implicit disclosure of information imparted to counsel. Another suggested resolution, of relatively recent origin, is that the advocate be entirely excused from the duty to reveal perjury if the perjury is that of the client. This is a coherent solution but makes the advocate a knowing instrument of perjury.

The other resolution of the dilemma is that the lawyer must reveal the client's perjury if necessary to rectify the situation. A criminal accused has a right to the assistance of an advocate, a right to testify

and a right of confidential communication with counsel. However, an accused should not have a right to assistance of counsel in committing perjury. Furthermore, an advocate has an obligation, not only in professional ethics but under the law as well, to avoid implication in the commission of perjury or other falsification of evidence. See Rule 1.2(d).

Remedial Measures. If perjured testimony or false Having offered material evidence has been offered in the belief that it was true, a lawyer may subsequently come to know that the evidence is false. Or, a lawyer may be surprised when the lawyer's client, or another witness called by the lawyer, offers testimony the lawyer knows to be false, either during the lawyer's direct examination or in response to cross-examination by the opposing lawyer. In such situations or if the lawyer knows of the falsity of testimony elicited from the client during a deposition, the lawyer must take reasonable remedial measures. <u>In such situations</u>, the advocate's proper course ordinarily is to remonstrate with the client confidentially, advise the client of the lawyer's duty of candor to the tribunal and seek the client's cooperation with respect to the withdrawal or correction of the false statements or evidence. If that fails, the advocate should seek to withdraw if that will remedy the situation must take further remedial action. If withdrawal from the representation is not permitted or will not remedy the situation or is impossible undo the effect of the false evidence, the advocate should must make such disclosure to the court tribunal as is reasonably necessary to remedy the situation, even if doing so requires the lawyer to reveal information that otherwise would be protected by Rule 1.6. It is for the eourt tribunal then to determine what should be done. making a statement about the matter to the trier of fact, ordering a mistrial or perhaps nothing. If the false testimony was that of the client, the client may controvert the lawyer's version of their communication when the lawyer discloses the situation to the court. If there is an issue whether the client has committed perjury, the lawyer cannot represent the client in resolution of the issue, and a mistrial may be unavoidable. An unscrupulous client might in this way attempt to produce a series of mistrials and thus escape prosecution. However, a second such encounter could be construed as a deliberate abuse of the right to counsel and as such a waiver of the right to further representation.

Except in the defense of a criminal accused, the rule generally recognized is that, if necessary to rectify the situation, an advocate must disclose the existence of the client's deception to the court or to the other party. Such a The disclosure of a client's false testimony can result in grave consequences to the client, including not only a sense of betrayal but also loss of the case and perhaps a prosecution for perjury. But the alternative is that the lawyer cooperate in deceiving the court, thereby subverting the truth-finding process which the adversary system is designed to implement. See Rule 1.2(d). Furthermore, unless it is clearly understood that the lawyer will act upon the duty to disclose the existence of false evidence, the client can simply reject the lawyer's advice to reveal the false evidence and insist that the lawyer keep silent. Thus the client could in effect coerce the lawyer into being a party to fraud on the court.

AMENDMENT NOTES: The above paragraph was previously entitled "False Evidence" and was located earlier in the Commentary for this Rule.

Preserving Integrity of Adjudicative Process. Lawyers have a special obligation to protect a tribunal against criminal or fraudulent conduct that undermines the integrity of the adjudicative process, such as bribing, intimidating or otherwise unlawfully communicating with a witness, juror, court official or other participant in the proceeding, unlawfully destroying or concealing documents or other evidence or failing to disclose information to the tribunal when required by law to do so. Thus, subsection (b) requires a lawyer to take reasonable remedial measures, including disclosure if necessary, whenever the lawyer knows that a person, including the lawyer's client, intends to engage, is engaging or has engaged in criminal or fraudulent conduct related to the proceeding. Nothing in Rule 3.3(e) is meant to limit a lawyer's obligation to take appropriate action after judgment has entered.

Constitutional Requirements. The general rule that an advocate must disclose the existence of perjury with respect to a material fact, even that of a client—applies to defense counsel in criminal cases, as well as in other instances. However, the definition of the lawyer's ethical duty in such a situation may be qualified by constitutional provisions for due process and the right to counsel in criminal cases. In some jurisdictions these provisions have been construed to require that counsel present an accused as a witness if the accused wishes to testify, even if counsel knows the testimony will be false. The obligation of the advocate under these Rules is subordinate to such a constitutional requirement.

Duration of Obligation. A practical time limit on the obligation to rectify the presentation of false evidence or false statements of fact has to be established. The conclusion of the proceeding is a reasonably definite point for the termination of the obligation. In criminal and juvenile delinquency matters the duty to correct a newly discovered and material falsehood continues until the defendant or delinquent is discharged from custody or released from judicial supervision, whichever occurs later. The lawyer shall notify the tribunal that false evidence or false statements of fact were made.

Refusing to Offer Proof Believed to Be False. Generally speaking, a lawyer has authority to refuse to offer testimony or other proof that the lawyer believes is untrustworthy. Offering such proof may reflect adversely on the lawyer's ability to discriminate in the quality of evidence and thus impair the

lawyer's effectiveness as an advocate. In criminal cases, however, a lawyer may, in some jurisdictions, be denied this authority by constitutional requirements governing the right to counsel.

AMENDMENT NOTES: The above paragraph has been amended and moved above under the "Offering Evidence" heading.

Ex Parte Proceedings. Ordinarily, an advocate has the limited responsibility of presenting one side of the matters that a tribunal should consider in reaching a decision; the conflicting position is expected to be presented by the opposing party. However, in any ex parte proceeding, such as an application for a temporary restraining order, there is no balance of presentation by opposing advocates. The object of an ex parte proceeding is nevertheless to yield a substantially just result. The judge has an affirmative responsibility to accord the absent party just consideration. The lawyer for the represented party has the correlative duty to make disclosures of material facts known to the lawyer and that the lawyer reasonably believes are necessary to an informed decision.

Withdrawal. Normally, a lawyer's compliance with the duty of candor imposed by this Rule does not require that the lawyer withdraw from the representation of a client whose interests will be or have been adversely affected by the lawyer's disclosure. The lawyer may, however, be required by Rule 1.16(a) to seek permission of the tribunal to withdraw if the lawyer's compliance with this Rule's duty of candor results in such an extreme deterioration of the client-lawyer relationship that the lawyer can no longer competently represent the client. Also see Rule 1.16(b) for the circumstances in which a lawyer will be permitted to seek a tribunal's permission to withdraw. In connection with a request for permission to withdraw that is premised on a client's misconduct, a lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation only to the extent reasonably necessary to comply with this Rule or as otherwise permitted by Rule 1.6.

Rule 3.4. Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel

A lawyer shall not:

- (1) Unlawfully obstruct another party's access to evidence or unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal a document or other material having potential evidentiary value. A lawyer shall not counsel or assist another person to do any such act;
- (2) Falsify evidence, counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely, or offer an inducement to a witness that is prohibited by law;
- (3) Knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal except for an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation exists;
- (4) In pretrial procedure, make a frivolous discovery request or fail to make reasonably diligent effort to comply with a legally proper discovery request by an opposing party;
- (5) In trial, allude to any matter that the lawyer does not reasonably believe is relevant or that will not be supported by admissible evidence, assert personal knowledge of facts in issue except when testifying as a witness, or state a personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, the credibility of a witness, the culpability of a civil litigant or the guilt or innocence of an accused; or
- (6) Request a person other than a client to refrain from voluntarily giving relevant information to another party unless:
 - (A) The person is a relative or an employee or other agent of a client; and
- (B) The lawyer reasonably believes that the person's interests will not be adversely affected by refraining from giving such information.
- (7) Present, participate in presenting, or threaten to present criminal charges solely to obtain an advantage in a civil matter.

COMMENTARY: The procedure of the adversary system contemplates that the evidence in a case is to be marshaled competitively by the contending parties. Fair competition in the adversary system is secured by prohibitions against destruction or concealment of evidence, improperly influencing witnesses, obstructive tactics in discovery procedure, and the like.

Documents and other items of evidence are often essential to establish a claim or defense. Subject to evidentiary privileges, the right of an opposing party, including the government, to obtain evidence through discovery or subpoena is an important procedural right. The exercise of that right can be frustrated if relevant material is altered, concealed or destroyed. Applicable law in many jurisdictions makes it an offense to destroy material for purpose of impairing its availability in a pending proceeding or one whose commencement can be foreseen. Falsifying evidence is also generally a criminal offense. Subdivision (1)

applies to evidentiary material generally, including computerized information. <u>Applicable law may permit a lawyer to take temporary possession of physical evidence of client crimes for the purpose of conducting a limited examination that will not alter or destroy material characteristics of the evidence. In such a case, applicable law may require the lawyer to turn the evidence over to the police or other prosecuting authority, depending on the circumstances.</u>

With regard to subdivision (2), it is not improper to pay a witness's expenses or to compensate an expert witness on terms permitted by law. The common law rule in most jurisdictions is that it is improper to pay an occurrence witness any fee for testifying and that it is improper to pay an expert witness a contingent fee.

Subdivision (6) permits a lawyer to advise employees of a client to refrain from giving information to another party, for the employees may identify their interests with those of the client. See also Rule 4.2.

Rule 3.5. Impartiality and Decorum of the Tribunal

A lawyer shall not:

- (1) Seek to influence a judge, juror, prospective juror or other official by means prohibited by law;
- (2) Communicate ex parte with such a person except as permitted during the proceeding unless authorized to do so by law or court order; or
 - (3) Communicate with a juror or prospective juror after discharge of the jury if:
 - (a) the communication is prohibited by law or court order;
 - (b) the juror has made known to the lawyer a desire not to communicate;
- (c) the communication involves misrepresentation, coercion, duress or harassment; of
- (3)(4) engage in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal or ancillary proceedings such as depositions and mediations.

COMMENTARY: Many forms of improper influence upon a tribunal are proscribed by criminal law. Others are specified in the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, with which an advocate should be familiar. A lawyer is required to avoid contributing to a violation of such provisions.

During a proceeding a lawyer may not communicate ex parte with persons serving in an official capacity in the proceeding, such as judges, masters or jurors, unless authorized to do so by law or court order.

A lawyer may on occasion want to communicate with a juror or prospective juror after the jury has been discharged. The lawyer may do so unless the communication is prohibited by law or a court order but must respect the desire of the juror not to talk with the lawyer. The lawyer may not engage in improper conduct during the communication.

The advocate's function is to present evidence and argument so that the cause may be decided according to law. Refraining from abusive or obstreperous conduct is a corollary of the advocate's right to speak on behalf of litigants. A lawyer may stand firm against abuse by a judge but should avoid reciprocation; the judge's default is not justification for similar dereliction by an advocate. An advocate can present the cause, protect the record for subsequent review and preserve professional integrity by patient firmness no less effectively than by belligerence or theatrics.

Rule 3.6. Trial Publicity

- (a) A lawyer who is participating or has participated in the investigation or litigation of a matter shall not make an extrajudicial statement that a reasonable person would expect to the lawyer knows or reasonably should know will be disseminated by means of public communication if the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that it and will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding in the matter.
 - (b) Notwithstanding subsection (a), a lawyer may state:
- (1) the claim, offense or defense involved and, except when prohibited by law, the identity of the persons involved;
 - (2) information contained in a public record;
 - (3) that an investigation of the matter is in progress;
 - (4) the scheduling or result of any step in litigation;

- (5) a request for assistance in obtaining evidence and information necessary thereto:
- (6) a warning of danger concerning the behavior of a person involved, when there is reason to believe that there exists the likelihood of substantial harm to an individual or to the public interest; and
 - (7) in a criminal case: in addition to subparagraphs (1) through (6):
 - (i) identity, residence, occupation and family status of the accused;
- (ii) if the accused has not been apprehended, information necessary to aid in apprehension of that person;
 - (iii) the fact, time and place of arrest; and
- (iv) the identity of investigating and arresting officers or agencies and the length of the investigation.
- (e)(b) Notwithstanding paragraph (a), a lawyer may make a statement that a reasonable lawyer would believe is required to protect a client from the substantial undue prejudicial effect of recent publicity not initiated by the lawyer or the lawyer's client. A statement made pursuant to this paragraph shall be limited to such information as is necessary to mitigate the recent adverse publicity.
- (d)(c) No lawyer associated in a firm or government agency with a lawyer subject to paragraph (a) shall make a statement prohibited by paragraph (a).
- COMMENTARY: (1) It is difficult to strike a balance between protecting the right to a fair trial and safeguarding the right of free expression. Preserving the right to a fair trial necessarily entails some curtailment of the information that may be disseminated about a party prior to trial, particularly where trial by jury is involved. If there were no such limits, the result would be the practical nullification of the protective effect of the rules of forensic decorum and the exclusionary rules of evidence. On the other hand, there are vital social interests served by the free dissemination of information about events having legal consequences and about legal proceedings themselves. The public has a right to know about threats to its safety and measures aimed at assuring its security. It also has a legitimate interest in the conduct of judicial proceedings, particularly in matters of general public concern. Furthermore, the subject matter of legal proceedings is often of direct significance in debate and deliberations over questions of public policy.
- (2) Special rules of confidentiality may validly govern proceedings in juvenile, domestic relations and mental disability proceedings, and perhaps other types of litigation. Rule 3.4(3) requires compliance with such Rules.
- (3) The Rule sets forth a basic general prohibition against a lawyer's making statements that the lawyer knows or should know will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding. Recognizing that the public value of informed commentary is great and the likelihood of prejudice to a proceeding by the commentary of a lawyer who is not involved in the proceeding is small, the Rule applies only to lawyers who are, or who have been involved in the investigation or litigation of a case, and their associates.
- (4) Paragraph (b) identifies specific matters about which a lawyer's statements would not ordinarily be considered to present a substantial likelihood of material prejudice, and should not in any event be considered prohibited by the general prohibition of paragraph (a). Paragraph (b) is not intended to be an exhaustive listing of the subjects upon which a lawyer may make a statement, but statements on other matters may be subject to paragraph (a). Certain subjects would not ordinarily be considered to present a substantial likelihood of material prejudice, such as:
- (a) the claim, offense or defense involved and, except when prohibited by law, the identity of the persons involved;
 - (b) information contained in a public record;
 - (c) that an investigation of the matter is in progress;
 - (d) the scheduling or result of any step in litigation;
 - (e) a request for assistance in obtaining evidence and information necessary thereto;
- (f) a warning of danger concerning the behavior of a person involved, when there is reason to believe that there exists the likelihood of substantial harm to an individual or to the public interest; and
 - (g) in a criminal case: in addition to subparagraphs (a) through (f):
 - (i) identity, residence, occupation and family status of the accused;
 - (ii) if the accused has not been apprehended, information necessary to aid in apprehension of that person;
 - (iii) the fact, time and place of arrest; and
 - (iv) the identity of investigating and arresting officers or agencies and the length of the investigation.

- (5) There are, on the other hand, certain subjects which are more likely than not to have a material prejudicial effect on a proceeding, particularly when they refer to a civil matter triable to a jury, a criminal matter, or any other proceeding that could result in incarceration. These subjects relate to:
- (a) the character, credibility, reputation or criminal record of a party, suspect in a criminal investigation or witness, or the identity of a witness, or the expected testimony of a party or witness;
- (b) in a criminal case or proceeding that could result in incarceration, the possibility of a plea of guilty to the offense or the existence or contents of any confession, admission, or statement given by a defendant or suspect or that person's refusal or failure to make a statement;
- (c) the performance or results of any examination or test or the refusal or failure of a person to submit to an examination or test, or the identity or nature of physical evidence expected to be presented;
- (d) any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of a defendant or suspect in a criminal case or proceeding that could result in incarceration;
- (e) information that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is likely to be inadmissible as evidence in a trial and that would, if disclosed, create a substantial risk of prejudicing an impartial trial; or
- (f) the fact that a defendant has been charged with a crime, unless there is included therein a statement explaining that the charge is merely an accusation and that the defendant is presumed innocent until and unless proven guilty.
- (6) Another relevant factor in determining prejudice is the nature of the proceeding involved. Criminal jury trials will be most sensitive to extrajudicial speech. Civil trials may be less sensitive. Non-jury hearings and arbitration proceedings may be even less affected. The Rule will still place limitations on prejudical comments in these cases, but the likelihood of prejudice may be different depending on the type of proceeding.
- (7) Finally, extrajudicial statements that might otherwise raise a question under this Rule may be permissible when they are made in response to statements made publicly by another party, another party's lawyer, or third persons, where a reasonable lawyer would believe a public response is required in order to avoid prejudice to the lawyer's client. When prejudicial statements have been publicly made by others, responsive statements may have the salutary effect of lessening any resulting adverse impact on the adjudicative proceeding. Such responsive statements should be limited to contain only such information as is necessary to mitigate undue prejudice created by the statements made by others.
- (8) See Rule 3.8(5) for additional duties of prosecutors in connection with extrajudicial statements about criminal proceedings.

Rule 3.7. Lawyer as Witness

- (a) A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness except where unless:
 - (1) The testimony relates to an uncontested issue;
- (2) The testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered in the case; or
 - (3) Disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on the client.
- (b) A lawyer may act as advocate in a trial in which another lawyer in the lawyer's firm is likely to be called as a witness unless precluded from doing so by Rule 1.7 or Rule 1.9.

COMMENTARY: Combining the roles of advocate and witness can prejudice the tribunal and the opposing party and can also involve a conflict of interest between the lawyer and client.

Advocate-Witness Rule. The tribunal has proper objection when the trier of fact may be confused or misled by a lawyer serving as both advocate and witness. The opposing party has proper objection where the combination of roles may prejudice that party's rights in the litigation. A witness is required to testify on the basis of personal knowledge, while an advocate is expected to explain and comment on evidence given by others. It may not be clear whether a statement by an advocate-witness should be taken as proof or as an analysis of the proof.

To protect the tribunal, subsection (a) prohibits a lawyer from simultaneously serving as advocate and necessary witness except in those circumstances specified in subsections (a)(1) through (a)(3). Subsection (a)(1) recognizes that if the testimony will be uncontested, the ambiguities in the dual role are purely theoretical. Subsection (a)(2) recognizes that where the testimony concerns the extent and value of legal services rendered in the action in which the testimony is offered, permitting the lawyers to testify avoids the need for a second trial with new counsel to resolve that issue. Moreover, in such a situation the judge has firsthand knowledge of the matter in issue; hence, there is less dependence on the adversary process to test the credibility of the testimony.

Apart from these two exceptions, subsection (a)(3) recognizes that a balancing is required between the interests of the client and those of the <u>tribunal and the</u> opposing party. Whether the <u>tribunal is likely to be misled or the</u> opposing party is likely to suffer prejudice depends on the nature of the case, the importance and probable tenor of the lawyer's testimony, and the probability that the lawyer's testimony will conflict with that of other witnesses. Even if there is risk of such prejudice, in determining whether the lawyer should be disqualified, due regard must be given to the effect of disqualification on the lawyer's client. It is relevant that one or both parties could reasonably foresee that the lawyer would probably be a witness. The <u>principle of imputed disqualification conflict of interest principles</u> stated in <u>Rule Rules 1.7, 1.9 and 1.10 has have</u> no application to this aspect of the problem.

Because the tribunal is not likely to be misled when a lawyer acts as advocate in a trial in which another lawyer in the lawyer's firm will testify as a necessary witness, subsection (b) permits the lawyer to do so except in situations involving a conflict of interest.

Conflict of Interest. Whether the combination of roles involves an improper In determining if it is permissible to act as advocate in a trial in which the lawyer will be a necessary witness, the lawyer must also consider that the dual role may give rise to a conflict of interest with respect to the client is determined by Rule that will require compliance with Rules 1.7 or 1.9. For example, if there is likely to be substantial conflict between the testimony of the client and that of the lawyer or a member of the lawyer's firm, the representation is improper involves a conflict of interest that requires compliance with Rule 1.7. This would be true even though the lawyer might not be prohibited by subsection (a) from simultaneously serving as advocate and witness because the lawyer's disqualification would work a substantial hardship on the client. Similarly, a lawyer who might be permitted to simultaneously serve as an advocate and a witness by subsection (a)(3) might be precluded from doing so by Rule 1.9. The problem can arise whether the lawyer is called as a witness on behalf of the client or is called by the opposing party. Determining whether or not such a conflict exists is primarily the responsibility of the lawyer involved. If there is a conflict of interest, the lawyer must secure the client's informed consent, confirmed in writing. In some cases, the lawyer will be precluded from seeking the client's consent. See Commentary to Rule 1.7. If a lawyer who is a member of a firm may not act as both advocate and witness by reason of conflict of interest, Rule 1.10 disqualifies the firm also. See Rule 1.0(c) for the definition of "confirmed in writing" and Rule 1.0(f) for the definition of "informed consent."

Subsection (b) provides that a lawyer is not disqualified from serving as an advocate because a lawyer with whom the lawyer is associated in a firm is precluded from doing so by subsection (a). If, however, the testifying lawyer would also be disqualified by Rule 1.7 or Rule 1.9 from representing the client in the matter, other lawyers in the firm will be precluded from representing the client by Rule 1.10 unless the client gives informed consent under the conditions stated in Rule 1.7.

Rule 3.8. Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor

The prosecutor in a criminal case shall:

- (1) Refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause;
- (2) Make reasonable efforts to assure that the accused has been advised of the right to, and the procedure for obtaining, counsel and has been given reasonable opportunity to obtain counsel;
- (3) Not seek to obtain from an unrepresented accused a waiver of important pretrial rights, such as the right to a preliminary hearing;
- (4) Make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense, and, in connection with sentencing, disclose to the defense and to the tribunal all unprivileged mitigating information known to the prosecutor, except when the prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility by a protective order of the tribunal; and
- (5) Exercise reasonable care to prevent investigators, law enforcement personnel, employees or other persons assisting or associated with the prosecutor in a criminal case from making an extrajudicial statement that the prosecutor would be prohibited from making under Rule 3.6.

COMMENTARY: A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate. This responsibility carries with it specific obligations to see that the defendant is accorded procedural justice and that guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient evidence. Precisely how far the prosecutor is required to go in this direction is a matter of debate and varies in different jurisdictions. Many jurisdictions have adopted the ABA Standards of Criminal Justice Relating to the Prosecution

Function, which in turn are the product of prolonged and careful deliberation by lawyers experienced in both criminal prosecution and defense. See also Rule 3.3(d), governing ex parte proceedings, among which grand jury proceedings are included. Applicable law may require other measures by the prosecutor and knowing disregard of those obligations or a systematic abuse of prosecutorial discretion could constitute a violation of Rule 8.4.

Subdivision (3) does not apply to an accused appearing pro se with the approval of the tribunal. Nor does it forbid the lawful questioning of a suspect who has knowingly waived the rights to counsel and silence.

The exception in subdivision (4) recognizes that a prosecutor may seek an appropriate protective order from the tribunal if disclosure of information to the defense could result in substantial harm to an individual or to the public interest.

AMENDMENT NOTES: No changes have been made to the above rule or Commentary.

Rule 3.9. Advocate in Nonadjudicative Proceedings

A lawyer representing a client before a legislative <u>body</u> or administrative <u>tribunal agency</u> in a nonadjudicative proceeding shall disclose that the appearance is in a representative capacity and shall conform to the provisions of Rules 3.3(a) through (c), 3.4(1) through (3), and 3.5.

COMMENTARY: In representation before bodies such as legislatures, municipal councils, and executive and administrative agencies acting in a rule-making or policy-making capacity, lawyers present facts, formulate issues and advance argument in the matters under consideration. The decision-making body, like a court, should be able to rely on the integrity of the submissions made to it. A lawyer appearing before such a body should must deal with the tribunal it honestly and in conformity with applicable rules of procedure. See Rules 3.3(a) through (c), 3.4(a) through (c) and 3.5.

Lawyers have no exclusive right to appear before nonadjudicative bodies, as they do before a court. The requirements of this Rule therefore may subject lawyers to regulations inapplicable to advocates who are not lawyers. However, legislatures and administrative agencies have a right to expect lawyers to deal with them as they deal with courts.

This Rule only applies when a lawyer represents a client in connection with an official hearing or meeting of a governmental agency or a legislative body to which the lawyer or the lawyer's client is presenting evidence or argument. It does not apply to representation of a client in a negotiation or other bilateral transaction with a governmental agency; representation or in connection with an application or a license or other privilege or the client's compliance with generally applicable reporting requirements, such as the filing of income-tax returns. Nor does it apply to the representation of a client in connection with an investigation or examination of the client's affairs conducted by government investigators or examiners. Representation in such a transaction matters is governed by Rules 4.1 through 4.4.

TRANSACTIONS WITH PERSONS OTHER THAN CLIENTS

Rule 4.1. Truthfulness In Statements to Others

In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly:

- (1) Make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person; or
- (2) Fail to disclose a material fact to a third person when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client, unless disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6.

COMMENTARY: **Misrepresentation.** A lawyer is required to be truthful when dealing with others on a client's behalf, but generally has no affirmative duty to inform an opposing party of relevant facts. A misrepresentation can occur if the lawyer incorporates or affirms a statement of another person that the lawyer knows is false. Misrepresentations can also occur by failure to aet partially true but misleading statements or omissions that are the equivalent of affirmative false statements. For dishonest conduct that does not amount to a false statement or for misrepresentations by a lawyer other than in the course of representing a client, see Rule 8.4.

Statements of Fact. This Rule refers to statements of fact. Whether a particular statement should be regarded as one of fact can depend on the circumstances. Under generally accepted conventions in negotiation, certain types of statements ordinarily are not taken as statements of material fact. Estimates of price or value placed on the subject of a transaction and a party's intentions as to an acceptable settlement of a claim are <u>ordinarily</u> in this category, and so is the existence of an undisclosed principal

except where nondisclosure of the principal would constitute fraud. <u>Lawyers should be mindful of their obligations under applicable law to avoid criminal and tortious misrepresentation.</u>

Crime or Fraud by Client. Under Rule 1.2(d), a lawyer is prohibited from counseling or assisting a client in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent. Subdivision (2) recognizes that states a specific application of the principle set forth in Rule 1.2(d) and addresses the situation where a client's crime or fraud takes the form of a lie or misrepresentation. Ordinarily, a lawyer can avoid assisting a client's crime or fraud by withdrawing from the representation. Sometimes it may be necessary for the lawyer to give notice of the fact of withdrawal and to disaffirm an opinion, document, affirmation or the like. In extreme cases, substantive law may require a lawyer to disclose eertain information relating to the representation to avoid being deemed to have assisted the client's crime or fraud. The requirement of If the lawyer can avoid assisting a client's crime or fraud only by disclosing this information, then under subdivision (2) the lawyer is required to do so, unless the disclosure ereated by this subdivision is, however, subject to the obligations created is prohibited by Rule 1.6.

Rule 4.2. Communication With Person Represented By Counsel

In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the representation with a party the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized by law to do so.

COMMENTARY: This Rule does not prohibit communication with a party, or an employee or agent of a party, concerning matters outside the representation. For example, the existence of a controversy between a government agency and a private party, or between two organizations, does not prohibit a lawyer for either from communicating with nonlawyer representatives of the other regarding a separate matter. Also, parties to a matter may communicate directly with each other and a lawyer having independent justification for communicating with the other party is permitted to do so. Communications authorized by law include, for example, the right of a party to a controversy with a government agency to speak with government officials about the matter.

In the case of an organization, this Rule prohibits communications by a lawyer for one party concerning the matter in representation with persons having a managerial responsibility on behalf of the organization, and with any other person whose act or omission in connection with that matter may be imputed to the organization for purposes of civil or criminal liability or whose statement may constitute an admission on the part of the organization. If an agent or employee of the organization is represented in the matter by his or her own counsel, the consent by that counsel to a communication will be sufficient for purposes of this Rule. (Compare Rule 3.4 (6)).

This Rule also covers any person, whether or not a party to a formal proceeding, who is represented by counsel concerning the matter in question.

AMENDMENT NOTES: No changes have been made to the above rule or Commentary.

Rule 4.3. Dealing With Unrepresented Person

In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented by counsel, a lawyer shall not state or imply that the lawyer is disinterested, wWhen the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the unrepresented person misunderstands the lawyer's role in the matter. Tthe lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding. The lawyer shall not give legal advice to an unrepresented person, other than the advice to secure counsel, if the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the interests of such a person are or have a reasonable possibility of being in conflict with the interests of the client.

COMMENTARY: An unrepresented person, particularly one not experienced in dealing with legal matters, might assume that a lawyer is disinterested in loyalties or is a disinterested authority on the law even when the lawyer represents a client. During the course of a lawyer's representation of a client, the lawyer should not give advice to an unrepresented person other than the advice to obtain counsel. In order to avoid a misunderstanding, a lawyer will typically need to identify the lawyer's client and, where necessary, explain that the client has interests opposed to those of the unrepresented person. For misunderstandings that sometimes arise when a lawyer for an organization deals with an unrepresented constituent, see Rule 1.13(d).

The Rule distinguishes between situations involving unrepresented persons whose interests may be adverse to those of the lawyer's client and those in which the person's interests are not in conflict with the client's. In the former situation, the possibility that the lawyer will compromise the unrepresented

person's interests is so great that the Rule prohibits the giving of any advice, apart from the advice to obtain counsel. Whether a lawyer is giving impermissible advice may depend on the experience and sophistication of the unrepresented person, as well as the setting in which the behavior and comments occur. This Rule does not prohibit a lawyer from negotiating the terms of a transaction or settling a dispute with an unrepresented person. So long as the lawyer has explained that the lawyer represents an adverse party and is not representing the person, the lawyer may inform the person of the terms on which the lawyer's client will enter into an agreement or settle a matter, prepare documents that require the person's signature and explain the lawyer's own view of the meaning of the document or the lawyer's view of the underlying legal obligations.

See Rule 3.8 for particular duties of prosecutors in dealing with unrepresented persons.

Rule 4.4. Respect For Rights of Third Persons

- (a) In representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person, or use methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of such a person.
- (b) A lawyer who receives a document relating to the representation of the lawyer's client and knows or reasonably should know that the document was inadvertently sent shall promptly notify the sender.

COMMENTARY: Responsibility to a client requires a lawyer to subordinate the interests of others to those of the client, but that responsibility does not imply that a lawyer may disregard the rights of third persons. It is impractical to catalogue all such rights, but they include legal restrictions on methods of obtaining evidence from third persons and unwarranted intrusions into privileged relationships, such as the client-lawyer relationship.

Subsection (b) recognizes that lawyers sometimes receive documents that were mistakenly sent or produced by opposing parties or their lawyers. If a lawyer knows or reasonably should know that such a document was sent inadvertently, then this Rule requires the lawyer to promptly notify the sender in order to permit that person to take protective measures. For purposes of this Rule, "document" includes e-mail or other electronic modes of transmission subject to being read or put into readable form.

LAW FIRMS AND ASSOCIATIONS

Rule 5.1. Responsibilities of a Partners, or Managers, and Supervisory Lawyers

- (a) A partner in a law firm, and a lawyer who individually or together with other lawyers possesses comparable managerial authority in a law firm, shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm conform to the Rules of Professional Conduct.
- (b) A lawyer having direct supervisory authority over another lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the other lawyer conforms to the Rules of Professional Conduct.
- (c) A lawyer shall be responsible for another lawyer's violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct if:
- (1) The lawyer orders or, with knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies the conduct involved; or
- (2) The lawyer is a partner <u>or has comparable managerial authority</u> in the law firm in which the other lawyer practices, or has direct supervisory authority over the other lawyer, and knows of the conduct at a time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable remedial action.

COMMENTARY: Subsections (a) and (b) refer applies to lawyers who have supervisory managerial authority over the professional work of a firm or legal department of a government agency. See Rule 1.0(d). This includes members of a partnership and, the shareholders in a law firm organized as a professional corporation, and members of other associations authorized to practice law; lawyers having supervisory comparable managerial authority in the a legal services organization or a law department of an enterprise or government agency; and lawyers who have intermediate managerial responsibilities in a firm. Subsection (b) applies to lawyers who have supervisory authority over the work of other lawyers in a firm.

AMENDMENT NOTES: In the above paragraph, the sentence that begins with "This includes members of a partnership" was previously the beginning of a new paragraph.

Subsection (a) requires lawyers with managerial authority within a firm to make reasonable efforts to establish internal policies and procedures designed to provide reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm will conform to the Rules of Professional Conduct. Such policies and procedures include those designed to detect and resolve conflicts of interest, identify dates by which actions must be taken in pending matters, account for client funds and property and ensure that inexperienced lawyers are properly supervised.

The Other measures that may be required to fulfill the responsibility prescribed in subsections (a) and (b) can depend on the firm's structure and the nature of its practice. In a small firm of experienced lawyers, informal supervision and occasional admonition periodic review of compliance with the required systems ordinarily might be sufficient will suffice. In a large firm, or in practice situations in which intensely difficult ethical problems frequently arise, more elaborate procedures measures may be necessary. Some firms, for example, have a procedure whereby junior lawyers can make confidential referral of ethical problems directly to a designated senior partner or special committee. See Rule 5.2. Firms, whether large or small, may also rely on continuing legal education in professional ethics. In any event, the ethical atmosphere of a firm can influence the conduct of all its members and a lawyer having authority over the work of another the partners may not assume that the subordinate lawyer all lawyers associated with the firm will inevitably conform to the Rules.

Subsection (c) $\frac{1}{1}$ expresses a general principle of <u>personal</u> responsibility for acts of another. See also Rule 8.4(1).

Subsection (c)(2) defines the duty of a <u>partner or other</u> lawyer having <u>comparable managerial authority in a law firm, as well as a lawyer who has</u> direct supervisory authority over performance of specific legal work by another lawyer. Whether a lawyer has supervisory authority in particular circumstances is a question of fact. Partners of a <u>private firm and lawyers with comparable authority</u> have at least indirect responsibility for all work being done by the firm, while a partner <u>or manager</u> in charge of a particular matter ordinarily <u>also</u> has <u>direct authority over supervisory responsibility for the work of other firm lawyers engaged in the matter. Appropriate remedial action by a partner <u>or managing lawyer</u> would depend on the immediacy of <u>the partner's that lawyer's</u> involvement and the seriousness of the misconduct. The <u>A</u> supervisor is required to intervene to prevent avoidable consequences of misconduct if the supervisor knows that the misconduct occurred. Thus, if a supervising lawyer knows that a subordinate misrepresented a matter to an opposing party in negotiation, the supervisor as well as the subordinate has a duty to correct the resulting misapprehension.</u>

Professional misconduct by a lawyer under supervision could reveal a violation of subsection (b) on the part of the supervisory lawyer even though it does not entail a violation of subsection (c) because there was no direction, ratification or knowledge of the violation.

Apart from this Rule and Rule 8.4(1), a lawyer does not have disciplinary liability for the conduct of a partner, associate or subordinate. Whether a lawyer may be liable civilly or criminally for another lawyer's conduct is a question of law beyond the scope of these Rules.

The duties imposed by this Rule on managing and supervising lawyers do not alter the personal duty of each lawyer in a firm to abide by the Rules of Professional Conduct. See Rule 5.2(a).

Rule 5.2. Responsibilities of a Subordinate Lawyer

(a) A lawyer is bound by the Rules of Professional Conduct notwithstanding that lawyer acted at the direction of another person.

(b) A subordinate lawyer does not violate the Rules of Professional Conduct if that lawyer acts in accordance with a supervisory lawyer's reasonable resolution of an arguable question of professional duty.

COMMENTARY: Although a lawyer is not relieved of responsibility for a violation by the fact that the lawyer acted at the direction of a supervisor, that fact may be relevant in determining whether a lawyer had the knowledge required to render conduct a violation of the Rules. For example, if a subordinate filed a frivolous pleading at the direction of a supervisor, the subordinate would not be guilty of a professional violation unless the subordinate knew of the document's frivolous character.

When lawyers in a supervisor-subordinate relationship encounter a matter involving professional judgment as to ethical duty, the supervisor may assume responsibility for making the judgment. Otherwise a consistent course of action or position could not be taken. If the question can reasonably be answered only one way, the duty of both lawyers is clear and they are equally responsible for fulfilling it. However, if the question is reasonably arguable, someone has to decide upon the course of action. That authority ordinarily reposes in the supervisor, and a subordinate may be guided accordingly. For example, if a question arises whether the interests of two clients conflict under Rule 1.7, the supervisor's reasonable

resolution of the question should protect the subordinate professionally if the resolution is subsequently challenged.

Rule 5.3. Responsibilities regarding Nonlawyer Assistants

With respect to a nonlawyer employed or retained by or associated with a lawyer:

- (1) A partner, and a lawyer who individually or together with other lawyers possesses comparable managerial authority in a law firm shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that the person's conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer;
- (2) A lawyer having direct supervisory authority over the nonlawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the person's conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer; and
- (3) A lawyer shall be responsible for conduct of such a person that would be a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct if engaged in by a lawyer if:
- (A) The lawyer orders or, with the knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies the conduct involved; or
- (B) The lawyer is a partner or has comparable managerial authority in the law firm in which the person is employed, or has direct supervisory authority over the person, and knows of the conduct at a time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable remedial action.

COMMENTARY: Lawyers generally employ assistants in their practice, including secretaries, investigators, law student interns, and paraprofessionals. Such assistants, whether employees or independent contractors, act for the lawyer in rendition of the lawyer's professional services. A lawyer should must give such assistants appropriate instruction and supervision concerning the ethical aspects of their employment, particularly regarding the obligation not to disclose information relating to representation of the client, and should be responsible for their work product. The measures employed in supervising nonlawyers should take account of the fact that they do not have legal training and are not subject to professional discipline.

Subdivision (1) requires lawyers with managerial authority within a law firm to make reasonable efforts to establish internal policies and procedures designed to provide reasonable assurance that nonlawyers in the firm will act in a way compatible with the Rules of Professional Conduct. See first paragraph of Commentary to Rule 5.1. Subdivision (2) applies to lawyers who have supervisory authority over the work of a nonlawyer. Subdivision (3) specifies the circumstances in which a lawyer is responsible for conduct of a nonlawyer that would be a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct if engaged in by a lawyer.

Rule 5.4. Professional Independence of a Lawyer

- (a) A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer, except that:
- (1) An agreement by a lawyer with the lawyer's firm, partner, or associate may provide for the payment of money, over a reasonable period of time after the lawyer's death, to the lawyer's estate or to one or more specified persons;
- (2) A lawyer who <u>purchases the practice undertakes to complete unfinished legal business</u> of a deceased, <u>disabled or disappeared</u> lawyer may, <u>pursuant to the provisions of Rule 1.17</u>, pay to the estate <u>or other representative</u> of the deceased that lawyer that proportion of the <u>agreed-upon purchase price total compensation which fairly represents the services rendered by the deceased lawyer; and</u>
- (3) A lawyer or law firm may include nonlawyer employees in a compensation or retirement plan, even though the plan is based in whole or in part on a profit-sharing arrangement.
- (b) A lawyer shall not form a partnership with a nonlawyer if any of the activities of the partnership consist of the practice of law.
- (c) A lawyer shall not permit a person who recommends, employs, or pays the lawyer to render legal services for another to direct or regulate the lawyer's professional judgment in rendering such legal services.

- (d) A lawyer shall not practice with or in the form of a professional corporation or association authorized to practice law for a profit, if:
- (1) A nonlawyer owns any interest therein, except that a fiduciary representative of the estate of a lawyer may hold the stock or interest of the lawyer for a reasonable time during administration;
- (2) A nonlawyer is a corporate director or officer thereof <u>or occupies the position</u> of similar responsibility in any form of association other than a corporation; or
- (3) A nonlawyer has the right to direct or control the professional judgment of a lawyer.

COMMENTARY: The provisions of this Rule express traditional limitations on sharing fees. These limitations are to protect the lawyer's professional independence of judgment. Where someone other than the client pays the lawyer's fee or salary, or recommends employment of the lawyer, that arrangement does not modify the lawyer's obligation to the client. As stated in subsection (c), such arrangements should not interfere with the lawyer's professional judgment.

This Rule also expresses traditional limitations on permitting a third party to direct or regulate the lawyer's professional judgment in rendering legal services to another. See also Rule 1.8(f) (lawyer may accept compensation from a third party as long as there is no interference with the lawyer's independent professional judgment and the client gives informed consent).

Rule 5.5. Unauthorized Practice of Law

A lawyer shall not:

- (1) Practice law in a jurisdiction where doing so violates the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction; or
- (2) Assist a person who is not a member of the bar, who has resigned from the bar, who has retired from the bar, or who has been suspended, disbarred, or placed on inactive status in the performance of activity that constitutes the unauthorized practice of law.

COMMENTARY: The definition of the practice of law is established by law and varies from one jurisdiction to another. Whatever the definition, limiting the practice of law to members of the bar protects the public against rendition of legal services by unqualified persons. Subdivision (2) does not prohibit a lawyer from employing the services of paraprofessionals and delegating functions to them, so long as the lawyer supervises the delegated work and retains responsibility for their work. See Rule 5.3. Likewise, it does not prohibit lawyers from providing professional advice and instruction to nonlawyers whose employment requires knowledge of law; for example, claims adjustors, employees of financial or commercial institutions, social workers, accountants and persons employed in government agencies. In addition, a lawyer may counsel nonlawyers who wish to proceed pro se.

AMENDMENT NOTES: No changes have been made to the above rule or Commentary.

Rule 5.6. Restrictions on Right to Practice

A lawyer shall not participate in offering or making:

- (1) A partnership of shareholders, operating, employment, or other similar type of agreement that restricts the right of a lawyer to practice after termination of the relationship, except an agreement concerning benefits upon retirement; or
- (2) An agreement in which a restriction on the lawyer's right to practice is part of the settlement of a <u>client</u> controversy between private parties.

COMMENTARY: An agreement restricting the right of partners or associates <u>lawyers</u> to practice after leaving a firm not only limits their professional autonomy but also limits the freedom of clients to choose a lawyer. Subdivision (1) prohibits such agreements except for restrictions incident to provisions concerning retirement benefits for service with the firm.

Subdivision (2) prohibits a lawyer from agreeing not to represent other persons in connection with settling a claim on behalf of a client.

This Rule does not apply to prohibit restrictions that may be included in the terms of the sale of a law practice pursuant to Rule 1.17.

PUBLIC SERVICE

Rule 6.1. Pro Bono Publico Service

A lawyer should render public interest legal service. A lawyer may discharge this responsibility by providing professional services at no fee or a reduced fee to persons of limited means or to public service or charitable groups or organizations, by service in activities for improving the law, the legal system or the legal profession, and by financial support for organizations that provide legal services to persons of limited means.

COMMENTARY: The ABA House of Delegates has formally acknowledged "the basic responsibility of each lawyer engaged in the practice of law to provide public interest legal services" without fee, or at a substantially reduced fee in one or more of the following areas: poverty law, civil rights law, public rights law, charitable organization representation and the administration of justice. This Rule expresses that policy but is not intended to be enforced through disciplinary process.

The rights and responsibilities of individuals and organizations in the United States are increasingly defined in legal terms. As a consequence, legal assistance in coping with the web of statutes, rules and regulations is imperative for persons of modest and limited means, as well as for the relatively well-to-do.

The basic responsibility for providing legal services for those unable to pay ultimately rests upon the individual lawyer, and personal involvement in the problems of the disadvantaged can be one of the most rewarding experiences in the life of a lawyer. Every lawyer, regardless of professional prominence or professional workload, should find time to participate in or otherwise support the provision of legal services to the disadvantaged. The provision of free legal services to those unable to pay reasonable fees continues to be an obligation of each lawyer as well as the profession generally, but the efforts of individual lawyers are often not enough to meet the need. Thus, it has been necessary for the profession and government to institute additional programs to provide legal services. Accordingly, legal aid offices, lawyer referral services and other related programs have been developed, and others will be developed by the profession and government. Every lawyer should support all proper efforts to meet this need for legal services. Law firms should act reasonably to enable and encourage all lawyers in the firm to provide the pro bono legal services recommended by this rule.

Rule 6.2. Accepting Appointments

A lawyer shall not seek to avoid appointment by a tribunal to represent a person except for good cause, such as:

- (1) Representing the client is likely to result in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law;
- (2) Representing the client is likely to result in an unreasonable financial burden on the lawyer; or
- (3) The client or the cause is so repugnant to the lawyer as to be likely to impair the client-lawyer relationship or the lawyer's ability to represent the client.

COMMENTARY: A lawyer ordinarily is not obliged to accept a client whose character or cause the lawyer regards as repugnant. The lawyer's freedom to select clients is, however, qualified. All lawyers have a responsibility to assist in providing pro bono publico service. See Rule 6.1. An individual lawyer fulfills this responsibility by accepting a fair share of unpopular matters or indigent or unpopular clients. A lawyer may also be subject to appointment by a court to serve unpopular clients or persons unable to afford legal services.

Appointed Counsel. For good cause a lawyer may seek to decline an appointment to represent a person who cannot afford to retain counsel or whose cause is unpopular. Good cause exists if the lawyer could not handle the matter competently, see Rule 1.1, or if undertaking the representation would result in an improper conflict of interest, for example, when the client or the cause is so repugnant to the lawyer as to be likely to impair the client-lawyer relationship or the lawyer's ability to represent the client. A lawyer may also seek to decline an appointment if acceptance would be unreasonably burdensome, for example, when it would impose a financial sacrifice so great as to be unjust.

An appointed lawyer has the same obligations to the client as retained counsel, including the obligations of loyalty and confidentiality, and is subject to the same limitations on the client-lawyer relationship, such as the obligation to refrain from assisting the client in violation of the Rules.

AMENDMENT NOTES: No changes have been made to the above rule or commentary.

Rule 6.3. Membership In Legal Services Organization

A lawyer may serve as a director, officer or member of a legal services organization, apart from the law firm in which the lawyer practices, notwithstanding that the organization serves persons having interests adverse to a client of the lawyer. The lawyer shall not knowingly participate in a decision or action of the organization:

- (1) If participating in the decision or action would be incompatible with the lawyer's obligations to a client under Rule 1.7; or
- (2) Where the decision or action could have a material adverse effect on the representation of a client of the organization whose interests are adverse to a client of the lawyer.

COMMENTARY: Lawyers should be encouraged to support and participate in legal service organizations. A lawyer who is an officer or a member of such an organization does not thereby have a client-lawyer relationship with persons served by the organization. However, there is potential conflict between the interests of such persons and the interests of the lawyer's clients. If the possibility of such conflict disqualified a lawyer from serving on the board of a legal services organization, the profession's involvement in such organizations would be severely curtailed.

It may be necessary in appropriate cases to reassure a client of the organization that the representation will not be affected by conflicting loyalties of a member of the board. Established, written policies in this respect can enhance the credibility of such assurances.

AMENDMENT NOTES: No changes have been made to the above rule or commentary.

Rule 6.4. Law Reform Activities Affecting Client Interests

A lawyer may serve as a director, officer or member of an organization involved in reform of the law or its administration notwithstanding that the reform may affect the interests of a client of the lawyer. When the lawyer knows that the interests of a client may be materially benefitted by a decision in which the lawyer participates, the lawyer shall disclose that fact but need not identify the client.

COMMENTARY: Lawyers involved in organizations seeking law reform generally do not have a client-lawyer relationship with the organization. Otherwise, it might follow that a lawyer could not be involved in a bar association law reform program that might indirectly affect a client. See also Rule 1.2(b). For example, a lawyer specializing in antitrust litigation might be regarded as disqualified from participating in drafting revisions of rules governing that subject. In determining the nature and scope of participation in such activities, a lawyer should be mindful of obligations to clients under other Rules, particularly Rule 1.7. A lawyer is professionally obligated to protect the integrity of the program by making an appropriate disclosure within the organization when the lawyer knows a private client might be materially benefitted.

AMENDMENT NOTES: No changes have been made to the above rule or commentary.

(NEW) Rule 6.5. Nonprofit and Court-Annexed Limited Legal Services Programs

- (a) A lawyer who, under the auspices of a program sponsored by a nonprofit organization or court, provides short-term limited legal services to a client without expectation by either the lawyer or the client that the lawyer will provide continuing representation in the matter:
- (1) is subject to Rules 1.7 and 1.9(a) only if the lawyer knows that the representation of the client involves a conflict of interest; and
- (2) is subject to Rule 1.10 only if the lawyer knows that another lawyer associated with the lawyer in a law firm is disqualified by Rule 1.7 or 1.9(a) with respect to the matter.
- (b) A lawyer who provides short-term limited legal services pursuant to this Rule must secure the client's informed consent to the limited scope of the representation. See Rule 1.2(c). If a short-term limited representation would not be reasonable under the circumstances, the lawyer may offer advice to the client but must also advise the client of the need for further assistance of counsel. Except as provided

in this Rule, the Rules of Professional Conduct, including Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c), are applicable to the limited representation.

(c) Except as provided in subsection (a)(2), Rule 1.10 is inapplicable to a representation governed by this Rule.

COMMENTARY: Legal services organizations, courts and various nonprofit organizations have established programs through which lawyers provide short-term limited legal services - such as advice or the completion of legal forms - that will assist persons to address their legal problems without further representation by a lawyer. In these programs, such as legal-advice hotlines, advice-only clinics or pro se counseling programs, a client-lawyer relationship is established, but there is no expectation that the lawyer's representation of the client will continue beyond the limited consultation. Such programs are normally operated under circumstances in which it is not feasible for a lawyer to systematically screen for conflicts of interest as is generally required before undertaking a representation. See, e.g., Rules 1.7, 1.9 and 1.10.

Because a lawyer who is representing a client in the circumstances addressed by this Rule ordinarily is not able to check systematically for conflicts of interest, subsection (a) requires compliance with Rules 1.7 or 1.9(a) only if the lawyer knows that the representation presents a conflict of interest for the lawyer, and with Rule 1.10 only if the lawyer knows that another lawyer in the lawyer's firm is disqualified by Rules 1.7 or 1.9(a) in the matter.

Because the limited nature of the services significantly reduces the risk of conflicts of interest with other matters being handled by the lawyer's firm, subsection (b) provides that Rule 1.10 is inapplicable to a representation governed by this Rule except as provided by subsection (a)(2). Subsection (a)(2) requires the participating lawyer to comply with Rule 1.10 when the lawyer knows that the lawyer's firm is disqualified by Rules 1.7 or 1.9(a). By virtue of subsection (b), however, a lawyer's participation in a short-term limited legal services program will not preclude the lawyer's firm from undertaking or continuing the representation of a client with interests adverse to a client being represented under the program's auspices. Nor will the personal disqualification of a lawyer participating in the program be imputed to other lawyers participating in the program.

If, after commencing a short-term limited representation in accordance with this Rule, a lawyer undertakes to represent the client in the matter on an ongoing basis, Rules 1.7, 1.9(a) and 1.10 become applicable.

INFORMATION ABOUT LEGAL SERVICES PROPOSED REVISIONS TO THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT CONCERNING LAWYER ADVERTISING

Rule 7.1. Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Services

A lawyer shall not make a false or misleading communication about the lawyer or the lawyer's services. A communication is false or misleading if it: (1) contains a material misrepresentation of fact or law, or omits a fact necessary to make the statement considered as a whole not materially misleading;

- (2) is likely to create an unjustified expectation about results the lawyer can achieve, or states or implies that the lawyer can achieve results by means that violate the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law; or
- (3) compares the lawyer's services with other lawyers' services, unless the comparison can be factually substantiated.

COMMENTARY: This Rule governs all communications about a lawyer's services, including advertising permitted by Rule 7.2. Whatever means are used to make known a lawyer's services, statements about them should must be truthful. The prohibition in subdivision (2) of statements that may create "unjustified expectations" would ordinarily preclude advertisements about results obtained on behalf of a client, such as the amount of a damage award or the lawyer's record in obtaining favorable verdicts, and advertisements containing client endorsements. Such information may create the unjustified expectation that similar results can be obtained for others without reference to the specific factual and legal circumstances.

Statements even if literally true that are misleading are also prohibited by this Rule. A truthful statement is misleading if it omits a fact necessary to make the lawyer's communication considered as a whole not materially misleading. A truthful statement is also misleading if there is a substantial

likelihood that it will lead a reasonable person to formulate a specific conclusion about the lawyer or the lawyer's services for which there is no reasonable factual foundation.

An advertisement that truthfully reports a lawyer's achievements on behalf of clients or former clients may be misleading if presented so as to lead a reasonable person to form an unjustified expectation that the same results could be obtained for other clients in similar matters without reference to the specific factual and legal circumstances of each client's case. Similarly, an unsubstantiated comparison of the lawyer's services or fees with the services or fees of other lawyers may be misleading if presented with such specificity as would lead a reasonable person to conclude that the comparison can be substantiated. The inclusion of an appropriate disclaimer or qualifying language may preclude a finding that a statement is likely to create unjustified expectations or otherwise mislead a prospective client.

See also Rule 8.4(5) for the prohibition against stating or implying an ability to influence improperly a government agency or official or to achieve results by means that violate the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law.

AMENDMENT NOTES: The intention concerning the above changes is to strike a balance between free-speech interests and the need for consumer protection.

Rule 7.2. Advertising

- (a) Subject to the requirements set forth in Rules 7.1 and 7.3, a lawyer may advertise services through public media, such as a telephone directory, legal directory, newspapers or other periodicals, billboards and other signs, radio, television, and recorded messages the public may access by dialing a telephone number, or through written or recorded communication. written, recorded or electronic communication, including public media.
- (b) A copy or recording of an advertisement or communication shall be kept for three years after its last dissemination along with a record of when and where it was used.
- (b)(1) A copy or recording of an advertisement or communication shall be kept for three years after its last dissemination along with a record of when and where it was used. An electronic advertisement or communication shall be copied once every three months on a compact disk or similar technology and kept for three years after its last dissemination.
- (2) A lawyer shall comply with the mandatory filing requirement of Practice Book Section 2-28A.
- (c) A lawyer shall not give anything of value to a person for recommending the lawyer's services, except that a lawyer may
- (1) pay the reasonable cost of advertisements or communications permitted by this Rule; and may
- (2) pay the usual charges of a not-for-profit or qualified lawyer referral service or other legal service organization. A qualified lawyer referral service is a lawyer referral service that has been approved by an appropriate regulatory authority.
 - (3) pay for a law practice in accordance with Rule 1.17;
- (g)(d) Any advertisement or communication made pursuant to this Rule shall include the name of at least one lawyer <u>admitted in Connecticut</u> responsible for its content. In the case of television advertisements, the name, address and telephone number of the lawyer admitted in Connecticut shall be displayed in bold print for fifteen seconds or the duration of the commercial, whichever is less, and shall be prominent enough to be readable.
- (d)(e) Advertisements on the electronic media such as television and radio may contain the same factual information and illustrations as permitted in advertisements in the print media.
- (e)(f) Every advertisement and written communication that contains information about the lawyer's fee, including those indicating that the charging of a fee is contingent on outcome, or that no fee will be charged in the absence of a recovery, or that the fee will be a percentage of the recovery, shall disclose whether and to what extent the client will be responsible for any court costs and expenses of

litigation. The disclosure concerning court costs and expenses of litigation shall be in the same print size and type as the information regarding the lawyer's fee and, if broadcast, shall appear for the same duration as the information regarding the lawyer's fee. If the information regarding the fee is spoken, the disclosure concerning court costs and expenses of litigation shall also be spoken.

- (f)(g) A lawyer who advertises a specific fee or range of fees for a particular service shall honor the advertised fee or range of fees for at least 90 days unless the advertisement specifies a shorter period; provided that, for advertisements in the yellow pages of telephone directories or other media not published more frequently than annually, the advertised fee or range of fees shall be honored for no less than one year following publication.
- (h) No lawyers shall, directly or indirectly pay all or part of the cost of an advertisement by a lawyer not in the same firm unless the advertisement discloses the name and address of the nonadvertising lawyer, and whether the advertising lawyer may refer any case received through the advertisement to the nonadvertising lawyer.
- (i) The following information in advertisements and written communications shall be presumed not to violate the provisions of Rule 7.1:
- (1) Subject to the requirements of Rule 7.3, the name of the lawyer or law firm, a listing of lawyers associated with the firm, office addresses and telephone numbers, office and telephone service hours, <u>fax numbers</u>, <u>website and e-mail addresses and domain names</u>, and a designation such as "attorney" or "law firm."
- (2) Date of admission to the Connecticut bar and any other bars and a listing of federal courts and jurisdictions where the lawyer is licensed to practice.
- (3) Technical and professional licenses granted by the state or other recognized licensing authorities.
 - (4) Foreign language ability.
- (5) Fields of law in which the lawyer practices or is designated, subject to the requirements of Rule 7.4, or is certified pursuant to Rule 7.4A.
 - (6) Prepaid or group legal service plans in which the lawyer participates.
 - (7) Acceptance of credit cards.
 - (8) Fee for initial consultation and fee schedule.
- (9) A listing of the name and geographic location of a lawyer or law firm as a sponsor of a public service announcement or charitable, civic or community program or event.
- (10) Nothing in this Rule prohibits a lawyer or law firm from permitting the inclusion in the law directories intended primarily for the use of the legal profession of such information as has traditionally been included in these publications.

COMMENTARY: To assist the public in obtaining legal services, lawyers should be allowed to make known their services not only through reputation but also through organized information campaigns in the form of advertising. Advertising involves an active quest for clients, contrary to the tradition that a lawyer should not seek clientele. However, the public's need to know about legal services can be fulfilled in part through advertising. This need is particularly acute in the case of persons of moderate means who have not made extensive use of legal services. The interest in expanding public information about legal services ought to prevail over considerations of tradition. Nevertheless, advertising by lawyers entails the risk of practices that are misleading or overreaching.

This Rule permits public dissemination of information concerning a lawyer's name or firm name, address and telephone number; the kinds of services the lawyer will undertake; the basis on which the lawyer's fees are determined, including prices for specific services and payment and credit arrangements; whether and to what extent the client will be responsible for any court costs and expenses of litigation; lawyer's foreign language ability; names of references and, with their consent, names of clients regularly represented; and other information that might invite the attention of those seeking legal assistance.

Questions of effectiveness and taste in advertising are matters of speculation and subjective judgment. Some jurisdictions have had extensive prohibitions against television advertising, against advertising going beyond specified facts about a lawyer, or against "undignified" advertising. Television is now

one of the most powerful media for getting information to the public, particularly persons of low and moderate income; prohibiting television advertising, therefore, would impede the flow of information about legal services to many sectors of the public. Limiting the information that may be advertised has a similar effect and assumes that the bar can accurately forecast the kind of information that the public would regard as relevant.

Neither this Rule nor Rule 7.3 prohibits communications authorized by law, such as notice to members of a class in class action litigation.

Record of Advertising. Subsection (b) requires that a record of the content and use of advertising be kept in order to facilitate enforcement of this Rule. It does not require that advertising be subject to review prior to dissemination. Such a requirement would be burdensome and expensive relative to its possible benefits, and may be of doubtful constitutionality.

Paying Others to Recommend a Lawyer. A lawyer is allowed to pay for advertising permitted by this Rule, but otherwise is not permitted to pay another person for channeling professional work. This restriction does not prevent an organization or person other than the lawyer from advertising or recommending the lawyer's services. Thus, a legal aid agency or prepaid legal services plan may pay to advertise legal services provided under its auspices. Likewise, a lawyer may participate in not for profit lawyer referral programs and pay the usual fees charged by such programs. Subsection (c) does not prohibit paying regular compensation to an assistant, such as a secretary, to prepare communications permitted by this Rule.

A lawyer may pay the usual charges of a legal service plan or a not-for-profit or qualified lawyer referral service. A legal service plan is a prepaid or group legal service plan or a similar delivery system that assists prospective clients to secure legal representation. A lawyer referral service, on the other hand, is any organization that holds itself out to the public as a lawyer referral service. Such referral services are understood by laypersons to be consumer-oriented organizations that provide unbiased referrals to lawyers with appropriate experience in the subject matter of the representation and afford other client protections, such as complaint procedures or malpractice insurance requirements. Consequently, this Rule only permits a lawyer to pay the usual charges of a not-for-profit or qualified lawyer referral service. A qualified lawyer referral service is one that is approved by an appropriate regulatory authority as affording adequate protections for prospective clients. See e.g., the American Bar Association's Model Supreme Court Rules Governing Lawyer Referral Services and Model Lawyer Referral and Information Service Quality Assurance Act (requiring that organizations that are identified as lawyer referral services (i) permit the participation of all lawyers who are licensed and eligible to practice in the jurisdiction and who meet reasonable objective eligibility requirements as may be established by the referral service for the protection of prospective clients; (ii) require each participating lawyer to carry reasonably adequate malpractice insurance; (iii) act reasonably to assess client satisfaction and address client complaints; and (iv) do not refer prospective clients to lawyers who own, operate or are employed by the referral service.)

A lawyer who accepts assignments or referrals from a legal service plan or referrals from a lawyer referral service must act reasonably to assure that the activities of the plan or service are compatible with the lawyer's professional obligations. See Rule 5.3. Legal service plans and lawyer referral services may communicate with prospective clients, but such communication must be in conformity with these Rules. Thus, advertising must not be false or misleading, as would be the case if the communications of a group advertising program or a group legal services plan would mislead prospective clients to think that it was a lawyer referral service sponsored by a state agency or bar association. Nor could the lawyer allow in-person, telephonic, or real-time contacts that would violate Rule 7.3.

AMENDMENT NOTES: In recognition of the many technological advances that have been made, including the increasing use of the Internet, the changes to subsection (a) make it clear that lawyers may advertise through the new electronic media and that such advertisements are subject to the Rules of Professional Conduct.

The change to subsection (d) will assist disciplinary authorities in identifying the individuals responsible for an advertisement in order to protect the public against misleading advertisements.

In subsection (d), the display of the lawyer's name, address and telephone number must be easily legible. An example of what would be acceptable is the crawler messages that appear at the bottom of the screen on cable news stations.

Rule 7.3. Personal Contact with Prospective Clients

- (a) A lawyer shall not initiate personal, or live telephone, or real-time electronic contact, including telemarketing contact, with a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining professional employment, except in the following circumstances:
- (1) If the prospective client is a close friend, relative, former client or one whom the lawyer reasonably believes to be a client;

- (2) Under the auspices of a public or charitable legal services organization;
- (3) Under the auspices of a bona fide political, social, civic, fraternal, employee or trade organization whose purposes include but are not limited to providing or recommending legal services, if the legal services are related to the principal purposes of the organization;
- (4) If the prospective client is a business organization, a not-for-profit organization or governmental body and the lawyer seeks to provide services related to the organization.
- (b) A lawyer shall not contact, or send, or knowingly permit to be sent, on the lawyer's behalf or on behalf of the lawyer's firm, partner, associate or any other lawyer affiliated with the lawyer or his or her firm, a written or electronic communication to, a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining professional employment if:
- (1) The lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the physical, emotional or mental state of the person makes it unlikely that the person would exercise reasonable judgment in employing a lawyer,
- (2) It has been made known to the lawyer that the person does not want to receive such communications from the lawyer,
- (3) The communication involves coercion, duress, fraud, overreaching, harassment, intimidation or undue influence,
- (4) The written communication concerns a specific matter and the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the person to whom the communication is directed is represented by a lawyer in the matter, or
- (5) The written <u>or electronic</u> communication concerns an action for personal injury or wrongful death or otherwise relates to an accident or disaster involving the person to whom the communication is addressed or a relative of that person, unless the accident or disaster occurred more than forty days prior to the mailing of the communication.
- (c) Every written communication, as well as any communication by audio or video recording, or other electronic means, used by a lawyer for the purpose of obtaining professional employment from a prospective client known to be in need of legal services in a particular matter, must be clearly and prominently labeled "Advertising Material" in red ink on the first page of any the written communication and the lower left corner of the outside envelope or container, if any, and at the beginning and ending of any communication by audio or video recording or other electronic means. If the written communication is in the form of a self-mailing brochure or pamphlet, the label "Advertising Material" in red ink shall appear on the address panel of the brochure or pamphlet. Brochures solicited by clients or prospective clients need not contain such mark. Every communication by audio or video recording or other electronic means must be clearly and prominently labeled "Advertising Material" on the container and at the beginning and ending of the communication. No reference shall be made in the communication to the communication having any kind of approval from the Connecticut bar. Written communications mailed to prospective clients shall be sent only by regular United States mail, not by registered mail or other forms of restricted delivery.
- (d) The first sentence of any written communication concerning a specific matter shall be: "If you have already retained a lawyer for this matter, please disregard this letter."
- (e) A written communication seeking employment by a specific prospective client in a specific matter shall not reveal on the envelope, or on the outside of a self-mailing brochure or pamphlet, the nature of the client's legal problem.
- (f) If a contract for representation is mailed with the communication, the top of each page of the contract shall be marked "SAMPLE" in red ink in a type size

one size larger than the largest type used in the contract and the words "DO NOT SIGN" shall appear on the client signature line.

- (g) Written communications shall be on letter-sized paper rather than legal-sized paper and shall not be made to resemble legal pleadings or other legal documents. This provision does not preclude the mailing of brochures and pamphlets.
- (h) If a lawyer other than the lawyer whose name or signature appears on the communication will actually handle the case or matter, or if the case or matter will be referred to another lawyer or law firm, any written communication concerning a specific matter shall include a statement so advising the client.
- (i) Notwithstanding the prohibitions in subsection (a), a lawyer may participate with a prepaid or group legal service plan operated by an organization not owned or directed by the lawyer which uses in-person or telephone contact to solicit memberships or subscriptions for the plan from persons who are not known to need legal services in a particular matter covered by the plan.

COMMENTARY: Unrestricted solicitation involves definite social harms. Among these are harassment, overreaching, provocation of nuisance litigation and schemes for systematic fabrication of claims, all of which were experienced prior to adoption of restrictions on solicitation. Measures reasonably designed to suppress these harms are constitutionally legitimate. At the same time, measures going beyond realization of such objectives would appear to be invalid under relevant decisions of the United States Supreme Court.

The use of general advertising and written, and recorded and electronic communications to transmit information from lawyer to prospective client, rather than direct in-person, or-live telephone, or real-time electronic contact, will help to assure that the information flows cleanly as well as freely. The contents of advertisements and communications permitted under Rule 7.2 are can be permanently recorded so that they cannot be disputed and may be shared with others who know the lawyer. This potential for informal review is itself likely to help guard against statements and claims that might constitute false and misleading communications, in violation of Rule 7.1. The contents of direct in-person, or live telephone, or real-time electronic conversations between a lawyer to a prospective client can be disputed and are not subject to a third-party scrutiny. Consequently, they are much more likely to approach (and occasionally cross) the dividing line between accurate representations and those that are false and misleading.

In determining whether a contact is permissible under Rule 7.3(b), it is relevant to consider the time and circumstances under which the contact is initiated. For example, a person undergoing active medical treatment for traumatic injury is unlikely to be in an emotional state in which reasonable judgment about employing a lawyer can be exercised. Moreover, if after sending a letter or other communication to a client as permitted by Rule 7.2 the lawyer receives no response, any further effort to communicate with the prospective client may violate the provisions of Rule 7.3(b).

The requirement in Rule 7.3(c) that certain communications be marked "Advertising Material" does not apply to communications sent in response to requests of potential clients or their spokespersons or sponsors. General announcements by lawyers, including changes in personnel or office location, do not constitute communications soliciting professional employment from a client known to be in need of legal services within the meaning of this Rule.

This Rule is not intended to prohibit a lawyer from contacting representatives of organizations or groups that may be interested in establishing a group or prepaid legal plan for their members, insureds, beneficiaries or other third parties for the purpose of informing such entities of the availability of and details concerning the plan or arrangement which the lawyer or lawyer's firm is willing to offer. This form of communication is not directed to a prospective client. Rather, it is usually addressed to an individual acting in a fiduciary capacity seeking a supplier of legal services for others who may, if they choose, become prospective clients of the lawyer. Under these circumstances, the activity which the lawyer undertakes in communicating with such representatives and the type of information transmitted to the individual are functionally similar to and serve the same purpose as advertising permitted under Rule 7.2. Subsection (i) of this Rule would permit an attorney to participate with an organization which uses personal contact to solicit members for its group or prepaid legal service plan, provided that the personal contact is not undertaken by any lawyer who would be a provider of legal services through the plan.

AMENDMENT NOTES: The above changes update the Rule to reflect current technological advances.

Rule 7.4. Communication of Fields of Practice

A lawyer may communicate the fact that the lawyer does or does not practice in particular fields of law. A lawyer shall not state or imply that the lawyer is a specialist except as follows and as provided in Rule 7.4A:

- (1) A lawyer admitted to engage in patent practice before the United States Patent and Trademark Office may use the designation "patent attorney" or a substantially similar designation; and
- (2) A lawyer engaged in admiralty practice may use the designation "admiralty," proctor in admiralty" or a substantially similar designation.

COMMENTARY: This Rule permits a lawyer to indicate areas of practice in communications about the lawyer's services, for example, in a telephone directory or other advertising. If a lawyer practices only in certain fields, or will not accept matters except in such fields, the lawyer is permitted so to indicate. However, stating that the lawyer is a "specialist" or that the lawyer's practice "is limited to" or "concentrated in" particular fields is not permitted. These terms have acquired a secondary meaning implying formal recognition as a specialist. Hence, use of these terms may be misleading unless the lawyer is certified or recognized in accordance with procedures in the state where the lawyer is licensed to practice.

Recognition of specialization in patent matters is a matter of long-established policy of the Patent and Trademark Office. Designation of admiralty practice has a long historical tradition associated with maritime commerce and the federal courts.

AMENDMENT NOTES: No changes have been made to the above rule or commentary.

Rule 7.4A. Certification as Specialist

- (a) Except as provided in Rule 7.4, a lawyer shall not state or imply that he or she is a specialist in a field of law unless the lawyer is currently certified as a specialist in that field of law by a board or other entity which is approved by the Rules Committee of the superior court of this state. Among the criteria to be considered by the Rules Committee in determining upon application whether to approve a board or entity as an agency which may certify lawyers practicing in this state as being specialists, shall be the requirement that the board or entity certify specialists on the basis of published standards and procedures which (1) do not discriminate against any lawyer properly qualified for such certification, (2) provide a reasonable basis for the representation that lawyers so certified possess special competence, and (3) require redetermination of the special qualifications of certified specialists after a period of not more than five years.
- (b) A lawyer shall not state that he or she is a certified specialist if the lawyer's certification has terminated, or if the statement is otherwise contrary to the terms of such certification.
 - (c) Certification as a specialist may not be attributed to a law firm.
 - (d) Lawyers may be certified as specialists in the following fields of law:
- (1) Administrative law: The practice of law dealing with states, their political subdivisions, regional and metropolitan authorities and other public entities including, but not limited to, their rights and duties, financing, public housing and urban development, the rights of public employees, election law, school law, sovereign immunity, and constitutional law; practice before federal and state courts and governmental agencies.
- (2) Admiralty: The practice of law dealing with all matters arising under the carriage of goods by sea act (COGSA), Harter Act, Jones Act, and federal and state maritime law including, but not limited to, the carriage of goods, collision and other maritime torts, general average, salvage, limitation of liability, ship financing, ship subsidies, the rights of injured sailors and longshoremen; practice before federal and state courts and governmental agencies (including the Federal Maritime Commission).

- (3) Antitrust: The practice of law dealing with all matters arising under the Sherman Act, Clayton Act, Federal Trade Commission Act, Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act and State Antitrust Statutes including but not limited to, restraints of trade, unfair competition, monopolization, price discrimination, restrictive practices; practice before federal and state courts and governmental agencies.
- (4) Appellate practice: The practice of law dealing with all procedural and substantive aspects of civil and criminal matters before federal and state appeals courts including, but not limited to, arguments and the submission of briefs.
- (5) Business Bankruptcy: The practice of law dealing with all aspects of the United States Bankruptcy Code when the debtor was engaged in business before the institution of a Chapter 7, 9, or 11 proceeding. This includes, but is not limited to, business liquidations, business reorganizations, and related adversary and contested proceedings.
- (6) Consumer Bankruptcy: The practice of law dealing with all aspects of the United States Bankruptcy Code when the debtor was not engaged in business before the institution of a Chapter 7, 12, or 13 proceeding. This includes, but is not limited to, liquidations, wage earner plans, family farmers and related adversary and contested proceedings.
- (7) Civil rights and discrimination: The practice of law dealing with all matters arising under federal and state law relating to proper treatment in the areas of, among others, public accommodations, voting, employment, housing, administration of welfare and social security benefits; practice before federal and state courts and governmental agencies.
- (8) Civil trial practice: The practice of law dealing with representation of parties before federal or state courts in all noncriminal matters.
- (9) Commercial transactions: The practice of law dealing with all aspects of commercial paper, contracts, sales and financing, including, but not limited to, secured transactions.
- (10) Consumer claims and protection: The practice of law dealing with all aspects of consumer transactions including, but not limited to, sales practices, credit transactions, secured transactions and warranties; all matters arising under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the Magnuson-Moss Act, the Truth in Lending Act, state statutes such as the "Little FTC" acts, and other analogous federal and state statutes.
- (11) Corporate and business organizations: The practice of law dealing with all aspects of the formation, operation and dissolution of corporations, partnerships (general and limited), agency and other forms of business organizations.
- (12) Corporate finance and securities: The practice of law dealing with all matters arising under the Securities Act of 1933, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Investment Advisors Act (or the Federal Securities Code, if adopted) and other federal and state securities statutes; financing corporate activities; mergers and acquisitions; practice before the Securities and Exchange Commission and state securities commissions.
- (13) Criminal: The practice of law dealing with the prosecution or representation of persons accused of crimes at all stages of criminal proceedings in federal or state courts, including, but not limited to, the protection of the accused's constitutional rights.
- (14) Environmental: The practice of law dealing with all aspects of the regulation of environmental quality by both federal and state governments; control of air pollution, water pollution, noise pollution, toxic substances, pesticides, and civilian uses of nuclear energy; solid waste/resource recovery; all matters arising under the National Environmental Policy Act, Clean Air Act, Federal Water Pollution Control

- Act, Noise Control Act, Solid Waste Disposal Act, Toxic Substance Control Act and other federal and state environmental statutes; practice before federal and state courts and governmental agencies.
- (15) Estate planning and probate: The practice of law dealing with all aspects of the analysis and planning for the conservation and disposition of estates, giving due consideration to the applicable tax consequences, both federal and state; the preparation of legal instruments in order to effectuate estate plans; administering estates, including tax related matters, both federal and state.
- (16) Family and matrimonial: The practice of law dealing with all aspects of antenuptial and domestic relationships, separation and divorce, alimony and child support, child custody matters and adoption, giving due consideration to the tax consequences, and court proceedings relating thereto.
- (17) Government contracts and claims: The practice of law dealing with all aspects of the negotiation and administration of contracts with federal and state governmental agencies.
- (18) Immigration and naturalization: The practice of law dealing with obtaining and retaining permission to enter and remain in the United States including, but not limited to, such matters as visas, change of status, deportation and naturalization; representation of aliens before courts and governmental agencies; protection of aliens' constitutional rights.
- (19) International: The practice of law dealing with all aspects of the relations among states, international business transactions, international taxation, customs and trade law and foreign and comparative law.
- (20) Labor: The practice of law dealing with all aspects of employment relations (public and private) including but not limited to, unfair labor practices, collective bargaining, contract administration, the rights of individual employees and union members, employment discrimination; all matters arising under the National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act), Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (Landrum-Griffin Act), Fair Labor Standards Act, Title VII of The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), other federal statutes and analogous state statutes; practice before the national labor relations board, analogous state boards, federal and state courts, and arbitrators.
- (21) Military: The practice of law dealing with the presentation of parties before courts-martial and other military tribunals in disputes arising under the uniform code of military justice; the representation of veterans and their dependents in seeking government benefits due to them on account of military service; handling civil law problems of the military.
- (22) Natural Resources: The practice of law dealing with all aspects of the regulation of natural resources such as coal, oil, gas, minerals, water and public lands; the rights and responsibilities relating to the ownership and exploitation of such natural resources.
- (23) Patent, trademark and copyright: The practice of law dealing with all aspects of the registration, protection and licensing of patents, trademarks or copyrights; practice before federal and state courts in actions for infringement and other actions; the prosecution of applications before the United States Patent and Trademark Office; counseling with regard to the law of unfair competition as it relates to patents, trademarks and copyrights.
- (24) (A) Residential Real Estate: The practice of law dealing with all aspects of real property transactions involving single one-to-four family residential dwellings when the client uses such dwelling or expresses in writing the intent to use such dwelling as the client's primary or other residence, including, but not limited to, real estate conveyances, title searches and property transfers, leases, condominiums

cooperatives, and other common interest communities, planned unit developments, mortgages, condemnation and eminent domain, zoning and land use planning, property taxes, and determination of property rights.

- (B) Commercial Real Estate: The practice of law dealing with all aspects of real property transactions except for residential real estate as defined in subsection (A) of this subsection, including, but not limited to, real estate conveyances, title searches and property transfers, leases, condominiums, cooperatives and other common interest communities, planned unit developments, mortgages, condemnation and eminent domain, zoning and land use planning, property taxes, real estate development and financing (with due consideration to tax and securities consequences) and determination of property rights.
- (25) Taxation: The practice of law dealing with all matters arising under the Internal Revenue Code, Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), state and local tax laws and foreign tax laws, including counseling with respect thereto; practice before federal and state courts and governmental agencies.
- (26) Workers' Compensation: The practice of law dealing with the representation of parties before federal and state agencies, boards and courts in actions to determine eligibility for workers' compensation, and disability.

AMENDMENT NOTES: No changes have been made to the above rule or commentary.

Rule 7.4B. Legal Specialization Screening Committee

- (a) The Chief Justice, upon recommendation of the Rules Committee of the superior court, shall appoint a committee of five members of the bar of this state which shall be known as the "Legal Specialization Screening Committee." The Rules Committee of the superior court shall designate one appointee as chair of the Legal Specialization Screening Committee and another as vice chair to act in the absence or disability of the chair.
- (b) When the committee is first selected, two of its members shall be appointed for a term of one year, two members for a term of two years, and one member for a term of three years, and thereafter all regular terms shall be three years. Terms shall commence on July 1. In the event that a vacancy arises in this position before the end of a term, the Chief Justice, upon recommendation of the Rules Committee of the superior court, shall appoint a member of the bar of this state to fill the vacancy for the balance of the term. The Legal Specialization Screening Committee shall act only with a concurrence of a majority of its members, provided, however, that three members shall constitute a quorum.
- (c) The Legal Specialization Screening Committee shall have the power and duty to:
- (1) Receive applications from boards or other entities for authority to certify lawyers practicing in this state as being specialists in a certain area or areas of law.
- (2) Investigate each applicant to determine whether it meets the criteria set forth in Rule 7.4A (a).
- (3) Submit to the Rules Committee of the superior court a written recommendation, with reasons therefor, for approval or disapproval of each application, or for the termination of any prior approval granted by the Rules Committee.
- (4) Adopt regulations and develop forms necessary to carry out its duties under this section. The regulations and forms shall not become effective until first approved by the Rules Committee of the superior court.
- (5) Consult with such persons deemed by the committee to be knowledgeable in the fields of law to assist it in carrying out its duties.

AMENDMENT NOTES: No changes have been made to the above rule or commentary.

Rule 7.4C. Application by Board or Entity to Certify Lawyers as Specialists

Any board or entity seeking the approval of the Rules Committee of the superior court for authority to certify lawyers practicing in this state as being specialists in a certain field or fields of law as set forth in Rule 7.4A (d), shall file an original and six copies of its application with the Legal Specialization Screening Committee pursuant to Rule 7.4B.

AMENDMENT NOTES: No changes have been made to the above rule.

Rule 7.5. Firm Names and Letterheads

- (a) A lawyer shall not use a firm name, letterhead or other professional designation that violates Rule 7.1. A trade name may be used by a lawyer in private practice if it does not imply a connection with a government agency or with a public or charitable legal services organization and is not otherwise in violation of Rule 7.1.
- (b) A law firm with offices in more than one jurisdiction may use the same name in each jurisdiction, but identification of the lawyers in an office of the firm shall indicate the jurisdictional limitations on those not licensed to practice in the jurisdiction where the office is located.
- (c) The name of a lawyer holding a public office shall not be used in the name of a law firm, or in communications on its behalf, during any substantial period in which the lawyer is not actively and regularly practicing with the firm.
- (d) Lawyers may state or imply that they practice in a partnership or other organization only when that is the fact.

COMMENTARY: A firm may be designated by the names of all or some of its members, by the names of deceased members where there has been a continuing succession in the firm's identity or by a trade name such as the "ABC Legal Clinic." Although the United States supreme court has held that legislation may prohibit the use of trade names in professional practice, use of such names in law practice is acceptable so long as it is not misleading. If a private firm uses a trade name that includes a geographical name such as "Springfield Legal Clinic," an express disclaimer that it is a public legal aid agency may be required to avoid a misleading implication. It may be observed that any firm name including the name of a deceased partner is, strictly speaking, a trade name. The use of such names to designate law firms has proven a useful means of identification. However, it is misleading to use the name of a lawyer not associated with the firm or a predecessor of the firm.

With regard to subsection (d), lawyers sharing office facilities, but who are not in fact partners, may not denominate themselves as, for example, "Smith and Jones," for that title suggests partnership in the practice of law.

AMENDMENT NOTES: No changes have been made to the above rule or commentary.

MAINTAINING THE INTEGRITY OF THE PROFESSION

Rule 8.1. Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters

An applicant for admission to the bar, or a lawyer in connection with a bar admission application or in connection with a disciplinary matter, shall not:

- (1) Knowingly make a false statement of material fact; or
- (2) Fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a misapprehension known by the person to have arisen in the matter, or knowingly fail to respond to a lawful demand for information from an admissions or disciplinary authority, except that this rule does not require disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.

COMMENTARY: The duty imposed by this Rule extends to persons seeking admission to the bar as well as to lawyers. Hence, if a person makes a material false statement in connection with an application for admission, it may be the basis for subsequent disciplinary action if the person is admitted, and in any event may be relevant in a subsequent admission application. The duty imposed by this Rule applies to a lawyer's own admission or discipline as well as that of others. Thus, it is a separate professional offense for a lawyer to knowingly make a misrepresentation or omission in connection with a disciplinary investigation of the lawyer's own conduct. This Subdivision (2) of this Rule also requires correction of any prior misstatement in the matter that the applicant or lawyer may have made and affirmative

clarification of any misunderstanding on the part of the admissions or disciplinary authority of which the person involved becomes aware.

This Rule is subject to the provisions of the fifth amendment of the United States Constitution and corresponding provisions of state constitutions. A person relying on such a provision in response to a question, however, should do so openly and not use the right of nondisclosure as a justification for failure to comply with this Rule.

A lawyer representing an applicant for admission to the bar, or representing a lawyer who is the subject of a disciplinary inquiry or proceeding, is governed by the rules applicable to the client-lawyer relationship, including Rule 1.6 and, in some cases, Rule 3.3.

Rule 8.2. Judicial and Legal Officials

- (a) A lawyer shall not make a statement that the lawyer knows to be false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge, adjudicatory officer or public legal officer, or of a candidate for election or appointment to judicial or legal office.
- (b) A lawyer who is a candidate for judicial office shall comply with the applicable provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

COMMENTARY: Assessments by lawyers are relied on in evaluating the professional or personal fitness of persons being considered for election or appointment to judicial office and to public legal offices, such as attorney general, prosecuting attorney and public defender. Expressing honest and candid opinions on such matters contributes to improving the administration of justice. Conversely, false statements by a lawyer can unfairly undermine public confidence in the administration of justice.

When a lawyer seeks judicial office, the lawyer should be bound by applicable limitations on political activity.

To maintain the fair and independent administration of justice, lawyers are encouraged to continue traditional efforts to defend judges and courts unjustly criticized.

AMENDMENT NOTES: No changes have been made to the above rule or commentary.

Rule 8.3. Reporting Professional Misconduct

- (a) A lawyer having knowledge who knows that another lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall inform the appropriate professional disciplinary authority. A lawyer may not condition settlement of a civil dispute involving allegations of improprieties on the part of a lawyer on an agreement that the subject misconduct not be reported to the appropriate disciplinary authority.
- (b) A lawyer having knowledge who knows that a judge has committed a violation of applicable rules of judicial conduct that raises a substantial question as to the judge's fitness for office shall inform the appropriate authority.
- (c) This Rule does not require disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6 or <u>General Statutes § 51-81d(f)</u> information gained by a lawyer or judge while serving as a member of a court appointed or bar association committee that renders assistance to ill or impaired lawyers or while serving as a member of a bar association professional ethics committee.

COMMENTARY: Self-regulation of the legal profession requires that members of the profession initiate a disciplinary investigation when they know of a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Lawyers have a similar obligation with respect to judicial misconduct. An apparently isolated violation may indicate a pattern of misconduct that only a disciplinary investigation can uncover. While allowing pledges of silence can expedite settlements and redress to individual victims, the public at large is not well served when lawyers can buy their way out of professional disciplinary action. Reporting a violation is especially important where the victim is unlikely to discover the offense.

A report about misconduct is not required where it would involve violation of Rule 1.6. However, a lawyer should encourage a client to consent to disclosure where prosecution would not substantially prejudice the client's interests.

If a lawyer were obliged to report every violation of the Rules, the failure to report any violation would itself be a professional offense. Such a requirement existed in many jurisdictions but proved to be unenforceable. This Rule limits the reporting obligation to those offenses that a self-regulating

profession must vigorously endeavor to prevent. A measure of judgment is, therefore, required in complying with the provisions of this Rule. The term "substantial" refers to the seriousness of the possible offense and not the quantum of evidence of which the lawyer is aware. A report should be made to the bar disciplinary agency unless some other agency, such as a peer review agency, is more appropriate in the circumstances. Similar considerations apply to the reporting of judicial misconduct.

The duty to report professional misconduct does not apply to a lawyer retained to represent a lawyer whose professional conduct is in question. Such a situation is governed by the Rules applicable to the client-lawyer relationship.

Information about a lawyer's or judge's misconduct or fitness may be received by a lawyer in the course of that lawyer's participation in an approved lawyers or judges assistance program. In that circumstance, providing for an exception to the reporting requirements of paragraphs (a) and (b) of this Rule encourages lawyers and judges to seek treatment through such a program. Conversely, without such an exception, lawyers and judges may hesitate to seek assistance from these programs, which may then result in additional harm to their professional careers and additional injury to the welfare of clients and the public.

Under subsection (e) the lawyer or judge who receives the information concerning the violation still has discretion to report it to the appropriate authority, depending on the seriousness of the conduct and the circumstances involved.

Rule 8.4. Misconduct

It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:

- (1) Violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another;
- (2) Commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects;
 - (3) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation;
 - (4) Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice;
- (5) State or imply an ability to influence improperly a government agency or official or to achieve results by means that violate the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law; or
- (6) Knowingly assist a judge or judicial officer in conduct that is a violation of applicable rules of judicial conduct or other law.

COMMENTARY: Lawyers are subject to discipline when they violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so or do so through the acts of another, as when they request or instruct an agent to do so on the lawyer's behalf. Subdivision (1), however, does not prohibit a lawyer from advising a client concerning action the client is legally entitled to take.

Many kinds of illegal conduct reflect adversely on fitness to practice law, such as offenses involving fraud and the offense of willful failure to file an income tax return. However, some kinds of offenses carry no such implication. Traditionally, the distinction was drawn in terms of offenses involving "moral turpitude." That concept can be construed to include offenses concerning some matters of personal morality, such as adultery and comparable offenses, that have no specific connection to fitness for the practice of law. Although a lawyer is personally answerable to the entire criminal law, a lawyer should be professionally answerable only for offenses that indicate lack of those characteristics relevant to law practice. Offenses involving violence, dishonesty, breach of trust, or serious interference with the administration of justice are in that category. A pattern of repeated offenses, even ones of minor significance when considered separately, can indicate indifference to legal obligation.

A lawyer who, in the course of representing a client, knowingly manifests by words or conduct, bias or prejudice based upon race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic status, violates subdivision (4) when such actions are prejudicial to the administration of justice. Legitimate advocacy respecting the foregoing factors does not violate subdivision (4).

A lawyer may refuse to comply with an obligation imposed by law upon a good faith belief that no valid obligation exists. The provisions of Rule 1.2(d) concerning a good faith challenge to the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law apply to challenges of legal regulation of the practice of law.

Lawyers holding public office assume legal responsibilities going beyond those of other citizens. A lawyer's abuse of public office can suggest an inability to fulfill the professional role of lawyers. The same is true of abuse of positions of private trust such as trustee, executor, administrator, guardian, agent and officer, director or manager of a corporation or other organization.

Rule 8.5. Jurisdiction Disciplinary Authority; Choice of Law

- (a) Disciplinary Authority. A lawyer admitted to practice in this jurisdiction is subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction, although engaged in practice elsewhere regardless of where the lawyer's conduct occurs. A lawyer not admitted in this jurisdiction is also subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction if the lawyer provides or offers to provide any legal services in this jurisdiction. A lawyer may be subject to the disciplinary authority of both this jurisdiction and another jurisdiction for the same conduct.
- (b) Choice of Law. In any exercise of the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction, the rules of professional conduct to be applied shall be as follows:
- (1) For conduct in connection with a matter pending before a tribunal, the rules of the jurisdiction in which the tribunal sits, unless the rules of the tribunal provide otherwise; and
- (2) For any other conduct, the rules of the jurisdiction in which the lawyer's conduct occurred, or, if the predominant effect of the conduct is in a different jurisdiction, the rules of that jurisdiction shall be applied to the conduct. A lawyer shall not be subject to discipline if the lawyer's conduct conforms to the rules of a jurisdiction in which the lawyer reasonably believes the predominant effect of the lawyer's conduct will occur.

COMMENTARY: In modern practice lawyers frequently act outside the territorial limits of the jurisdiction in which they are licensed to practice, either in another state or outside the United States. In doing so, they remain subject to the governing authority of the jurisdiction in which they are licensed to practice. If their activity in another jurisdiction is substantial and continuous, it may constitute practice of law in that jurisdiction. See Rule 5.5.

If the Rules of Professional Conduct in the two jurisdictions differ, principles of conflict of laws may apply. Similar problems can arise when a lawyer is licensed to practice in more than one jurisdiction.

Where the lawyer is licensed to practice law in two jurisdictions which impose conflicting obligations, applicable rules of choice of law may govern the situation. A related problem arises with respect to practice before a federal tribunal, where the general authority of the states to regulate the practice of law must be reconciled with such authority as federal tribunals may have to regulate practice before them.

Disciplinary Authority. It is longstanding law that the conduct of a lawyer admitted to practice in this jurisdiction is subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction. Extension of the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction to other lawyers who provide or offer to provide legal services in this jurisdiction is for the protection of the citizens of this jurisdiction. Reciprocal enforcement of a jurisdiction's disciplinary findings and sanctions will further advance the purposes of this Rule. See Rules 6 and 22, ABA Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement. A lawyer who is admitted pursuant to Practice Book Sections 2-16 or 2-17 et seq. is subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction under Rule 8.5(a) and appoints an official to be designated by this Court to receive service of process in this jurisdiction. The fact that the lawyer is subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction may be a factor in determining whether personal jurisdiction may be asserted over the lawyer for civil matters.

Choice of Law. A lawyer may be potentially subject to more than one set of rules of professional conduct which impose different obligations. The lawyer may be licensed to practice in more than one jurisdiction with differing rules, or may be admitted to practice before a particular court with rules that differ from those of the jurisdiction or jurisdictions in which the lawyer is licensed to practice. Additionally, the lawyer's conduct may involve significant contacts with more than one jurisdiction.

Subsection (b) seeks to resolve such potential conflicts. Its premise is that minimizing conflicts between rules, as well as uncertainty about which rules are applicable, is in the best interest of both clients and the profession (as well as the bodies having authority to regulate the profession). Accordingly, it takes the approach of (i) providing that any particular conduct of a lawyer shall be subject to only one set of rules of professional conduct, and (ii) making the determination of which set of rules applies to particular conduct as straightforward as possible, consistent with recognition of appropriate regulatory interests of relevant jurisdictions.

Subsection (b) (1) provides that as to a lawyer's conduct relating to a proceeding pending before a tribunal the lawyer shall be subject only to the rules of the jurisdiction in which the tribunal sits unless the rules of the tribunal, including its choice of law rule, provides otherwise. As to all other conduct, including conduct in anticipation of a proceeding not yet pending before a tribunal, subsection (b) (2)

provides that a lawyer shall be subject to the rules of the jurisdiction in which the lawyer's conduct occurred, or, if the predominant effect of the conduct is in another jurisdiction, the rules of that jurisdiction shall be applied to the conduct. So long as the lawyer's conduct conforms to the rules of a jurisdiction in which the lawyer reasonably believes the predominant effect will occur, the lawyer shall not be subject to discipline under this Rule.

When a lawyer's conduct involves significant contacts with more than one jurisdiction, it may not be clear whether the predominant effect of the lawyer's conduct will occur in a jurisdiction other than the one in which the conduct occurred. So long as the lawyer's conduct conforms to the rules of a jurisdiction in which the lawyer reasonably believes the predominant effect will occur, the lawyer shall not be subject to discipline under this Rule.

If two admitting jurisdictions were to proceed against a lawyer for the same conduct, they should, applying this rule, identify the same governing ethics rules. They should take all appropriate steps to see that they do apply the same rule to the same conduct, and in all events should avoid proceeding against a lawyer on the basis of two inconsistent rules.

The choice of law provision applies to lawyers engaged in transnational practice, unless international law, treaties or other agreements between competent regulatory authorities in the affected jurisdictions provide otherwise.

AMENDMENT NOTES: One of the changes to this Rule is the addition of a provision that a local jurisdiction has authority over a foreign lawyer who does not comply with local rules if the impact of the lawyer's conduct is on the local jurisdiction. This provision will enhance the ability of disciplinary authorities to enforce the Rules of Professional Conduct against foreign lawyers who advertise or who engage in other ethical misconduct in Connecticut.

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Sec. 1-4. Family Division

The family division of the superior court shall consist of the following parts:

- (1) J—Juvenile matters including neglect, dependency, delinquency, families with service needs and termination of parental rights.
 - (2) S—Support and paternity actions.
- (3) D—All other family relations matters, including dissolution of marriage <u>or civil union</u> cases.

COMMENTARY: The above change is made in light of Public Act 05-10, an act that authorizes same sex civil unions.

(NEW) Sec. 2-4A. —Records of Examining Committee

The records and transcripts, if any, of hearings conducted by the state bar examining committee or the several standing committees on recommendations for admission to the bar shall be available only to such committee, to a judge of the superior court, to the statewide grievance committee, to disciplinary counsel or, with the consent of the applicant, to any other person, unless otherwise ordered by the court.

COMMENTARY: This new section is taken from Section 2-50(a) but has been amended to provide that the records and transcripts shall also be available to disciplinary counsel.

Sec. 2-12. County Committees on Recommendations for Admission

- (a) There shall be in each county a standing committee on recommendations for admission, consisting of not less than three nor more than seven members of the bar of that county, who shall be appointed by the judges of the superior court to hold office for three years from the date of their appointment and until their successors are appointed. The appointment of any member may be revoked or suspended by the judges or by the executive committee of the superior court. In connection with such revocation or suspension, the judges or the executive committee shall appoint a qualified individual to fill the vacancy for the balance of the term or for any other appropriate period. Appointments to fill vacancies which have arisen by reasons other than revocation or suspension may be made by the chief justice until the next annual meeting of the judges of the superior court, and in the event of the foreseen absence or the illness or the disqualification of a member of the committee the chief justice may make a pro tempore appointment to the committee to serve during such absence, illness or disqualification.
- (b) [All] Any application[s] for admission to the bar [shall] may be referred to the committee for the county [in] through which the applicant seeks admission, which shall investigate the general fitness of [each] the applicant and report to the bar of the county whether the applicant has complied with the rules relating to admission to the bar, is a person of good character and should be admitted.

COMMENTARY: The above amendment has been made because there is currently a duplication of the efforts of the County Standing Committees and the Bar Examining Committee with respect to reviewing the character and fitness of bar applicants. This duplication extends the time it takes to complete the character and fitness review process. The amendment will give the Bar Examining Committee discretion in referring such matters to the County Standing Committees.

Sec. 2-27. Clients' Funds

(a) Consistent with the requirement of Rule 1.15 of the Rules of Professional Conduct each lawyer or law firm shall maintain, separate from the lawyer's or the firm's personal funds, one or more accounts accurately reflecting the status of funds

handled by the lawyer or firm as fiduciary or attorney, and shall not use such funds for any unauthorized purpose.

- (b) Each lawyer or law firm maintaining one or more trust accounts as defined in Section 2-28 (b) shall keep records of the maintenance and disposition of all funds of clients or of third persons held by the lawyer or firm in a fiduciary capacity from the time of receipt to the time of final distribution. Each lawyer or law firm shall retain the records required under this section for a period of seven years after final distribution of such funds or any portion thereof. Specifically, each lawyer or law firm shall maintain the following in connection with each such trust account:
- (1) a receipt and disbursement journal identifying all deposits in and withdrawals from the account and showing the running account balance;
- (2) a separate accounting page or column for each client or third person for whom funds are held showing (A) all receipts and disbursements and (B) a running account balance;
- (3) at least quarterly a written reconciliation of trust account journals, client ledgers and bank statements;
 - (4) a list identifying all trust accounts as defined in Section 2-28 (b); and
 - (5) all checkbooks, bank statements, and canceled or voided checks.
- (c) Such books of account and statements of reconciliation, and any other records required to be maintained pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, shall be made available upon request of the statewide grievance committee or its counsel, or the disciplinary counsel for review, examination or [and] audit upon [a finding by the statewide grievance committee or a grievance panel that there exists probable cause that the lawyer or law firm is guilty of misconduct] receipt of notice by the statewide grievance committee of an overdraft notice as provided by Section 2-28(f). Upon the filing of a grievance complaint or a finding of probable cause, such records shall be made available upon request of the statewide grievance committee, its counsel or the disciplinary counsel for review or audit.
- (d) Each lawyer shall register with the statewide grievance committee, on a form devised by the committee, the address of the lawyer's office or offices maintained for the practice of law and the name and address of the financial institution with which the lawyer maintains any account in which the funds of more than one client are kept and the identification number of any such account. Such registrations will be made on an annual basis and at such time as the lawyer changes his or her address or addresses or location or identification number of any such trust account in which the funds of more than one client are kept. This subsection shall not apply to judges of the supreme, appellate or superior courts, judge trial referees, family support magistrates, federal judges, federal magistrate judges, federal administrative law judges or federal bankruptcy judges.
- (e) The statewide grievance committee or its counsel may conduct random inspections and audits of accounts maintained pursuant to subsection (b) of this section to determine whether such accounts are in compliance with this section and Rule 1.15 of the Rules of Professional Conduct. If any random inspection or audit performed under this subsection discloses an apparent violation of this section or the Rules of Professional Conduct, the matter may be referred to a grievance panel for further investigation or to the disciplinary counsel for presentment to the superior court. Any lawyer whose accounts are selected for inspection or audit under this section shall fully cooperate with the inspection or audit, which cooperation shall not be construed to be a violation of Rule 1.6(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Any records, documents or information obtained or produced pursuant to a random inspection or audit shall remain confidential unless and until a presentment is initiated by the disciplinary counsel alleging a violation of Rule 1.15 of the Rules of Professional Conduct or of this section, or discipline is imposed by the statewide

grievance committee or a reviewing committee for violations of said rule or this section. Prior to the commencement of a presentment or a hearing held pursuant to Section 2-35(c), notice shall be given in writing by the statewide grievance committee to any client or third person whose identity may be publicly disclosed through the disclosure of records obtained or produced in accordance with this subsection. Thereafter, public disclosure of such records at a presentment or hearing held pursuant to Section 2-35(c) shall be subject to the client or third person having the reasonable opportunity to seek a court order restricting publication of any such records disclosing confidential information.

[(e)](f) Violation of this section shall constitute misconduct.

COMMENTARY: The above change to subsection (c) will allow the statewide bar counsel and disciplinary counsel to react quickly in cases of unexplained or inadequately explained overdrafts. Subsection (e) will permit random audits of trust accounts maintained by attorneys.

Sec. 2-28. Overdraft Notification

- (a) The terms used in this section are defined as follows:
- (1) "Financial institution" includes banks, savings and loan associations, credit unions, savings banks and any other business or person which accepts for deposit funds held in trust by attorneys.
- (2) "Properly payable" refers to an instrument which, if presented in the normal course of business, is in a form requiring payment under law.
- (3) "Insufficient funds" refers to the status of an account that does not contain sufficient funds available to pay a properly payable instrument.
- (4) "Uncollected funds" refers to funds deposited in an account and available to be drawn upon but not yet deemed by the financial institution to have been collected.
- (b) Attorneys shall deposit all funds held in any fiduciary capacity in accounts clearly identified as "trust," "client funds" or "escrow" accounts, referred to herein as "trust accounts," and shall take all steps necessary to inform the depository institution of the purpose and identity of such accounts. Funds held in trust include funds held in any fiduciary capacity in connection with a representation in Connecticut, whether as trustee, agent, guardian, executor or otherwise. Where an attorney fiduciary has the right to draw by a properly payable instrument on such trust account in which the funds of more than one client are kept, such account shall be maintained only in financial institutions approved by the statewide grievance committee. No such trust account in which the funds of more than one client are kept shall be maintained in any financial institution in Connecticut which does not file the agreement required by this section. Violation of this subsection shall constitute misconduct.
- (c) Attorneys regularly maintaining funds in a fiduciary capacity shall register any account in which the funds of more than one client are kept with the statewide grievance committee in accordance with Section 2-27 (d).
- (d) A financial institution shall be approved as a depository for attorney trust accounts only if it files with the statewide grievance committee an agreement, in a form provided by the committee, to report to the committee the fact that an instrument has been presented against an attorney trust account containing insufficient funds, irrespective of whether or not the instrument is honored. No report shall be required if funds in an amount sufficient to cover the deficiency in the trust account are deposited within one business day of the presentation of the instrument. No report shall be required in the case of an instrument presented and paid against uncollected funds.
- (e) Any such agreement shall not be cancelled by a financial institution except upon thirty days written notice to the statewide grievance committee. The statewide grievance committee shall establish rules governing approval and termination of

approved status for financial institutions, and shall publish annually a list of approved institutions. Any such agreement shall apply to all branches of the financial institution in Connecticut and shall not be cancelled except upon thirty days notice in writing to the statewide grievance committee.

- (f) The financial institution shall report to the statewide grievance committee within seven business days from the date of such presentation, any instrument presented against insufficient funds on any trust funds account unless funds in an amount sufficient to cover the deficiency in the [trust] account are deposited within one business day of the presentation of the instrument. The report shall be accompanied by a copy of the instrument.
- (g) The statewide grievance committee may delegate to the statewide bar counsel the authority to investigate overdraft notifications and determine that no misconduct has occurred or that no further action is warranted. Any determination that misconduct may have occurred and a grievance complaint should be initiated, unless such complaint is premised upon the failure of an attorney to file an explanation of an overdraft, shall be made by the statewide grievance committee.
- (h) Upon receipt of notification of an overdraft, the statewide grievance committee, its counsel or disciplinary counsel may request that the attorney produce such books of account and statements of reconciliation, and any other records required to be maintained pursuant to Section 2-27(b) for review, examination or audit. Failure of the attorney to respond to inquiries of the statewide grievance committee, its counsel, or disciplinary counsel, or to produce the requested books of account and statements of reconciliation or other records shall be grounds for disciplinary counsel to file an application for an interim suspension in accordance with the provisions of Section 2-42.
- [(h)](i) Every attorney practicing or admitted to practice in Connecticut shall, as a condition thereof, be conclusively presumed to have authorized the reporting and production requirements of this section. Where an attorney qualifies as executor of a will or as trustee or successor fiduciary, the attorney fiduciary shall have a reasonable time after qualification to bring preexisting trust accounts into compliance with the provisions of this section.

COMMENTARY: The above changes will allow the statewide bar counsel and disciplinary counsel to react quickly in cases of unexplained or inadequately explained overdrafts.

(NEW) Sec. 2-28A. Attorney Advertising; Mandatory Filing

- (a) Any attorney who advertises services to the public through any media, electronic or otherwise, or through written or recorded communication pursuant to Rule 7.2 of the Rules of Professional Conduct shall file a copy of each such advertisement or communication with the statewide grievance committee either prior to or concurrently with the attorney's first dissemination of the advertisement or written or recorded communication, except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) herein. The materials shall be filed in a format prescribed by the statewide grievance committee, which may require them to be filed electronically. Any such submission in a foreign language must include an accurate English language translation. The filing shall consist of the following:
- (1) A copy of the advertisement or communication in the form or forms in which it is to be disseminated (e.g., videotapes, DVDs, audiotapes, compact disks, print media, photographs of outdoor advertising);
 - (2) A transcript, if the advertisement or communication is in video or audio format;
 - (3) A list of domain names used by the attorney, which shall be updated quarterly;
- (4) A sample envelope in which the written communication will be enclosed, if the communication is to be mailed;

- (5) A statement listing all media in which the advertisement or communication will appear, the anticipated frequency of use of the advertisement or communication in each medium in which it will appear, and the anticipated time period during which the advertisement or communication will be used.
- (b) The filing requirements of subsection (a) do not extend to any of the following materials:
- (1) An advertisement in the public media that contains only the information, in whole or in part, contained in Rule 7.2(i) of the Rules of Professional Conduct, provided the information is not false or misleading;
 - (2) An advertisement in a telephone directory;
 - (3) A listing or entry in a regularly published law list;
- (4) An announcement card stating new or changed associations, new offices, or similar changes relating to an attorney or firm, or a tombstone professional card;
 - (5) A communication sent only to:
 - (i) Existing or former clients;
- (ii) Other attorneys or professionals; business organizations including trade groups; not-for-profit organizations; governmental bodies and/or
- (iii) Members of a not-for-profit organization that meets the following conditions: the primary purposes of the organization do not include the rendition of legal services; the recommending, furnishing, paying for or educating persons regarding legal services is incidental and reasonably related to the primary purposes of the organization; the organization does not derive a financial benefit from the rendition of legal services by a attorney; and the person for whom the legal services are rendered, and not the organization, is recognized as the client of the attorney who is recommended, furnished, or paid for by the organization.
 - (6) Communication that is requested by a prospective client.
- (7) The contents of an attorney's internet website that appears under any of the domain names submitted pursuant to subparagraph (3) of subsection (a).
- (c) If requested by the statewide grievance committee, an attorney shall promptly submit information to substantiate statements or representations made or implied in any advertisement in the public media and/or written or recorded communications.
- (d) The statewide bar counsel shall review advertisements and communications filed pursuant to this section that have been selected for such review on a random basis. If after such review the statewide bar counsel determines that an advertisement or communication does not comply with the Rules of Professional Conduct, the statewide bar counsel shall in writing advise the attorney responsible for the advertisement or communication of the noncompliance and shall attempt to resolve the matter with such attorney. If the matter is not resolved to the satisfaction of the statewide bar counsel, he or she shall forward the advertisement or communication and a statement describing the attempt to resolve the matter to the statewide grievance committee for review. If, after reviewing the advertisement or communication, the statewide grievance committee determines that it violates the Rules of Professional Conduct, it shall forward a copy of its file to the disciplinary counsel and direct the disciplinary counsel to file a presentment against the attorney in the superior court.
- (e) The procedure set forth in subsection (d) shall apply only to advertisements and communications that are reviewed as part of the random review process. If an advertisement or communication comes to the attention of the statewide bar counsel other than through that process, it shall be handled pursuant to the grievance procedure that is set forth in Sections 2-29 et seq.
- (f) The materials required to be filed by this section shall be retained by the statewide grievance committee for a period of one year from the date of their filing, unless, at the expiration of the one year period, there is pending before the statewide grievance committee, a reviewing committee, or the court a proceeding concerning

such materials, in which case the materials that are the subject of the proceeding shall be retained until the expiration of the proceeding or for such other period as may be prescribed by the statewide grievance committee.

- (g) Except for records filed in court in connection with a presentment brought pursuant to subsection (d), records maintained by the statewide bar counsel, the statewide grievance committee and/or the disciplinary counsel's office pursuant to this section shall not be public. Nothing in this rule shall prohibit the use or consideration of such records in any subsequent disciplinary or client security fund proceeding and such records shall be available in such proceedings to a judge of the superior court or to the standing committee on recommendations for admission to the bar, to disciplinary counsel, to the statewide bar counsel or assistant bar counsel, or, with the consent of the respondent, to any other person, unless otherwise ordered by the court.
 - (h) Violation of subsections (a) or (c) shall constitute misconduct.

COMMENTARY: This section is intended to enhance the ability of the statewide grievance committee to monitor attorneys' advertising practices and to provide a procedure for enforcing compliance with the Rules of Professional Conduct for the protection of the public.

In subsection (a)(3) "quarterly" means the first business day of January, April, July and October.

(NEW) Sec. 2-28B. -Advisory Opinions

- (a) An attorney who desires to secure an advance advisory opinion concerning compliance with the Rules of Professional Conduct of a contemplated advertisement or communication may submit to the statewide grievance committee, not less than 30 days prior to the date of first dissemination, the material specified in Section 2-28A(a) accompanied by a fee established by the Chief Court Administrator. It shall not be necessary to submit a videotape or DVD if the videotape or DVD has not then been prepared and the production script submitted reflects in detail and accurately the actions, events, scenes, and background sounds that will be depicted or contained on such videotapes or DVDs, when prepared, as well as the narrative transcript of the verbal and printed portions of such advertisement.
- (b) An advisory opinion shall be issued, without a hearing, by the statewide grievance committee or by a reviewing committee assigned by the statewide grievance committee. Such reviewing committee shall consist of at least three members of the statewide grievance committee, at least one-third of whom are not attorneys.
- (c) An advisory opinion issued by the statewide grievance committee or a reviewing committee finding noncompliance with the Rules of Professional Conduct is not binding in a disciplinary proceeding, but a finding of compliance is binding in favor of the submitting attorney in a disciplinary proceeding if the representations, statements, materials, facts and written assurances received in connection therewith are not false or misleading. The finding constitutes admissible evidence if offered by a party. If a request for an advisory opinion is made within 60 days of the effective date of this section, the statewide grievance committee or reviewing committee shall issue its advisory opinion within 45 days of the filing of the request. Thereafter, the statewide grievance committee or reviewing committee shall issue its advisory opinion within 30 days of the filing of the request. For purposes of this section, an advisory opinion is issued on the date notice of the opinion is transmitted to the attorney who requested it pursuant to subsection (a) herein.
- (d) If requested by the statewide grievance committee or a reviewing committee, the attorney seeking an advisory opinion shall promptly submit information to substantiate statements or representations made or implied in such attorney's advertisement. The time period set forth in subsection (c) herein shall be tolled from the date of the committee's request to the date the requested information is filed with the committee.

- (e) If an advisory opinion is not issued by the statewide grievance committee or a reviewing committee within the time prescribed in this section, the advertisement or communication for which the opinion was sought shall be deemed to be in compliance with the Rules of Professional Conduct.
- (f) If, after receiving an advisory opinion finding that an advertisement or communication violates the Rules of Professional Conduct, the attorney disseminates such advertisement or communication, the statewide grievance committee, upon receiving notice of such dissemination, shall forward a copy of its file concerning the matter to the disciplinary counsel and direct the disciplinary counsel to file a presentment against the attorney in the superior court.
- (g) Except for advisory opinions, all records maintained by the statewide grievance committee pursuant to this section shall not be public. Advisory opinions issued pursuant to this section shall not be public for a period of 30 days from the date of their issuance. During that 30 day period the advisory opinion shall be available only to the attorney who requested it pursuant to subsection (a), to the statewide grievance committee or its counsel, to reviewing committees, to grievance panels, to disciplinary counsel, to a judge of the superior court, and, with the consent of the attorney who requested the opinion, to any other person. Nothing in this rule shall prohibit the use or consideration of such records in any subsequent disciplinary or client security fund proceeding and such records shall be available in such proceedings to a judge of the superior court or to the standing committee on recommendations for admission to the bar, to disciplinary counsel, to the statewide bar counsel or assistant bar counsel, or, with the consent of the respondent, to any other person, unless otherwise ordered by the court.

COMMENTARY: This section gives attorneys the option of obtaining an advisory opinion concerning whether their advertisement conforms to the requirements of the Rules of Professional Conduct prior to disseminating the advertisement. An advisory opinion that finds that the advertisement complies with the Rules will be binding in favor of the submitting attorney in a disciplinary proceeding provided the statements, representations and materials submitted in connection with the advertisement are not false or misleading.

Sec. 2-35. Action by Statewide Grievance Committee or Reviewing Committee

- (a) Upon receipt of the record from a grievance panel, the statewide grievance committee may assign the case to a reviewing committee which shall consist of at least three members of the statewide grievance committee, at least one third of whom are not attorneys. The statewide grievance committee may, in its discretion, reassign the case to a different reviewing committee. The committee shall regularly rotate membership on reviewing committees and assignments of complaints from the various grievance panels. An attorney who maintains an office for the practice of law in the same judicial district as the respondent may not sit on the reviewing committee for that case.
- (b) The statewide grievance committee and the reviewing committee shall have the power to issue a subpoena to compel any person to appear before it to testify in relation to any matter deemed by the statewide grievance committee or the reviewing committee to be relevant to the complaint and to produce before it for examination any books or papers which, in its judgment, may be relevant to such complaint. Any such testimony shall be on the record.
- (c) If the grievance panel determined that probable cause exists that the respondent is guilty of misconduct, the statewide grievance committee or the reviewing committee shall hold a hearing on the complaint. If the grievance panel determined that probable cause does not exist, but filed the matter with the statewide grievance committee because the complaint alleges that a crime has been committed, the

statewide grievance committee or the reviewing committee shall review the determination of no probable cause, take evidence if it deems it appropriate and, if it determines that probable cause does exist, shall take the following action: (1) if the statewide grievance committee reviewed the grievance panel's determination, it shall hold a hearing concerning the complaint or assign the matter to a reviewing committee to hold the hearing; or (2) if a reviewing committee reviewed the grievance panel's determination, it shall hold a hearing concerning the complaint or refer the matter to the statewide grievance committee which shall assign it to another reviewing committee to hold the hearing. At least two of the same members of a reviewing committee shall be physically present at all hearings held by such reviewing committee. Unless waived by the disciplinary counsel and the respondent, the remaining member of the reviewing committee shall obtain and review the transcript of each such hearing and shall participate in the committee's determination. The review by the statewide grievance committee or reviewing committee of a grievance panel determination that probable cause exists shall not be limited to the grievance panel determination. The statewide grievance committee or reviewing committee may review the entire record and determine whether any allegation in the complaint, or any issue arising from the review of the record or arising during any hearing on the complaint, supports a finding of probable cause of misconduct. If either the statewide grievance committee or the reviewing committee determines that probable cause does exist, it shall issue a written notice which shall include but not be limited to the following: (i) a description of the factual allegation or allegations that were considered in rendering the determination; and (ii) for each such factual allegation, an identification of the specific provision or provisions of the applicable rules governing attorney conduct considered in rendering the determination. All hearings following a determination of probable cause shall be public and on the record. The statewide grievance committee or reviewing committee shall not make a probable cause determination based, in full or in part, on a claim of misconduct not alleged in the complaint without first notifying the respondent that it is considering such action and affording the respondent the opportunity to be heard.

- (d) The complainant and respondent shall be entitled to be present at all hearings and other proceedings on the complaint at which testimony is given and to have counsel present. At all hearings the respondent shall have the right to be heard in the respondent's own defense and by witnesses and counsel. The disciplinary counsel shall pursue the matter before the statewide grievance committee or reviewing committee. The disciplinary counsel and the respondent shall be entitled to examine or cross-examine witnesses. At the conclusion of the evidentiary phase of a hearing, the complainant, the disciplinary counsel and the respondent shall have the opportunity to make a statement, either individually or through counsel. The statewide grievance committee or reviewing committee may request oral argument.
- (e) Within ninety days of the date the grievance panel filed its determination with the statewide grievance committee pursuant to Section 2-32 (i), the reviewing committee shall render a final written decision dismissing the complaint, imposing sanctions and conditions as authorized by Section 2-37 or directing the disciplinary counsel to file a presentment against the respondent in the superior court and file it with the statewide grievance committee. Where there is a final decision dismissing the complaint, the reviewing committee may give notice in a written summary order to be followed by a full written decision. The reviewing committee's record in the case shall consist of a copy of all evidence it received or considered, including a transcript of any testimony heard by it, and its decision. The record shall also be sent to the statewide grievance committee. The reviewing committee shall forward a copy of the final decision to the complainant, the disciplinary counsel, the respon-

dent, and the grievance panel to which the complaint was forwarded. The decision shall be a matter of public record if it results in the imposition of discipline. The reviewing committee may file a motion for extension of time not to exceed thirty days with the statewide grievance committee which shall grant the motion only upon a showing of good cause. If the reviewing committee does not complete its action on a complaint within the time provided in this section, the statewide grievance committee shall, on motion of the complainant or the respondent or on its own motion, inquire into the delay and determine the appropriate course of action. Enforcement of the final decision, including the publication of the notice of a reprimand pursuant to Section 2-54, shall be stayed for thirty days from the date of the issuance to the parties of the final decision. In the event the respondent timely submits to the statewide grievance committee a request for review of the final decision of the reviewing committee, such stay shall remain in full force and effect pursuant to Section 2-38 (b).

- (f) If the reviewing committee finds probable cause to believe the respondent has violated the criminal law of this state, it shall report its findings to the chief state's attorney.
- (g) Within thirty days of the issuance to the parties of the final decision by the reviewing committee, the respondent may submit to the statewide grievance committee a request for review of the decision. Any request for review submitted under this section must specify the basis for the request, including, but not limited to a claim or claims that the reviewing committee's findings, inferences, conclusions or decision is or are: (1) in violation of constitutional, rules of practice or statutory provisions; (2) in excess of the authority of the reviewing committee; (3) made upon unlawful procedure; (4) affected by other error of law; (5) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or (6) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion and the specific basis for such claim or claims. For grievance complaints filed on or after January 1, 2004, the respondent shall serve a copy of the request for review on disciplinary counsel in accordance with Sections 10-12 through 10-17. Within fourteen days of the respondent's submission of a request for review, disciplinary counsel may file a response. Disciplinary counsel shall serve a copy of the response on the respondent in accordance with Sections 10-12 through 10-17. No reply to the response shall be allowed.
- (h) If, after its review of a complaint pursuant to this section that was forwarded to the statewide grievance committee pursuant to Section 2-32 (i) (2), a reviewing committee agrees with a grievance panel's determination that probable cause does not exist that the attorney is guilty of misconduct and there has been no finding of probable cause by the statewide grievance committee or a reviewing committee, the reviewing committee shall have the authority to dismiss the complaint within the time period set forth in subsection (e) of this section without review by the statewide grievance committee. The reviewing committee shall file its decision dismissing the complaint with the statewide grievance committee along with the record of the matter and shall send a copy of the decision to the complainant, the respondent, and the grievance panel to which the complaint was assigned.
- (i) If the statewide grievance committee does not assign a complaint to a reviewing committee, it shall have one hundred and twenty days from the date the panel's determination was filed with it to render a decision dismissing the complaint, imposing sanctions and conditions as authorized by Section 2-37 or directing the disciplinary counsel to file a presentment against the respondent. The decision shall be a matter of public record. The failure of a reviewing committee to complete its action on a complaint within the period of time provided in this section shall not be cause for dismissal of the complaint. If the statewide grievance committee finds

probable cause to believe that the respondent has violated the criminal law of this state, it shall report its findings to the chief state's attorney.

COMMENTARY: The above change establishes a procedure with regard to grievance complaints filed on or after January 1, 2004 whereby disciplinary counsel may respond to a respondent's request for review of a final decision by a reviewing committee.

Sec. 2-36. Action by Statewide Grievance Committee on Request for Review

Within sixty days of the expiration of the thirty day period for the filing of a request for review under Section 2-35 (g), or, with regard to grievance complaints filed on or after January 1, 2004, within sixty days of the expiration of the fourteen day period for the filing of a response by disciplinary counsel to a request for review under that section, the statewide grievance committee shall issue a written decision affirming the decision of the reviewing committee, dismissing the complaint, imposing sanctions and conditions as authorized by Section 2-37, directing the disciplinary counsel to file a presentment against the respondent in the superior court or referring the complaint to the same or a different reviewing committee for further investigation and a decision. Before issuing its decision, the statewide grievance committee may, in its discretion, request oral argument. The statewide grievance committee shall forward a copy of its decision to the complainant, the disciplinary counsel, the respondent, the reviewing committee and the grievance panel which investigated the complaint. The decision shall be a matter of public record. A decision of the statewide grievance committee shall be issued only if the respondent has timely filed a request for review under Section 2-35 (g).

COMMENTARY: The above change is needed in light of the change to Section 2-35.

Sec. 2-40. Discipline of Attorneys Convicted of a Felony and Other Matters in Connecticut

- (a) The clerk of the superior court location in this state in which an attorney [lawyer] is convicted of a [felony, any larceny or any crime for which the lawyer is sentenced to a term of incarceration or for which a suspended period of incarceration is imposed,] serious crime as defined herein shall transmit, immediately upon the imposition of sentence, a certificate of the conviction to the disciplinary counsel and to the statewide grievance committee. The [lawyer] attorney shall also notify the disciplinary counsel in writing of his or her conviction. The disciplinary counsel or designee shall, pursuant to Section 2-47, file a presentment against the [lawyer] attorney predicated upon the conviction. No entry fee shall be required for proceedings hereunder. The filing of a presentment shall be discretionary with the disciplinary counsel where the offense for which the attorney has been convicted carries a maximum penalty of a period of incarceration of one year or less.
- (b) The term "conviction" as used herein refers to the disposition of any charge of a serious crime as hereinafter defined resulting from either a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or from a verdict after trial or otherwise, and regardless of the pendency of any appeal.
- (c) The term "serious crime" as used herein shall mean any felony or any larceny or any crime for which the attorney was sentenced to a term of incarceration or for which a suspended period of incarceration was imposed.
- [(b)](d) The provisions of subsection [(c)] (e) of this section notwithstanding, after sentencing an attorney who has been convicted of a <u>serious crime</u> [felony, any larceny or any crime for which the lawyer is sentenced to a term of incarceration or for which a suspended period of incarceration is imposed], the sentencing judge may in his or her discretion enter an order immediately suspending the attorney pending final disposition of a disciplinary proceeding predicated upon the conviction. Thereafter, upon good cause shown, the judge <u>who placed the attorney on suspension</u>

or any other judge before whom [the] a presentment is pending may, in the interest of justice, set aside or modify the interim suspension.

- [(c)](e) A presentment filed pursuant to this section shall be heard by the judge who presided at the [trial] sentencing [which resulted in the conviction]. A hearing on the presentment complaint addressing the issue of the eligibility of such attorney to continue the practice of law in this state shall be held within thirty days of sentencing or the filing of the presentment, whichever is later. Such hearing shall be prosecuted by the disciplinary counsel or an attorney designated pursuant to Section 2-48. At such hearing the attorney shall have the right to counsel, to be heard in his or her own defense and to present evidence and witnesses in his or her behalf. After such hearing, the judge shall enter an order dismissing the matter or imposing discipline upon such attorney in the form of suspension for a period of time, disbarment or such other discipline as the judge deems appropriate.
- [(d)](f) Whenever the judge enters an order suspending or disbarring an attorney pursuant to subsections [(b) or (c)] (d) or (e) of this section, the judge may appoint a trustee, pursuant to Section 2-64, to protect the clients' and the attorney's interests.
- [(e)](g) If an attorney suspended solely under the provisions of this section demonstrates to the court that the underlying judgment of conviction has been vacated or reversed, the court shall vacate the order of interim suspension and place the attorney on active status. The vacating of the interim suspension shall not automatically terminate any other disciplinary proceeding then pending against the attorney.
- (h) An attorney's failure to send the written notice required by this section shall constitute misconduct.
- [(f)](i) Immunity from prosecution granted to an attorney is not a bar to disciplinary proceedings, unless otherwise ordered by a judge of the superior court. The granting of a pretrial diversion program to an attorney charged with a <u>serious</u> crime <u>as defined herein</u> is not a bar to disciplinary proceedings, unless otherwise ordered by the judge who granted the program to the attorney.
- [(g) When an attorney has been found guilty of a crime, and if the matter is not final and is subject to appeal, the disciplinary counsel may seek an interim suspension.]

COMMENTARY: The above changes make this rule consistent with Section 2-41 with regard to the definitions of "conviction" and "serious crime." Other changes include a provision giving disciplinary counsel discretion in filing a presentment where the offense for which the attorney has been convicted carries a maximum penalty of a period of incarceration of one year or less and making it misconduct for an attorney to fail to notify disciplinary counsel in writing of the attorney's conviction.

Sec. 2-41. Discipline of Attorneys Convicted of a Felony and Other Matters in Another Jurisdiction

- (a) An attorney shall send to the disciplinary counsel written notice of his or her conviction in any court of the United States, or the District of Columbia, or of any state, territory, commonwealth or possession of the United States of a serious crime as hereinafter defined within ten days of the entry of the judgment of conviction. That written notice shall be sent by certified mail, return receipt requested.
- (b) The term "conviction" as used herein refers to the disposition of any charge of a serious crime as hereinafter defined resulting from either a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or from a verdict after trial or otherwise, and regardless of the pendency of any appeal.
- (c) The term "serious crime" as used herein shall mean any felony or any larceny as defined in the jurisdiction in which the attorney was convicted or any crime for which the attorney was sentenced to a term of incarceration or for which a suspended period of incarceration or a period of probation was imposed.

- (d) The written notice required by subsection (a) of this section shall include the name and address of the court in which the judgment of conviction was entered, the date of the judgment of conviction, and the specific section of the applicable criminal or penal code upon which the conviction is predicated.
- (e) Upon receipt of the written notice of conviction the disciplinary counsel shall obtain a certified copy of the attorney's judgment of conviction, which certified copy shall be conclusive evidence of the commission of that crime in any disciplinary proceeding instituted against that attorney on the basis of the conviction. Upon receipt of the certified copy of the judgment of conviction, the disciplinary counsel shall file a presentment against the attorney with the superior court for the judicial district wherein the attorney maintains an office for the practice of law in this state, except that, if the attorney has no such office, the disciplinary counsel shall file it with the superior court for the judicial district of Hartford. The filing of a presentment shall be discretionary with the disciplinary counsel where the offense for which the attorney has been convicted carries a maximum penalty of a period of incarceration of one year or less. The sole issue to be determined in the presentment proceeding shall be the extent of the final discipline to be imposed, provided that the presentment proceeding instituted will not be brought to hearing until all appeals from the conviction are concluded unless the attorney requests that the matter not be deferred. The disciplinary counsel shall also apply to the court for an order of immediate interim suspension, which application shall contain the certified copy of the judgment of conviction. The court may in its discretion enter an order immediately suspending the attorney pending final disposition of a disciplinary proceeding predicated upon the judgment of conviction. Thereafter, upon good cause shown, the court may, in the interest of justice, set aside or modify the interim suspension. Whenever the court enters an order suspending or disbarring an attorney pursuant to this section, the court may appoint a trustee, pursuant to Section 2-64, to protect the clients' and the attorney's interests.
- (f) If an attorney suspended solely under the provisions of this section demonstrates to the court that the underlying judgment of conviction has been vacated or reversed, the court shall vacate the order of interim suspension and place the attorney on active status. The vacating of the interim suspension shall not automatically terminate any other disciplinary proceeding then pending against the attorney.
- (g) An attorney's failure to send the written notice required by this section shall constitute misconduct.
 - (h) No entry fee shall be required for proceedings hereunder.
- (i) Immunity from prosecution granted to an attorney is not a bar to disciplinary proceedings, unless otherwise ordered by a judge of the superior court. The granting of a pretrial diversion program to an attorney charged with a serious crime as defined herein is not a bar to disciplinary proceedings, unless otherwise ordered by the judge who granted the program to the attorney.

COMMENTARY: The change in subsection (c) is made because in federal court and in the courts of some other states a sentence of probation is not always accompanied by a suspended sentence. In such cases, probation is a disposition in and of itself. The addition of subsection (i) above is so that Section 2-41 mirrors Section 2-40 in this regard to make it clear that the granting of immunity from prosecution or of a pretrial diversionary program is not a bar to disciplinary proceedings.

Sec. 2-42. Conduct Constituting Threat of Harm to Clients

(a) If there is a disciplinary proceeding pending against a lawyer, or if there has been a notice of overdraft in accordance with the provisions of Section 2-28(f) and the grievance panel, the reviewing committee, the statewide grievance committee or the disciplinary counsel believes that the lawyer poses a substantial threat of irreparable harm to his or her clients or to prospective clients, or that there has been

an unexplained overdraft in the lawyer's trust funds account, the panel or committee shall so advise the disciplinary counsel. The disciplinary counsel shall, upon being so advised or upon his or her own belief, apply to the court for an order of interim suspension. The disciplinary counsel shall provide the lawyer with notice that an application for interim suspension has been filed and that a hearing will be held on such application.

- (b) The court, after hearing, pending final disposition of the disciplinary proceeding, may, if it finds that the lawyer poses a substantial threat of irreparable harm to his or her clients or to prospective clients, enter an order of interim suspension, or may order such other interim action as deemed appropriate. Thereafter, upon good cause shown, the court may, in the interest of justice, set aside or modify the interim suspension or other order entered pursuant hereto. Whenever the court enters an interim suspension order pursuant hereto, the court may appoint a trustee, pursuant to Section 2-64, to protect the clients' and the suspended attorney's interests.
- (c) No entry fee shall be required for proceedings hereunder. Any hearings necessitated by the proceedings may, in the discretion of the court, be held in chambers

COMMENTARY: The above changes will allow prompt action to be taken in cases of unexplained or inadequately explained overdrafts.

Sec. 2-47. Presentments and Unauthorized Practice of Law Petitions

- (a) Presentment of attorneys for misconduct, whether or not the misconduct occurred in the actual presence of the court, shall be made by written complaint of the [statewide grievance committee or a reviewing committee] disciplinary counsel. Service of the complaint shall be made as in civil actions. Any interim proceedings to the contrary notwithstanding, a hearing on the merits of the complaint shall be held within sixty days of the date the complaint was filed with the court. At such hearing, the respondent shall have the right to be heard in his or her own defense and by witnesses and counsel. After such hearing the court shall render a judgment dismissing the complaint or imposing discipline as follows: reprimand, suspension for a period of time, disbarment or such other discipline as the court deems appropriate. This may include conditions to be fulfilled by the attorney before he or she may apply for readmission or reinstatement. Unless otherwise ordered by the court, such complaints shall be prosecuted by the disciplinary counsel or an attorney appointed pursuant to Section 2-48.
- (b) The sole issue to be determined in a disciplinary proceeding predicated upon conviction of a felony, any larceny or crime for which the lawyer is sentenced to a term of incarceration or for which a suspended period of incarceration is imposed shall be the extent of the final discipline to be imposed.
- (c) A petition to restrain any person from engaging in the unauthorized practice of law not occurring in the actual presence of the court may be made by written complaint to the superior court in the judicial district where such violation occurs. When offenses have been committed by the same person in more than one judicial district, presentment for all offenses may be made in any one of such judicial districts. Such complaint may be prosecuted by the state's attorney, by the disciplinary counsel, or by any member of the bar by direction of the court. Upon the filing of such complaint, a rule to show cause shall issue to the defendant, who may make any proper answer within twenty days from the return of the rule and who shall have the right to be heard as soon as practicable, and upon such hearing the court shall make such lawful orders as it may deem just. Such complaints shall be proceeded with as civil actions.
- (d)(1) If a determination is made by the statewide grievance committee or a reviewing committee that a respondent is guilty of misconduct and such misconduct

does not otherwise warrant a presentment to the superior court, but the respondent has been disciplined pursuant to these rules by the statewide grievance committee, a reviewing committee or the court at least three times pursuant to complaints filed within the five year period preceding the date of the filing of the grievance complaint that gave rise to such finding of misconduct in the instant case, the statewide grievance committee or the reviewing committee shall direct the disciplinary counsel to file a presentment against the respondent in the superior court. Service of the matter shall be made as in civil actions. The statewide grievance committee or the reviewing committee shall file with the court the record in the matter and a copy of the prior discipline issued against the respondent within such five year period. The sole issue to be determined by the court upon the presentment shall be the appropriate action to take as a result of the nature of the misconduct in the instant case and the cumulative discipline issued concerning the respondent within such five year period. Such action shall be in the form of a judgment dismissing the complaint or imposing discipline as follows: reprimand, suspension for a period of time, disbarment or such other discipline as the court deems appropriate. This may include conditions to be fulfilled by the respondent before he or she may apply for readmission or reinstatement. This subsection shall apply to all findings of misconduct issued from the day of enactment forward and the determination of presentment shall consider all discipline pursuant to complaints filed within the five year period preceding the date of the filing of the grievance complaint that gave rise to the finding of misconduct even if they predate the effective date of these rules.

- (2) If the respondent has appealed the issuance of a finding of misconduct made by the statewide grievance committee or the reviewing committee, the court shall first adjudicate and decide that appeal in accordance with the procedures set forth in subsections (d) through (f) of Section 2-38. In the event the court denies the respondent's appeal of the finding of misconduct, the court shall then adjudicate the presentment brought under this section. In no event shall the court review the merits of the matters for which the prior reprimands were issued against the respondent.
- (e) No entry fee shall be required for the filing of any complaint pursuant to this section.

COMMENTARY: The change to subsection (a) is made to be consistent with Section 2-34A(b)(6) which provides that presentments are filed by disciplinary counsel.

Under current subsection (d) the "three strike" provision will apply to a new complaint against a respondent only if the three prior disciplines against that respondent occurred within five years preceding the date of the filing of the new grievance complaint. The result of this is that if four complaints are filed against a lawyer in close temporal proximity and three resulted in discipline while the fourth is pending, the three earlier disciplines will not qualify under subsection (d) as "strikes" with regard to the matter still pending. The above revision to subsection (d) is intended to address this situation so that the three earlier disciplines in the example would qualify as "strikes" with regard to the pending grievance complaint.

(NEW) Sec. 2-47A. Disbarment of Attorney for Misappropriation of Funds

In any disciplinary proceeding where there has been a finding by a judge of the superior court that a lawyer has knowingly misappropriated a client's funds or other property held in trust the discipline for such conduct shall be disbarment.

COMMENTARY: The above rule is a codification of the "Wilson" rule. In <u>In Re Wilson</u>, 81 N.J. 451, 409 A.2d 1153 (1979), the New Jersey Supreme Court articulated a rule that the universal response in cases of knowing misappropriation of clients' money should, without exception, be disbarment.

See also the proposed revision to Section 2-53, which provides that an application for reinstatement may not be considered until twelve years have elapsed from the date of an order disbarring an attorney for misappropriation of funds.

Sec. 2-50. Records of Statewide Grievance Committee, Reviewing Committee, and Grievance Panel [and Bar Examining Committee]

- [(a) The records and transcripts, if any, of hearings conducted by the state bar examining committee or the several standing committees on recommendations for admission to the bar shall be available only to such committee or to a judge of the superior court or to the statewide grievance committee or, with the consent of the applicant, to any other person, unless otherwise ordered by the court.
- (b) For purposes of this section, the record in a grievance proceeding shall consist of the following: (1) the grievance panel's record, (2) the reviewing committee's record, (3) any statement submitted to the statewide grievance committee concerning a proposed decision, (4) any request submitted to the statewide grievance committee concerning a reviewing committee decision, and (5) the decision and record, if any, of the statewide grievance committee or reviewing committee. The statewide grievance committee shall maintain the record of each grievance proceeding, including presentments. All such records pertaining to grievance complaints that have been filed on or after July 1, 1986, and that have not been dismissed by a grievance panel, by the statewide grievance committee or by a reviewing committee, shall be public. All such records pertaining to grievance complaints that have been filed on or after July 1, 1986, and that have been dismissed by a grievance panel, by the statewide grievance committee or by a reviewing committee shall be available only to such committee or its counsel, to reviewing committees, to grievance panels, to a judge of the superior court, to the standing committee on recommendations for admission to the bar, or, with the consent of the respondent, to any other person, unless otherwise ordered by the court. For all complaints filed on or after July 1, 1986, the following shall be public records: (1) the grievance panel's probable cause determination, (2) the reviewing committee's proposed or final decision, (3) the statewide grievance committee's decision and (4) transcripts of hearings held following a determination that probable cause exists except that records of complaints dismissed pursuant to Section 2-32 (a) (2) shall not be public. For purposes of this section, all grievance complaints that are pending before a grievance panel on July 1, 1986, shall be deemed to have been filed on that date. Notwithstanding the above, in any proceeding which has been concluded by: (A) a final decision of the statewide grievance committee or a reviewing committee thereof or a grievance panel dismissing the complaint; or (B) a final judgment of the superior court, after all appeals are exhausted, in a proceeding under Section 2-38 rescinding a reprimand, including a judgment directed on an appeal from the superior court; or (C) a final judgment of the superior court in favor of a respondent, after all appeals are exhausted, in a proceeding commenced pursuant to Sections 2-36, 2-39 through 2-46, and Sections 2-47 or 2-52, including a judgment directed on an appeal from the superior court, all records of the statewide grievance committee, a grievance panel and any disciplinary counsel shall not be made public. Nothing in this rule shall prohibit the use or consideration of such records in any subsequent disciplinary or client security fund proceeding pertaining to the respondent and such records shall be available in such proceedings to a judge of the superior court or to the standing committee on recommendations for admission to the bar, to disciplinary counsel, to the statewide bar counsel or assistant bar counsel, or, with the consent of the respondent, to any other person, unless otherwise ordered by the court.
- (c) Any respondent who shall have been the subject of a complaint in which the respondent was misidentified and which has been dismissed shall be deemed to have never been subject to disciplinary proceedings with respect to that complaint and may so swear under oath.

- (d) The records and decisions pertaining to grievance complaints that have been decided by a local grievance committee prior to July 1, 1986, shall be available only to the statewide grievance committee or its counsel, to reviewing committees, to grievance panels, to a judge of the superior court, to the standing committee on recommendations for admission to the bar, or, with the consent of the respondent, to any other person, unless otherwise ordered by the court.]
- (a) The statewide grievance committee shall maintain the record of each grievance proceeding. The record in a grievance proceeding shall consist of the following:
 - (1) The grievance panel's record as set forth in Section 2-32(i);
 - (2) The reviewing committee's record as set forth in Section 2-35(e);
 - (3) The statewide grievance committee's record;
- (4) Any probable cause determinations issued by the statewide grievance committee or a reviewing committee;
- (5) Transcripts of hearings held before the statewide grievance committee or a reviewing committee;
 - (6) The reviewing committee's proposed decision;
- (7) Any statement submitted to the statewide grievance committee concerning a proposed decision;
 - (8) The statewide grievance committee's final decision;
 - (9) The reviewing committee's final decision;
- (10) Any request for review submitted to the statewide grievance committee concerning a reviewing committee's decision; and
 - (11) The statewide grievance committee's decision on the request for review.
- (b) The following records of the statewide grievance committee shall be non-public:
- (1) All records pertaining to grievance complaints that have been decided by a local grievance committee prior to July 1, 1986.
- (2) All records pertaining to grievance complaints that have been filed on or after July 1, 1986, and that have been dismissed by a grievance panel, by the statewide grievance committee or by a reviewing committee. For purposes of this section, all grievance complaints that were pending before a grievance panel on July 1, 1986 shall be deemed to have been filed on that date.
 - (3) All records of complaints dismissed pursuant to Section 2-32(a)(2).
- (4) All records of the statewide grievance committee and grievance panels pertaining to grievance proceedings that have been concluded by: (A) a final judgment of the superior court, after all appeals are exhausted, in a proceeding under Section 2-38 rescinding a reprimand, including a judgment directed on an appeal from the superior court; (B) a final judgment of the superior court, after all appeals are exhausted, in a proceeding commenced pursuant to Section 2-47, dismissing a presentment, including a judgment directed on an appeal from the superior court; or (C) a final judgment of the superior court, after all appeals are exhausted, dismissing a proceeding commenced pursuant to Sections 2-39 through 2-46 or Section 2-52, including a judgment directed on an appeal from the superior court.
- (5) All records of pending grievance complaints in which probable cause has not yet been determined.
- (c) Unless otherwise ordered by the court, all non-public records shall be available only to the statewide grievance committee or its counsel, the reviewing committees, the grievance panels or their counsel, the standing committee on recommendations for admission to the bar, disciplinary counsel, the client security fund committee or its counsel, a judge of the superior court, a judge of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, any grievance committee or other disciplinary authority of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut or, with the consent of the respondent, to any other person. Such records may be used or

considered in any subsequent disciplinary or client security fund proceeding pertaining to the respondent.

- (d) The following records of the statewide grievance committee shall be public:
- (1) Prior to a final decision being issued by the statewide grievance committee or a reviewing committee, the following portions of the record: (A) the grievance panel's probable cause determination(s); (B) any probable cause determination(s) issued by the statewide grievance committee or a reviewing committee and, (C) transcripts of any public hearings held following a determination that probable cause exists.
- (2) After a final decision has been issued by the statewide grievance committee or a reviewing committee, all records pertaining to grievance complaints that have been filed on or after July 1, 1986, and that have not been dismissed or are not otherwise classified by this rule as non-public.
- (e) Any respondent who was the subject of a complaint in which the respondent was misidentified and the complaint was dismissed shall be deemed to have never been subject to disciplinary proceedings with respect to that complaint and may so swear under oath.

COMMENTARY: The above changes clarify and simplify this section. That part of this section that pertained to records of the bar examining committee has been amended and transferred to new Section 2-4A.

Sec. 2-53. Reinstatement after Suspension, Disbarment or Resignation

- (a) No application for reinstatement or readmission shall be considered by the court unless the applicant, inter alia, states under oath in the application that he or she has successfully fulfilled all conditions imposed on him or her as a part of the applicant's discipline. However, if an applicant asserts that a certain condition is impossible to fulfill, he or she may apply, stating that assertion and the basis therefor. It is the applicant's burden to prove at the hearing on reinstatement or readmission the impossibility of the certain condition. Any application for reinstatement or readmission to the bar shall contain a statement by the applicant indicating whether such applicant has previously applied for reinstatement or readmission and if so, when. The application shall be referred, by the court to which it is brought, to the standing committee on recommendations for admission to the bar that has jurisdiction over the judicial district court location in which the applicant was suspended or disbarred or resigned, and notice of the pendency of such application shall be given to the state's attorney of that judicial district, the chair of the grievance panel whose jurisdiction includes that judicial district court location, the statewide grievance committee, the attorney or attorneys appointed by the court pursuant to Section 2-64, and to all complainants whose complaints against the attorney resulted in the discipline for which the attorney was disbarred or suspended or resigned, and it shall also be published in the Connecticut Law Journal. The standing committee on recommendations shall investigate the application, hold hearings pertaining thereto and render a report with its recommendations to the court. The court shall thereupon inform the chief justice of the supreme court of the pending application and report, and the chief justice shall designate two other judges of the superior court to sit with the judge presiding at the session. Such three judges, or a majority of them, shall determine whether the application should be granted.
- (b) The standing committee shall notify the presiding judge, no later than fourteen days prior to the court hearing, if the committee will not be represented by counsel at the hearing and, upon such notification, the presiding judge may appoint, in his or her discretion, an attorney to review the issue of reinstatement and report his or her findings to the court. The attorney so appointed shall be compensated in accordance with a fee schedule approved by the executive committee of the superior court.

- (c) The applicant shall pay to the clerk of the superior court \$200 at the time his or her application is filed. This sum shall be expended in the manner provided by Section 2-22 of these rules. If the petition for readmission or reinstatement is denied, the reasons therefor shall be stated on the record or put in writing. The attorney may not reapply for six months following the denial.
- (d) An attorney who has been suspended from the practice of law in this state for a period of one year or more shall be required to apply for reinstatement in accordance with this section, unless the court that imposed the discipline specifically provided in its order that such application is not required. An attorney who has been suspended for less than one year need not file an application for reinstatement, unless otherwise ordered by the court at the time the discipline was imposed.
- (e) In no event shall an application for reinstatement by an attorney disbarred pursuant to the provisions of Section 2-47A be considered until after twelve years from the date of the order disbarring the attorney. No such application may be granted unless the attorney provides satisfactory evidence that full restitution has been made of all sums found to be knowingly misappropriated.

COMMENTARY: The above change requires that an application for reinstatement may not be considered until twelve years have elapsed from the date of an order disbarring an attorney pursuant to proposed new Section 2-47A for misappropriation of funds.

Sec. 2-76. —Confidentiality

- (a) Claims, proceedings and reports involving claims for reimbursement for losses caused by the dishonest conduct of attorneys are confidential until the client security fund committee authorizes a disbursement to the claimant, at which time the committee may disclose the name of the claimant, the attorney whose conduct produced the claim and the amount of the reimbursement. However, the client security fund committee may provide access to relevant information regarding such claims to the statewide grievance committee, grievance panels [and], to law enforcement agencies, to the office of the chief disciplinary counsel, and to a judge of the superior court. The client security fund committee may also disclose such information to any attorney retained or employed by the committee to protect the interests of the client security fund or the committee in any state or federal action in which the interests of the committee or the fund may be at issue, and may disclose such information as may be necessary to protect the rights of the committee in any action or proceeding in which the committee's right to receive restitution pursuant to Sections 2-80 or 2-81 is at issue. The client security fund committee may also provide statistical information regarding claims which does not disclose the names of claimants and attorneys until a disbursement is authorized.
- (b) All information given or received in connection with the provision of crisis intervention and referral assistance under these rules shall be subject to the provisions of General Statutes § 51-81d (f).

COMMENTARY: The above changes permit disclosure of relevant information concerning claims for reimbursement for losses caused by the dishonest conduct of attorneys filed with the client security fund to the office of chief disciplinary counsel and to a judge of the Superior Court, in addition to the statewide grievance committee, grievance panels, and law enforcement agencies. The rule previously did not expressly permit disclosure of relevant information to the chief disciplinary counsel's office or a judge of the superior court. In addition, the amendment to the rule expressly permits the committee to provide access to relevant information to counsel retained or employed to protect the interests of the committee or the client security fund in litigation. Finally, the committee will be permitted to disclose such information as will reasonably be necessary to protect the fund's interests in proceedings or actions affecting the committee's right to receive restitution after paying a claim.

Sec. 2-82. Admission of Misconduct; Discipline by Consent

(a) [A respondent against whom a complaint has been filed and in connection with which probable cause has been found that the respondent is guilty of misconduct may tender a conditional admission to the complaint, or a portion thereof, to the disciplinary counsel to whom the case has been referred. The disciplinary counsel shall review the complaint and the conditional admission, shall determine the sanctions to which the respondent may be subject, and shall discuss and may negotiate a disposition of the complaint with the respondent or, if the respondent is represented by an attorney, with the respondent's attorney. The complaint, the record in the matter and the conditional admission shall be submitted to the court for approval in matters involving suspension or disbarment and to a reviewing committee of the statewide grievance committee in all other matters. If, after a hearing, the conditional admission is accepted by the court or the reviewing committee, the discipline to be imposed shall be determined by the court or reviewing committee and shall be as prescribed by these rules. If the conditional admission is not accepted by the court or the reviewing committee, it shall be withdrawn, shall not be made public and shall not be used against the respondent in any subsequent proceedings.]

The disciplinary counsel to whom a complaint is forwarded after a finding that probable cause exists that the respondent is guilty of misconduct may negotiate a proposed disposition of the complaint with the respondent or, if the respondent is represented by an attorney, with the respondent's attorney. Such a proposed disposition shall be based upon the respondent's admission of misconduct, which shall consist of either (1) an admission by the respondent that the material facts alleged in the complaint, or a portion thereof describing one or more acts of misconduct to which the admission relates, are true, or (2) if the respondent denies some or all of such material facts, an acknowledgment by the respondent that there is sufficient evidence to prove such material facts by clear and convincing evidence.

(b) [If a respondent has tendered to the disciplinary counsel a conditional admission to the complaint, or a portion thereof, and if the disciplinary counsel and the respondent agree to the form of discipline to be imposed, the complaint, the record in the matter, the conditional admission and the agreement concerning the form of discipline to be imposed shall be submitted to the court for approval in matters involving suspension or disbarment and to a reviewing committee of the statewide grievance committee in all other matters. If, after a hearing, the form of discipline agreed to is approved by the court or the reviewing committee, the imposition of discipline shall be made public in the manner prescribed by these rules. If the form of discipline agreed to is rejected by the court or the reviewing committee, the conditional admission and the agreement shall be withdrawn, shall not be made public and shall not be used against the respondent in any subsequent proceedings.]

If disciplinary counsel and the respondent agree to a proposed disposition of the matter, they shall place their agreement in writing and submit it, together with the complaint, the record in the matter, and the respondent's underlying admission of misconduct, for approval as follows: (i) by the court, in all matters involving possible suspension or disbarment, or possible imposition of a period of probation or other sanctions beyond the authority of the statewide grievance committee, as set forth in section 2-37; or (ii) by a reviewing committee of the statewide grievance committee, in all other matters. If, after a hearing, the admission of misconduct is accepted and the proposed disposition is approved by the court or the reviewing committee, the matter shall be disposed of in the manner agreed to. If any resulting admission of misconduct or proposed disposition is rejected by the court or the reviewing committee, the admission of misconduct and proposed disposition shall be withdrawn, shall not be made public, and shall not be used against the respondent in

any subsequent proceedings. In that event, the matter shall be referred for further proceedings to a different judicial authority or reviewing committee, as appropriate.

- (c) If disciplinary counsel and the respondent are unable to agree to a proposed disposition of the matter, the respondent may nonetheless tender an admission of misconduct, which shall be in accordance with subdivision (a) of this section. If such an admission of misconduct without proposed disposition is tendered, disciplinary counsel shall cause it to be forwarded, together with the complaint and the record in the matter, for consideration, possible acceptance and disposition as follows: (i) by the court, in all matters involving possible suspension or disbarment, or possible imposition of a period of probation or other sanctions beyond the authority of the statewide grievance committee, as set forth in section 2-37; or (ii) by a reviewing committee of the statewide grievance committee, in all other matters. If, after a hearing, the admission of misconduct is accepted by the court or the reviewing committee, the matter shall be disposed of and any resulting imposition of discipline shall be made public in the manner prescribed by these rules. If the admission of misconduct is rejected by the court or the reviewing committee, it shall be withdrawn, shall not be made public, and shall not be used against the respondent in any subsequent proceedings. In that event, the matter shall be referred for further proceedings to a different judicial authority or reviewing committee, as appropriate.
- [(c)](d) A respondent who tenders an [conditional] admission of misconduct [to the complaint] and, if applicable, [his or her consent to the form of discipline] enters with disciplinary counsel into a proposed disposition of the matter, shall present to the court or the reviewing committee an affidavit stating the following:
- (1) That [T]the [conditional] admission of misconduct and, if applicable, the [consent to the form of discipline] proposed disposition are freely and voluntarily submitted; that the respondent is not [being subjected to] making the admission of misconduct and, if applicable, the proposed disposition, as a result of any threats or other coercion or duress, or any promises or other inducements not set forth in the proposed disposition; that the respondent is fully aware of the [implications] consequences of such submissions;
- (2) That [T]the respondent is aware that there is presently pending a complaint [or an investigation into, or proceeding involving, allegations that there exist grounds for discipline, the nature of which shall be specifically set forth], in connection with which probable cause has been found that the respondent committed the following acts of misconduct: (list specific acts); and
- (3) Either (i) that [T]the respondent [acknowledges] admits that the material facts [so] alleged in the complaint, or in that portion thereof to which the respondent's admission relates, are true, or (ii) if the respondent denies some or all of such material facts, that the respondent acknowledges that there is sufficient evidence to prove such material facts by clear and convincing evidence.
- (e) The disciplinary counsel may recommend dismissal of acts of misconduct alleged in the complaint that are not admitted by the respondent. The respondent's admission of some acts of misconduct shall not foreclose the disciplinary counsel from pursuing discipline based upon other acts of misconduct alleged in the complaint.
- [(d)](f) Prior to acceptance by the court or the reviewing committee of the conditional admission of misconduct, the proposed disposition of the matter, if applicable, and the imposition of any discipline, the complainant will be given the right to comment thereon.
- [(e) The conditional admission and, if applicable, the consent to the form of discipline shall not be submitted to the judicial authority or reviewing committee before which the underlying complaint is pending.]

(g) In any disciplinary proceeding where respondent already has other disciplinary matters pending before a court, either pursuant to an order of interim suspension under section 2-42, or pursuant to a presentment filed under sections 2-35, 2-40, 2-41 or 2-47, the respondent and disciplinary counsel may agree to a presentment. Respondent and disciplinary counsel shall stipulate that the order of presentment is requested for the purpose of consolidating all pending disciplinary matters before the court.

COMMENTARY: The above changes allow respondents to offer to accept discipline without having to compromise important rights and benefits that may be impacted by admitting that the material facts alleged in the complaint are true. The changes also add probation as a disciplinary remedy, clarify when matters may be filed with the courts as opposed to with the grievance committee, and allow respondents with multiple cases to agree with disciplinary counsel to consolidate all pending cases.

Sec. 3-9. Withdrawal of Appearance; Duration of Appearance

- (a) An attorney or party whose appearance has been filed shall be deemed to have withdrawn such appearance upon failure to file a written objection within ten days after written notice has been given or mailed to such attorney or party that a new appearance has been filed in place of the appearance of such attorney or party in accordance with Section 3-8.
- (b) An attorney may withdraw his or her appearance for a party or parties in any action after the appearance of other counsel representing the same party or parties has been entered. An application for withdrawal in accordance with this subsection shall state that such an appearance has been entered and that such party or parties are being represented by such other counsel at the time of the application. Such an application may be granted by the clerk as of course, if such an appearance by other counsel has been entered.
- (c) All appearances of counsel shall be deemed to have been withdrawn 180 days after the entry of judgment in any action seeking a dissolution of marriage or civil union, annulment, or legal separation, provided no appeal shall have been taken. In the event of an appeal or the filing of a motion to open a judgment within such 180 days, all appearances of counsel shall be deemed to have been withdrawn after final judgment on such appeal or motion or within 180 days after the entry of the original judgment, whichever is later. Nothing herein shall preclude or prevent any attorney from filing a motion to withdraw with leave of the court during that period subsequent to the entry of judgment. In the absence of a specific withdrawal, counsel will continue of record for all postjudgment purposes until 180 days have elapsed from the entry of judgment or, in the event an appeal or a motion to open a judgment is filed within such 180 day period, until final judgment on that appeal or determination of that motion, whichever is later.
- (d) Except as provided in subsections (a), (b) and (c), no attorney shall withdraw his or her appearance after it has been entered upon the record of the court without the leave of the court.
- (e) All appearances in juvenile matters shall be deemed to continue during the period of delinquency or family with service needs probation or supervision, or during the period of any commitment or protective supervision or during the period until final adoption following termination of parental rights; however, in the absence of a specific request, no attorney appointed in a prior proceeding shall automatically continue to represent the parent for any subsequent petition to terminate parental rights. The attorney shall represent the client in connection with appeals, subject to Section 35-4 (b), and with petitions for extensions, revocations or postjudgment motions and shall have access to any documents filed in court. The attorney for the

child shall continue to represent the child in all proceedings relating to the child, including termination of parental rights.

COMMENTARY: The above change is made in light of Public Act 05-10, an act that authorizes same sex civil unions.

Sec. 6-2. Judgment Files; Captions and Contents

The name and residence of every party to the action, at the date of judgment, must be given in the caption of every judgment file. In the captions of pleas, answers, etc., the parties may be described as John Doe v. Richard Roe et al., but this will not be sufficient in a judgment file, which must give all the data necessary for use in drawing any execution that may be necessary. All judgment files in actions for dissolution of marriage or civil union, legal separation and annulment shall state the date and place, including the city or town, of the marriage and the jurisdictional facts as found by the judicial authority upon the hearing.

COMMENTARY: The above change is made in light of Public Act 05-10, an act that authorizes same sex civil unions.

Sec. 6-3. —Preparation; When; By Whom; Filing

- (a) Judgment files in civil, criminal, family and juvenile cases shall be prepared when: (1) an appeal is taken; (2) a party requests in writing that the judgment be incorporated into a judgment file; (3) a judgment has been entered involving the granting of a dissolution of marriage or civil union, a legal separation, an annulment, injunctive relief, or title to property (including actions to quiet title but excluding actions of foreclosure), except in those instances where judgment is entered in such cases pursuant to Section 14-3 and no appeal has been taken from the judicial authority's judgment; (4) a judgment has been entered in a juvenile matter involving neglect, uncared for, dependent, termination, commitment of a delinquent child or commitment of a child from a family with service needs; (5) in criminal cases, sentence review is requested; or (6) ordered by the judicial authority.
- (b) Unless otherwise ordered by the judicial authority, the judgment file in juvenile cases shall be prepared by the clerk and in all other cases, in the clerk's discretion, by counsel or the clerk. As to judgments of foreclosure, the clerk's office shall prepare a certificate of judgment in accordance with a form prescribed by the chief court administrator only when requested in the event of a redemption.
 - (c) Judgment files in family cases shall be filed within sixty days of judgment.

COMMENTARY: The above change is made in light of Public Act 05-10, an act that authorizes same sex civil unions.

Sec. 6-4. —Signing of Judgment File

- (a) Except as hereinafter provided, the judgment file, where it is necessary that it be prepared pursuant to Section 6-3, shall be signed by the clerk or assistant clerk unless otherwise ordered by the judicial authority.
- (b) In all actions involving dissolution of marriage <u>or civil union</u> where counsel have appeared for both the plaintiff and the defendant, unless the judicial authority shall order otherwise, counsel for the parties shall endorse their approval of the judgment file immediately below the line for the subscribing authority in the following words: "I hereby certify that the foregoing judgment file conforms to the judgment entered by the court"; the clerk or assistant clerk, after ascertaining that the terms of the judgment have been correctly incorporated into the judgment file, may sign any judgment file so endorsed.
- (c) In those cases in which there is no provision in this section for a clerk to sign a judgment file and in which a case has been tried and judgment has been directed in open court or by memorandum of decision and the trial judge shall die or become

incapacitated before the judgment file is signed, any judge holding such court may examine the docket and file and, if it appears therefrom that the issues have been definitely decided and that the only thing remaining to be done is the signing of the judgment file, the judgment file may be drawn up by that judge or under that judge's direction and signed by him or her.

(d) Whenever a clerk or assistant clerk signs a judgment file, the signer's name shall be legibly typed or printed beneath such signature.

COMMENTARY: The above change is made in light of Public Act 05-10, an act that authorizes same sex civil unions.

Sec. 7-11. —Judgments on the Merits—Stripping and Retention

- (a) With the exception of actions which affect the title to land and actions which have been disposed of pursuant to Section 7-10, the files in civil, family and juvenile actions in which judgment has been rendered may be stripped and destroyed pursuant to the schedule set forth in subsection (d) below, except that requests relating to discovery, responses and objections thereto may be stripped after the expiration of the appeal period.
 - (b) When a file is to be stripped, all papers in the file shall be destroyed except:
- (1) The complaint, including any amendment thereto, substituted complaint or amended complaint;
 - (2) All orders of notice, appearances and officers' returns;
 - (3) All military or other affidavits;
 - (4) Any cross complaint, third-party complaint, or amendment thereto;
 - (5) All responsive pleadings;
 - (6) Any memorandum of decision;
- (7) The judgment file or notation of the entry of judgment, and all modifications of judgment;
 - (8) All executions issued and returned.
- (c) Upon the expiration of the stripping date, or at any time if facilities are not available for local retention, the file in any action set forth in subsection (d) may be transferred to the records center or other proper designated storage area, where it shall be retained for the balance of the retention period. Files in actions concerning dissolution of marriage or civil union, legal separation, or annulment may, upon agreement with officials of the state library, be transferred to the state library at the expiration of their retention period.
- (d) The following is a schedule which sets forth when a file may be stripped and the length of time the file shall be retained. The time periods indicated below shall run from the date judgment is rendered except receivership actions or actions for injunctive relief which shall run from the date of the termination of the receivership or injunction.

	Type of Case	Stripping Date	Retention Date
(1)	Administrative appeals		3 years
(2)	Contracts (where money damages are not awarded)	1 year	20 years
(3)	Eminent domain (except as provided in Section 7-12)		10 years
(4)	Family -Dissolution of marriage, or civil union, legal separation, annulment and change of name	5 years	75 years

	-Delinquency		TT-411 - 1-14 1- 05
	Definquency		Until subject is 25 years of age
	-Family With Service Needs		Until subject is 25 years of age
	-Termination of parental rights -Neglect and uncared for -Emancipation of minor -Orders in relief from physical abuse (General Statutes § 46b-15)		Permanent 75 years 5 years 5 years
	-Other		75 years
(5)	Family support magistrate matters -Uniform reciprocal enforcement of support (General Statutes §§ 46b-180 through 46b-211)		75 years 6 years after youngest child reaches majority age or after activity ceases, whichever is shorter, subject to federal law on filing an amended tax return.
	-Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (General Statutes §§ 46b-212 through 46b-213v)		6 years after youn- gest child reaches majority age or after activity ceases, whichever is shorter, subject to
			federal law on filing an amended tax return.
(6)	Landlord/Tenant -Summary process		an amended tax
(6)			an amended tax return.
(6)	-Summary process -Housing code enforcement (Gen-	1 year	an amended tax return.
(6)	-Summary process -Housing code enforcement (General Statutes § 47a-14h) -Contracts/Leases (where money	1 year 1 year	an amended tax return. 3 years 5 years
(6)	-Summary process -Housing code enforcement (General Statutes § 47a-14h) -Contracts/Leases (where money damages are not awarded) -Money damages (except where a satisfaction of judgment has been filed) Miscellaneous	•	an amended tax return. 3 years 5 years 20 years 26 years
	-Summary process -Housing code enforcement (General Statutes § 47a-14h) -Contracts/Leases (where money damages are not awarded) -Money damages (except where a satisfaction of judgment has been filed)	•	an amended tax return. 3 years 5 years 20 years
	-Summary process -Housing code enforcement (General Statutes § 47a-14h) -Contracts/Leases (where money damages are not awarded) -Money damages (except where a satisfaction of judgment has been filed) Miscellaneous -Bar discipline -Money damages (except where a satisfaction of judgment has	1 year	an amended tax return. 3 years 5 years 20 years 26 years
	-Summary process -Housing code enforcement (General Statutes § 47a-14h) -Contracts/Leases (where money damages are not awarded) -Money damages (except where a satisfaction of judgment has been filed) Miscellaneous -Bar discipline -Money damages (except where a satisfaction of judgment has been filed) -Mandamus, habeas corpus, arbitration, petition for new trial, action for an accounting, inter-	1 year	an amended tax return. 3 years 5 years 20 years 26 years 50 years 26 years
	-Summary process -Housing code enforcement (General Statutes § 47a-14h) -Contracts/Leases (where money damages are not awarded) -Money damages (except where a satisfaction of judgment has been filed) Miscellaneous -Bar discipline -Money damages (except where a satisfaction of judgment has been filed) -Mandamus, habeas corpus, arbitration, petition for new trial, action for an accounting, interpleader -Injunctive relief (where no other	1 year	an amended tax return. 3 years 5 years 20 years 26 years 50 years 26 years 10 years
(7)	-Summary process -Housing code enforcement (General Statutes § 47a-14h) -Contracts/Leases (where money damages are not awarded) -Money damages (except where a satisfaction of judgment has been filed) Miscellaneous -Bar discipline -Money damages (except where a satisfaction of judgment has been filed) -Mandamus, habeas corpus, arbitration, petition for new trial, action for an accounting, interpleader -Injunctive relief (where no other relief is requested)	1 year	an amended tax return. 3 years 5 years 20 years 26 years 10 years 5 years

(11)	Torts (except as noted below) -Money damages if the judgment was rendered in an action to recover damages for personal injury caused by sexual assault where the party at fault was con- victed under General Statutes §§ 53a-70 or 53a-70a (except where a satisfaction of judgment has been filed)	1 year	26 years Permanent
(12)	Wills and estates		10 years
(13)	Asset forfeiture (General Statutes § 54-36h)		10 years
(14)	Alcohol and drug commitment (General Statutes § 17a-685)		10 years
(15)	All other civil actions (except as provided in Section 7-12)		75 years

AMENDMENTS TO THE CIVIL RULES

(NEW) Sec. 14-7A. Withdrawal or Settlement of Zoning and Inland Wetlands Appeals to Superior Court

No appeal under General Statutes, §§ 8-8 or 22a-43 shall be withdrawn and no settlement between the parties to any such appeal shall be effective unless and until a hearing has been held before the superior court and such court has approved such proposed withdrawal or settlement. No decision that is appealed under General Statutes, §§ 8-8 or 22a-43 shall be modified by settlement or stipulated judgment unless the terms of the settlement or stipulated judgment have been approved at a public meeting of the municipal agency that issued the decision. The proposed settlement shall be identified on the agenda of such meeting, which agenda shall be posted in accordance with the applicable requirements of General Statutes, §§ 1-210 et seq., and the reasons for such approval shall be stated on the record during such public meeting of such agency and before the court. The court may inquire about the procedure followed by the agency, inquire of the parties whether settlement was reached by coercion or intimidation, and consider any other factors that the court deems appropriate. No notice of the court proceeding other than normal publication of the calendar and notice to the parties is required unless otherwise ordered by the court.

COMMENTARY: The above rule is intended to make uniform the procedure to be followed with regard to the withdrawal or settlement of zoning and inland wetland appeals to the Superior Court.

Sec. 17-11. Offer of [Judgment] Compromise by Defendant; How Made

In any action on contract, or seeking the recovery of money damages, whether or not other relief is sought, the defendant may not later than thirty days before the commencement of jury selection in a jury trial or before the commencement of evidence in a court trial file with the clerk of the court a written [notice] offer of compromise signed by the defendant or the defendant's attorney, directed to the plaintiff or the plaintiff's attorney, offering to [allow the plaintiff to take judgment for the sum named in such notice] settle the claim underlying the action for a sum certain.

COMMENTARY: The changes to Sections 17-11 through 17-18 are intended to adopt certain provisions of Public Act 05-275.

Sec. 17-12. —Acceptance of Defendant's Offer

The plaintiff may, within [ten] <u>sixty</u> days after being notified by the defendant of the filing of [such] <u>an</u> offer <u>of</u> compromise, file with the clerk of the court a written acceptance of [such] <u>the</u> offer signed by the plaintiff or the plaintiff's attorney agreeing to settle the underlying action for the sum certain specified in the defendant's <u>offer</u> of compromise. [Such] <u>Upon the filing of the</u> written acceptance [being filed, the judicial authority shall render judgment against the defendant as upon default for the sum so named and for the costs accrued at the time of the defendant's giving the plaintiff notice of such offer] <u>and receipt by the plaintiff of such sum certain, the plaintiff shall file a withdrawal of the action with the clerk of the court and the clerk shall record the withdrawal of the action against the defendant accordingly. No trial shall be postponed because the period within which the plaintiff may accept such offer has not expired, except at the discretion of the judicial authority.</u>

Sec. 17-13. —Defendant's Offer Not Accepted

If the plaintiff does not, within [said] the time allowed for acceptance of the offer of compromise and before any evidence is offered at the trial, file [a] the plaintiff's notice of acceptance, [such] the offer shall be deemed to be withdrawn and shall not be given in evidence; and the plaintiff, unless recovering more than the sum [named] specified in [such] the offer, with interest from its date, shall recover no costs accruing after [having] the plaintiff received notice of the filing of such offer, but shall pay the defendant's costs accruing after said time. Such costs may include reasonable attorney's fees in an amount not to exceed \$350. Nothing in this section shall be interpreted to abrogate the contractual rights of any party concerning the recovery of attorney's fees in accordance with the provisions of any written contract between the parties to the action. The provisions of this section shall not apply to cases in which nominal damages have been assessed upon a hearing after a default or after a motion to strike has been denied.

Sec. 17-14. Offer of [Judgment] Compromise by Plaintiff; How Made

After commencement of any civil action based upon contract or seeking the recovery of money damages, whether or not other relief is sought, the plaintiff may, not earlier than one hundred eighty days after service of process is made upon the defendant in such action but not later than thirty days before the commencement of jury selection in a jury trial or the commencement of evidence in a court trial, file with the clerk of the court a written ['offer of judgment'] offer of compromise signed by the plaintiff or the plaintiff's attorney, directed to the defendant or the defendant's attorney, offering to settle the claim underlying [such] the action [and to stipulate to a judgment] for a sum certain. The plaintiff shall give notice of such offer of [settlement] compromise to the defendant's attorney, or if the defendant is not represented by an attorney, to the defendant.

(NEW) Sec. 17-14A. —Alleged Negligence of Health Care Provider

In the case of any action to recover damages resulting from personal injury or wrongful death, whether in tort or in contract, in which it is alleged that such injury or death resulted from the negligence of a health care provider, an offer of compromise pursuant to Section 17-14 shall state with specificity all damages then known to the plaintiff or the plaintiff's attorney upon which the action is based. At least sixty days prior to filing such an offer, the plaintiff or the plaintiff's attorney shall provide the defendant or the defendant's attorney with an authorization to disclose medical records that meets the privacy provisions of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-191) (HIPAA), as amended from time to time, or regulations adopted thereunder, and disclose any and all expert

witnesses who will testify as to the prevailing professional standard of care. The plaintiff shall file with the court a certification that the plaintiff has provided each defendant or such defendant's attorney with all documentation supporting such damages.

Sec. 17-15. —Acceptance of Plaintiff's Offer

Within [sixty] thirty days after being notified of the filing of such ['offer of judgment''] offer of compromise and prior to the rendering of a verdict by the jury or an award by the judicial authority, the defendant or the defendant's attorney may file with the clerk of the court a written ['acceptance of offer of judgment''] acceptance of the offer of compromise agreeing to [a stipulation for judgment as contained in the plaintiff's "offer of judgment.''] settle the claim underlying the action for the sum certain specified in the plaintiff's offer. Upon such filing[, the judicial authority shall render judgment forthwith on the stipulation] and the receipt by the plaintiff of such sum certain, the plaintiff shall file a withdrawal of the action with the clerk and the clerk shall record the withdrawal of the action against the defendant accordingly.

Sec. 17-16. —Plaintiff's Offer Not Accepted

If such [''offer of judgment''] <u>offer of compromise</u> is not accepted within [sixty] <u>thirty</u> days and prior to the rendering of a verdict by the jury or an award by the judicial authority, such [''offer of judgment''] <u>offer of compromise</u> shall be considered rejected and not subject to acceptance unless refiled.

Sec. 17-17. —Offer of [Judgment] <u>Compromise</u> and Acceptance Included in Record

Any such ['offer of judgment''] offer of compromise and any ['acceptance of offer of judgment''] acceptance of the offer of compromise shall be included by the clerk in the record of the case.

Sec. 17-18. —Judgment where Plaintiff Recovers an Amount Equal to or Greater than Offer

After trial the judicial authority shall examine the record to determine whether the plaintiff made an [''offer of judgment''] offer of compromise which the defendant failed to accept. If the judicial authority ascertains from the record that the plaintiff has recovered an amount equal to or greater than the sum certain [stated] specified in that plaintiff's [''offer of judgment,''] offer of compromise, the judicial authority shall add to the amount so recovered [12] 8 percent annual interest on said amount, computed as provided in General Statutes § 52-192a, may award reasonable attorney's fees in an amount not to exceed \$350, and shall render judgment accordingly. Nothing in this section shall be interpreted to abrogate the contractual rights of any party concerning the recovery of attorney's fees in accordance with the provisions of any written contract between the parties to the action.

Sec. 19-1. Application of Chapter

The provisions of this chapter shall govern the procedure in matters, except dissolution of marriage or civil union, legal separation, annulment, and juvenile matters, referred to committees, state referees and senior judges, attorney trial referees, and, so far as applicable, to auditors, appraisers or other persons designated to make reports to the court.

COMMENTARY: The above change is made in light of Public Act 05-10, an act that authorizes same sex civil unions.

AMENDMENTS TO THE FAMILY RULES

Sec. 25-1. Definitions Applicable to Proceedings on Family Matters

The following shall be ''family matters'' within the scope of these rules: Any actions brought pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-1, including but not limited to dissolution of marriage or civil union, legal separation, dissolution of marriage or civil union after legal separation, annulment of marriage or civil union, alimony, support, custody, and change of name incident to dissolution of marriage or civil union, habeas corpus and other proceedings to determine the custody and visitation of children except those which are properly filed in the superior court as juvenile matters, the establishing of paternity, enforcement of foreign matrimonial or civil union judgments, actions related to prenuptial or pre-civil union and separation agreements and to matrimonial or civil union decrees of a foreign jurisdiction, actions brought pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-15, custody proceedings brought under the provisions of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and proceedings for enforcement of support brought under the provisions of the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act.

COMMENTARY: The above change is made in light of Public Act 05-10, an act that authorizes same sex civil unions.

Sec. 25-2. Complaints for Dissolution of Marriage <u>or Civil Union</u>, Legal Separation, or Annulment

- (a) Every complaint in a dissolution of marriage <u>or civil union</u>, legal separation or annulment action shall state the date and place, including the city or town, of the marriage and the facts necessary to give the court jurisdiction.
- (b) Every such complaint shall also state whether there are minor children issue of the marriage and whether there are any other minor children born to the wife since the date of marriage of the parties, the name and date of birth of each, and the name of any individual or agency presently responsible by virtue of judicial award for the custody or support of any child. These requirements shall be met whether a child is issue of the marriage or not and whether custody of children is sought in the action. In every case in which the state of Connecticut or any town thereof is contributing or has contributed to the support or maintenance of a party or child of said party, such fact shall be stated in the complaint and a copy thereof served on the attorney general or town clerk in accordance with the provisions of Sections 10-12 through 10-17. Although the attorney general or town clerk shall be a party to such cases, he or she need not be named in the writ of summons or summoned to appear.
- (c) The complaint shall also set forth the plaintiff's demand for relief and the automatic orders as required by Section 25-5.

COMMENTARY: The above change is made in light of Public Act 05-10, an act that authorizes same sex civil unions.

Sec. 25-3. Action for Custody of Minor Child

Every application in an action for custody of a minor child, other than actions for dissolution of marriage or civil union, legal separation or annulment, shall state the name and date of birth of such minor child or children, the names of the parents and legal guardian of such minor child or children, and the facts necessary to give the court jurisdiction. The application shall comply with Section 25-5. Such application shall be commenced by an order to show cause. Upon presentation of the application and an affidavit concerning children, the judicial authority shall cause an order to be issued requiring the adverse party or parties to appear on a day certain and show cause, if any there be, why the relief requested in the application

should not be granted. The application, order and affidavit shall be served on the adverse party not less than twelve days before the date of the hearing, which shall not be held more than thirty days from the filing of the application.

COMMENTARY: The above change is made in light of Public Act 05-10, an act that authorizes same sex civil unions.

Sec. 25-4. Action for Visitation of Minor Child

Every application in an action for visitation of a minor child, other than actions for dissolution of marriage or civil union, legal separation or annulment, shall state the name and date of birth of such minor child or children, the names of the parents and legal guardian of such minor child or children, and the facts necessary to give the court jurisdiction. The application shall comply with Section 25-5. Such application shall be commenced by an order to show cause. Upon presentation of the application and an affidavit concerning children, the judicial authority shall cause an order to be issued requiring the adverse party or parties to appear on a day certain and show cause, if any there be, why the relief requested in the application should not be granted. The application, order and affidavit shall be served on the adverse party not less than twelve days before the date of the hearing, which shall not be held more than thirty days from the filing of the application.

COMMENTARY: The above change is made in light of Public Act 05-10, an act that authorizes same sex civil unions.

Sec. 25-5. Automatic Orders upon Service of Complaint or Application

- (a) The following automatic orders shall apply to both parties, with service of the automatic orders to be made with service of process of a complaint for dissolution of marriage or civil union, legal separation, or annulment, or of an application for custody or visitation. An automatic order shall not apply if there is a prior, contradictory order of a judicial authority. The automatic orders shall be effective with regard to the plaintiff or the applicant upon the signing of the complaint or the application and with regard to the defendant or the respondent upon service and shall remain in place during the pendency of the action, unless terminated, modified, or amended by further order of a judicial authority upon motion of either of the parties:
- (1) Neither party shall sell, transfer, encumber (except for the filing of a lis pendens), conceal, assign, remove, or in any way dispose of, without the consent of the other party in writing, or an order of a judicial authority, any property, individually or jointly held by the parties, except in the usual course of business or for customary and usual household expenses or for reasonable attorney's fees in connection with this action.
- (2) Neither party shall incur unreasonable debts hereafter, including, but not limited to, further borrowing against any credit line secured by the family residence, further encumbrancing any assets, or unreasonably using credit cards or cash advances against credit cards.
- (3) The parties shall each complete and exchange sworn financial statements substantially in accordance with a form prescribed by the chief court administrator within thirty days of the return day. The parties may thereafter enter and submit to the court a stipulated interim order allocating income and expenses, in accordance with the uniform child support guidelines.
- (4) The case management date for this case is ______. The parties shall comply with Section 25-50 to determine if their actual presence at the court is required on that date.
- (5) Neither party shall permanently remove the minor child or children from the state of Connecticut, without written consent of the other or order of a judicial authority.

- (6) The parties, if they share a minor child or children, shall participate in the parenting education program within sixty days of the return day or within sixty days from the filing of the application.
- (7) Neither party shall cause the other party or the children of the marriage to be removed from any medical, hospital and dental insurance coverage, and each party shall maintain the existing medical, hospital and dental insurance coverage in full force and effect.
- (8) Neither party shall change the beneficiaries of any existing life insurance policies, and each party shall maintain the existing life insurance, automobile insurance, homeowners or renters insurance policies in full force and effect.
- (9) If the parties are living together on the date of service of these orders, neither party may deny the other party use of the current primary residence of the parties, whether it be owned or rented property, without order of a judicial authority. This provision shall not apply if there is a prior, contradictory order of a judicial authority.
- (10) If the parties share a child or children, a party vacating the family residence shall notify the other party or the other party's attorney, in writing, within forty-eight hours of such move, of an address where the relocated party can receive communication. This provision shall not apply if there is a prior, contradictory order of a judicial authority.
- (11) If the parents of minor children live apart during this dissolution proceeding, they shall assist their children in having contact with both parties, which is consistent with the habits of the family, personally, by telephone, and in writing unless there is a prior order of a judicial authority.
- (b) The automatic orders of a judicial authority as enumerated in subsection (a) shall be set forth immediately following the party's requested relief in any complaint for dissolution of marriage or civil union, legal separation, or annulment, or in any application for custody or visitation, and shall set forth the following language in uppercase letters: FAILURE TO OBEY THESE ORDERS MAY BE PUNISHABLE BY CONTEMPT OF COURT. IF YOU OBJECT TO OR SEEK MODIFICATION OF THESE ORDERS DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE ACTION, YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO A HEARING BEFORE A JUDGE WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME. The clerk shall not accept for filing any complaint for dissolution of marriage or civil union, legal separation, or annulment, or any application for custody or visitation, that does not comply with this subsection.
- (c) The automatic orders of a judicial authority as enumerated in subdivisions (a) (1), (2), and (3) shall not apply in custody and visitation cases.

COMMENTARY: The above change is made in light of Public Act 05-10, an act that authorizes same sex civil unions.

Sec. 25-8. —Amendment; New Ground for Dissolution of Marriage or Civil Union

- (a) In any action for a dissolution of marriage <u>or civil union</u> an amendment to the complaint which states a ground for dissolution of marriage <u>or civil union</u> alleged to have arisen since the commencement of the action may be filed with permission of the judicial authority.
- (b) The provisions of Sections 10-59, 10-60 and 10-61 of the rules of practice shall apply to family matters as defined in Section 25-1.

COMMENTARY: The above change is made in light of Public Act 05-10, an act that authorizes same sex civil unions.

Sec. 25-9. —Answer, Cross Complaint, Claims for Relief by Defendant

The defendant in a dissolution of marriage or civil union, legal separation, or annulment matter may file, in addition to the above mentioned pleadings, one of the following pleadings which shall comply with Sections 10-1, 10-3, 10-5, 10-7, 10-8 and 10-12 through 10-17, 10-18 and 10-19 inclusive:

- (1) An answer may be filed which denies or admits the allegations of the complaint, or which states that the defendant has insufficient information to form a belief and leaves the pleader to his or her proof, and which may set forth the defendant's claims for relief.
- (2) An answer and cross complaint may be filed which denies or admits the allegations of the complaint, or which states that the defendant has insufficient information to form a belief and leaves the pleader to his or her proof, and which alleges the grounds upon which a dissolution, legal separation or annulment is sought by the defendant and specifies therein the claims for relief.

COMMENTARY: The above change is made in light of Public Act 05-10, an act that authorizes same sex civil unions.

Sec. 25-10. —Answer to Cross Complaint

A plaintiff in a dissolution of marriage <u>or civil union</u>, legal separation, or annulment matter seeking to contest the grounds of a cross complaint shall file an answer admitting or denying the allegations of such cross complaint or leaving the pleader to his or her proof. If a decree is rendered on the cross complaint, the judicial authority may award to the plaintiff such relief as is claimed in the complaint.

COMMENTARY: The above change is made in light of Public Act 05-10, an act that authorizes same sex civil unions.

Sec. 25-28. Order of Notice

- (a) On a complaint for dissolution of marriage or civil union, legal separation, or annulment, or on an application for custody or visitation, when the adverse party resides out of or is absent from the state or the whereabouts of the adverse party are unknown to the plaintiff or the applicant, any judge or clerk of the court may make such order of notice as he or she deems reasonable. If such notice is by publication, it shall not include the automatic orders set forth in Section 25-5, but shall instead include a statement that automatic orders have issued in the case pursuant to Section 25-5 and that such orders are set forth in the complaint or the application on file with the court. Such notice having been given and proved, the judicial authority may hear the complaint or the application if it finds that the adverse party has actually received notice that the complaint or the application is pending. If actual notice is not proved, the judicial authority in its discretion may hear the case or continue it for compliance with such further order of notice as it may direct.
- (b) With regard to any postjudgment motion for modification or for contempt or any other motion requiring an order of notice, where the adverse party resides out of or is absent from the state any judge or clerk of the court may make such order of notice as he or she deems reasonable. Such notice having been given and proved, the court may hear the motion if it finds that the adverse party has actually received notice that the motion is pending.

COMMENTARY: The above change is made in light of Public Act 05-10, an act that authorizes same sex civil unions.

Sec. 25-29. Notice of Orders for Support or Alimony

In all dissolution of marriage <u>or civil union</u>, legal separation, annulment, custody or visitation actions, such notice as the judicial authority shall direct shall be given to nonappearing parties of any orders for support or alimony. No such order shall

be effective until the order of notice shall have been complied with or the nonappearing party has actually received notice of such orders.

COMMENTARY: The above change is made in light of Public Act 05-10, an act that authorizes same sex civil unions.

Sec. 25-30. Statements to Be Filed

- (a) At least five days before the hearing date of a motion or order to show cause concerning alimony, support, or counsel fees, or at the time a dissolution of marriage or civil union, legal separation or annulment action or action for custody or visitation is scheduled for a hearing, each party shall file, where applicable, a sworn statement substantially in accordance with a form prescribed by the chief court administrator, of current income, expenses, assets and liabilities. When the attorney general has appeared as a party in interest, a copy of the sworn statements shall be served upon him or her in accordance with Sections 10-12 through 10-17. Unless otherwise ordered by the judicial authority, all appearing parties shall file sworn statements within thirty days prior to the date of the decree. Notwithstanding the above, the court may render pendente lite and permanent orders, including judgment, in the absence of the opposing party's sworn statement.
- (b) At least ten days before the scheduled family special masters session, alternative dispute resolution session, or judicial pretrial, the parties shall serve on each appearing party, but not file with the court, written proposed orders, and, at least ten days prior to the date of the final limited contested or contested hearing, the parties shall file with the court and serve on each appearing party written proposed orders.
- (c) The written proposed orders shall be comprehensive and shall set forth the party's requested relief including, where applicable, the following:
 - (1) a parenting plan;
 - (2) alimony;
 - (3) child support;
 - (4) property division;
 - (5) counsel fees;
 - (6) life insurance;
 - (7) medical insurance; and
 - (8) division of liabilities.
- (d) The proposed orders shall be neither factual nor argumentative but shall, instead, only set forth the party's claims.
- (e) Where there is a minor child who requires support, the parties shall file a completed child support and arrearage guidelines worksheet at the time of any court hearing concerning child support; or at the time of a final hearing in an action for dissolution of marriage or civil union, legal separation, annulment, custody or visitation.
- (f) At the time of any hearing, including pendente lite and postjudgment proceedings, in which a moving party seeks a determination, modification, or enforcement of any alimony or child support order, a party shall submit an Advisement of Rights Re: Wage Withholding Form (JD-FM-71).

COMMENTARY: The above change is made in light of Public Act 05-10, an act that authorizes same sex civil unions.

Sec. 25-32. Mandatory Disclosure and Production

(a) Unless otherwise ordered by the judicial authority for good cause shown, upon request by a party involved in an action for dissolution of marriage or civil union, legal separation, annulment or support, or a postjudgment motion for modification of alimony or support, opposing parties shall exchange the following documents within thirty days of such request:

- (1) all federal and state income tax returns filed within the last three years, including personal returns and returns filed on behalf of any partnership or closelyheld corporation of which a party is a partner or shareholder;
- (2) IRS forms W-2, 1099 and K-1 within the last three years including those for the past year if the income tax returns for that year have not been prepared;
- (3) copies of all pay stubs or other evidence of income for the current year and the last pay stub from the past year;
- (4) statements for all accounts maintained with any financial institution, including banks, brokers and financial managers, for the past 24 months;
- (5) the most recent statement showing any interest in any Keogh, IRA, profit sharing plan, deferred compensation plan, pension plan, or retirement account;
 - (6) the most recent statement regarding any insurance on the life of any party;
- (7) a summary furnished by the employer of the party's medical insurance policy, coverage, cost of coverage, spousal benefits, and COBRA costs following dissolution:
 - (8) any written appraisal concerning any asset owned by either party.
- (b) Such duty to disclose shall continue during the pendency of the action should a party appear. This section shall not preclude discovery under any other provisions of these rules.

COMMENTARY: The above change is made in light of Public Act 05-10, an act that authorizes same sex civil unions.

Sec. 25-51. When Motion for Default for Failure to Appear Does Not Apply

- (a) Any case claiming a dissolution of marriage or civil union, legal separation, or annulment in which the defendant has failed to file an appearance may be assigned a date certain for disposition as an uncontested matter pursuant to Section 25-50. If the defendant has not filed an appearance by the date assigned for disposition, the case may proceed to judgment without further notice to such defendant. Section 17-20 concerning motions for default shall not apply to such cases.
- (b) If the defendant files an appearance by the date assigned for disposition, the presiding judge or a designee shall determine which track the case shall take pursuant to Section 25-50.

COMMENTARY: The above change is made in light of Public Act 05-10, an act that authorizes same sex civil unions.

Sec. 25-58. Reports of Dissolution of Marriage or Civil Union and Annulment

Before a hearing is commenced for a dissolution of marriage or civil union or annulment of marriage or civil union, the parties concerned, or their attorneys, shall provide, on forms prescribed by the chief court administrator and furnished by the clerk, such information as is required by the judges of the superior court.

COMMENTARY: The above change is made in light of Public Act 05-10, an act that authorizes same sex civil unions.

Sec. 25-67. Support Enforcement Services

In cases where the payment of alimony and support has been ordered, a support enforcement officer, where provided by statute, shall:

(1) Whenever there is a default in any payment of alimony or support of children under judgments of dissolution of marriage or civil union or separation, or of support under judgments of support, where necessary, (A) bring an application to a family support magistrate for a rule requiring said party to appear before a family support magistrate to show cause why such party should not be held in contempt, or (B) take such other action as is provided by rule or statute.

- (2) In connection with subdivision (1) above, or at any other time upon direction of a family support magistrate, investigate the financial situation of the parties and report his or her findings thereon to a family support magistrate which may authorize the officer to bring an application for a rule requiring any party to appear before a family support magistrate to show cause why there should not be a modification of the judgment.
- (3) In non-[AFDC] <u>TANF</u> IV-D cases, review child support orders at the request of either parent subject to a support order or, in [AFDC] <u>TANF</u> cases, review child support orders at the request of the bureau of child support enforcement and initiate and facilitate, but not advocate on behalf of either party, an action before a family support magistrate to modify such support order if it is determined upon such review that the order substantially deviates from the child support guidelines established pursuant to General Statutes §§ 46b-215a or 46b-215b. The requesting party shall have the right to such review every three years without proving a substantial change in circumstances; more frequent reviews shall be made only if the requesting party demonstrates a substantial change in circumstances.

COMMENTARY: The above change to subsection (1) is made in light of Public Act 05-10, an act that authorizes same sex civil unions. The change to subsection (3) is a technical amendment that adopts the statutory change replacing "Aid to Families with Dependent Children" with "Temporary Assistance to Needy Families."

AMENDMENTS TO THE JUVENILE RULES

Sec. 30a-5. Dispositional Hearing

- (a) The dispositional hearing may follow immediately upon a conviction or an adjudication.
- (b) The judicial authority may admit into evidence any testimony which is considered relevant to the issue of the disposition, in any form the judicial authority finds of probative value, but no disposition shall be made by the judicial authority until the predispositional study, unless waived, has been submitted. A written predispositional study may be waived by the judicial authority for good cause shown upon the request of the parties, provided that the basis for the waiver and the probation officer's oral summary of any investigation are both placed on the record. The predispositional study shall be presented to the judicial authority and copies thereof shall be provided to all counsel in sufficient time for them to prepare adequately for the dispositional hearing, and, in any event, no less than forty-eight hours prior to the date of the disposition.
- (c) The prosecutor and the child or youth and parent or guardian shall have the right to produce witnesses on behalf of any dispositional plan they may wish to offer.
- (d) Prior to any disposition, the child or youth shall be allowed a reasonable opportunity to make a personal statement to the judicial authority in mitigation of any disposition.

COMMENTARY: The changes to the above rule and to Section 43-7 make uniform the timeframe for filing predispositional studies in juvenile matters and presentence investigations in criminal matters.

AMENDMENTS TO THE CRIMINAL RULES

Sec. 38-4. —Release by Judicial Authority

(a) When any defendant is presented before a judicial authority, such authority shall, in bailable offenses, promptly order the release of such person upon the first

of the following conditions of release found sufficient reasonably to assure the person's appearance in court and, when the crimes charged or the facts and circumstances brought to the attention of the judicial authority suggest that the defendant may pose a risk to the physical safety of any person, that the safety of any person will not be endangered:

- (1) The defendant's execution of a written promise to appear without special conditions;
- (2) The defendant's execution of a written promise to appear with nonfinancial conditions;
- (3) The defendant's execution of a bond without surety in no greater amount than necessary;
- (4) The defendant's deposit with the clerk of the court of an amount of cash equal to 10 percent of the amount of the surety bond set, pursuant to Section 38-8;
- (5) The defendant's execution of a bond with surety in no greater amount than necessary;
- (6) The defendant's execution of a cash bond and his or her deposit with the clerk of the court of cash in the amount of the bond set by the judicial authority in no greater amount than necessary.

In addition to or in conjunction with any of the conditions of release enumerated in this subsection, the judicial authority may impose one or more nonfinancial conditions of release pursuant to subsection (d).

- (b) The judicial authority may, in determining what conditions of release will reasonably assure the appearance of the defendant in court, consider factors (1) through (7) below, and, when the crimes charged or the facts and circumstances brought to the attention of the judicial authority suggest that the defendant may pose a risk to the physical safety of any person, the judicial authority may also consider factors (8) through (10) below:
- (1) The nature and circumstances of the offense, including the weight of the evidence against the defendant;
 - (2) The defendant's record of previous convictions;
 - (3) The defendant's past record of appearance in court after being admitted to bail;
 - (4) The defendant's family ties;
 - (5) The defendant's employment record;
 - (6) The defendant's financial resources, character, and mental condition;
 - (7) The defendant's community ties;
 - (8) The defendant's history of violence;
- (9) Whether the defendant has previously been convicted of similar offenses while released on bond; and
- (10) The likelihood based upon the expressed intention of the defendant that he will commit another crime while released.
- (c) In addition to or in conjunction with any of the conditions enumerated in subdivisions (1) to (6) of subsection (a), the judicial authority may, when it has reason to believe that the defendant is drug-dependent and where necessary, reasonable and appropriate, order the person to submit to a urinalysis drug test and to participate in a program of periodic drug testing and treatment. The results of any such drug test shall not be admissible in any criminal proceeding concerning such defendant.
- (d) If the judicial authority determines that a nonfinancial condition of release should be imposed in addition to or in conjunction with any of the conditions enumerated in subdivisions (1) to (6) of subsection (a) [pursuant to subsection (a)(2)] of this section, the judicial authority shall order the pretrial release of the defendant subject to the least restrictive condition or combination of conditions that the judicial authority determines will reasonably assure the appearance of the defendant in court and, when the crimes charged or the facts and circumstances brought to the attention

of the judicial authority suggest that the defendant may pose a risk to the physical safety of any person, that the safety of any person will not be endangered, which conditions may include an order that he or she do one or more of the following:

- (1) Remain under the supervision of a designated person or organization;
- (2) Comply with specified restrictions on his or her travel, association or place of abode;
- (3) Not engage in specified activities, including the use or possession of a dangerous weapon, an intoxicant or a controlled substance;
- (4) Participate in the zero-tolerance drug supervision program established under General Statutes § 53a-39d;
- (5) Provide sureties of the peace pursuant to General Statutes § 54-56f under supervision of a designated bail commissioner;
- (6) Avoid all contact with an alleged victim of the crime and with a potential witness who may testify concerning the offense;
 - (7) Maintain employment or, if unemployed, actively seek employment;
 - (8) Maintain or commence an educational program;
 - (9) Be subject to electronic monitoring; or
- (10) Satisfy any other condition that is reasonably necessary to assure the appearance of the defendant in court and that the safety of any other person will not be endangered.
- (e) The judicial authority shall state on the record its reasons for imposing any such nonfinancial condition.
- (f) The judicial authority may require that the defendant subject to electronic monitoring pursuant to subsection (d) of this section pay directly to the electronic monitoring service provider a fee for the cost of such electronic monitoring services. If the judicial authority finds that the defendant subject to electronic monitoring is indigent and unable to pay the costs of electronic monitoring services, it shall waive such costs.

COMMENTARY: The above change provides that in addition to or in conjunction with any of the conditions of release enumerated in subsection (a), the judicial authority may impose one or more nonfinancial conditions of release pursuant to subsection (d).

Sec. 43-7. —Persons Receiving Report

The presentence investigation or alternate incarceration assessment report or both shall be provided to the judicial authority, and copies thereof shall be provided to the prosecuting authority and to the defendant or his or her counsel in sufficient time for them to prepare adequately for the sentencing hearing, and in any event, no less than [twenty-four] forty-eight hours prior to the date of the sentencing. Upon request of the defendant, the sentencing hearing shall be continued for a reasonable time if the judicial authority finds that the defendant or his or her counsel did not receive the presentence investigation or alternate incarceration assessment report or both within such time.

COMMENTARY: The changes to the above rule and to Section 30a-5 make uniform the timeframe for filing predispositional studies in juvenile matters and presentence investigations in criminal matters.

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